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This dissertation explores how the syntax and semantics of gradability contribute to 
the understanding of other linguistic phenomena. Within this research agenda, I 
examine three different topics instantiating the interaction between gradability and 
other linguistic notions. The exploration is important not only for studying the 
linguistic properties of these phenomena, but also for understanding theoretical issues 
behind them.  
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the basics of degree semantics and the 
interval-based ontological formalization of degrees. Chapter 2 presents a detailed 
description and syntactic-semantic analysis of the construction in which a possessive 
verb takes a surface degree expression. During the description and analysis, the 
construction is compared to other degree constructions. The interpretation of the 
construction can be derived from the function of the possessive verb interacting with 
the interval-based representation of degrees. My proposal provides additional support 
to the small clause-based analysis of possessive verbs. 
Chapter 3 deals with the interaction between nominal and adjectival gradability, 
through examining size adjectives used as degree modifiers for gradable nouns. In 
particular, I examine the status of the Bigness Generalization, which says that only 
positive size adjectives can degree-modify gradable nouns. I show that the 
 generalization is not categorical, because negative size adjectives indeed can be degree 
modifiers for gradable nouns in certain contexts. In the chapter I propose an analysis 
of the phenomenon at the semantic-pragmatic interface that explains the violable 
nature of the Bigness Generalization. 
Chapter 4 explores the relevance of gradability to the interpretation of weak 
generic sentences best represented by Dutchmen are good sailors. Interpreting such a 
sentence requires restricting the domain of individuals that the sentence quantifies 
over and determining what the underlying predicate is. The first aspect makes 
reference to a contextual standard associated with the population denoted by the 
subject, and the second aspect makes reference to a different standard, which is 
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This dissertation aims to explore how gradability relates to and explains some other linguistic 
phenomena that are kin to this rather broad notion. As a linguistic concept, gradability provides 
one tangible means of manifesting the fundamental human capacity to establish ordering among 
entities according to the extent to which they possess some gradable property. Such ordering is 
an essential component of the human cognitive system, which is able to interact with other parts 
in the system to yield more complex cognitive mechanisms and processes. As a cognitive 
capacity that is intrinsically grounded in human cognition, natural language should, as it does, 
provide strategies to describe the interactions between gradability and other linguistic notions. 
The syntactic and semantic literature has dealt with many different cases in which 
gradability bears upon the understanding of other language phenomena. For example, Dowty 
(1979), Abusch (1986), and Kennedy and Levin (2008) suggested that variable telicity in degree 
achievements with some verbs can duly be linked to the semantic properties of the corresponding 
gradable adjectives from which the verbs are derived. McCready (2009) showed that gradability 
and expressivity are both at work for the enterprise of understanding particles expressing 
emotional attitude and intensification, such as man in the sentence Man, I just passed the exam. 
Some modals, such as probable, possible and certain, appear to encode both modality and 
gradability. One plausible approach to analyzing their semantics is to incorporate the semantics 
of gradable adjectives into a theory of modality. Portner (2009) and Lassiter (2010) constitute 
reasonable recent attempts along these lines.  
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This dissertation deals with three specific topics instantiating the broad range of 
interaction between gradability and other language phenomena. The first topic has to do with the 
semantic interpretation of a construction in which the possessive verb “have”, or its Chinese 
near-equivalent you, takes a degree expression as the surface object. In my analysis I adopt the 
“standard” representation of gradability as ordering of degrees along some scale (Creswell, 1976; 
von Stechow, 1984; Kennedy, 1999, 2001; cf. McConnell-Ginet, 1973; Klein, 1980). In this 
framework, degrees are treated as a primitive semantic artifact that is comparable to individuals, 
events and times. Just like phrases denoting the latter three types of concepts, degree expressions 
also can appear in the object position of the possessive verb “have” and you, as though they stand 
in some abstract possessee-possessor relation with the subject. This “possessive degree” 
construction has an equative interpretation that I will show to be derived from a degree relation 
that the possessive verb establishes between the subject and the object. The degree use of the 
possessive verb has the same semantic interpretation as its other uses. 
The semantic literature on gradability has been mostly confined to the adjectival category. 
However, gradability has been suggested to be a wide-spread cross-categorial property that is 
present in nouns, verbs, and even prepositions (Sapir, 1944; Bolinger, 1972; Doetjes, 1997; 
Kennedy and McNally, 2005; Kennedy and Levin, 2008). The second topic that I will explore in 
this dissertation has to do with the interaction of gradability in the nominal domain with 
gradability in the adjectival domain. More specifically, adjectives that normally express physical 
size can be used to characterize the degree to which gradable nouns of a certain category hold 
(e.g. a big flop and an enormous fan of music). The phenomenon suggests a close analogy 
between modification of nominal gradability and that of adjectival gradability. In particular, the 
use of size adjectives as degree modifiers is subject to a violable constraint that positive size 
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adjectives like big and enormous can serve as degree modifiers for gradable nouns. This 
constraint and exceptions to the constraint have root in the interface between the semantics and 
pragmatics of the scale structure of gradable nouns and of size adjectives used as degree 
modifiers. 
The third topic deals with how some gradable predicates interact with generic 
quantification. The main task is to capture the elusive weak interpretation of one particular 
subset of generic sentences best represented by the Port Royal Puzzle sentence Dutchmen are 
good sailors. Only until recently has it been suggested that the semantics of gradability plays a 
role in understanding such weak generic sentences (Nickel, 2009, 2010a). The interaction is 
evident from two related aspects. First, gradability restricts the domain of individuals that are 
generically quantified over. Second, gradability is an essential component in the predicate of 
such weak generic sentences. I show that the proper interpretation of those sentences should 
combine the two aspects together. 
1.2.Key theoretical assumptions 
1.2.1. Degree semantics 
In this dissertation, I will adopt one dominant framework for understanding gradability proposed 
in the literature (Seuren, 1973; Cresswell, 1973, 1976; von Stechow, 1984; Heim, 1985; 
Bierwisch, 1989; Kennedy, 1999, 2007a; Rett 2008b, among others). Along the lines of such 
works, the semantic interpretation of a gradable predicate makes crucial reference to degree as a 
semantic primitive. A set of degrees can be totally ordered along some dimension and form (part 
of) a scale. Gradable predicates are associated with different types of scale structures, and as 
such they manifest varied linguistic patterns. The major competing alternative to this framework, 
often referred to as the vague predicate analysis (McConnell-Ginet, 1973; Kamp, 1975; Klein, 
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1982; Larson, 1988), makes no recourse to the notion of degree or scale structure. I do not adopt 
the alternative framework, because it has been shown to face serious empirical challenges.  
Within the first broad framework, there are different versions of actual implementations. 
In this dissertation, I adopt the analysis of gradability by assuming that a gradable predicate 
denotes a measure function of the semantic type <e, d> from an individual to the individual’s 
actual degree on the relevant scale specified by the gradable predicate, with d being used as the 
semantic type label for degrees. The measure function corresponding to the adjective tall, for 
example, takes an individual as its argument and yields the individual’s height.  
As such, the gradable predicate does not denote a property. It cannot directly combine 
with an argument to yield a proposition. Rather, the predicate has to be transformed into a 
property of individuals by being the argument to a degree morpheme that most typically specifies 
some relation between the degree resulting from the subject argument being applied to the 
gradable predicate and another degree that is either contextually or linguistically supplied. The 
degree morpheme can be overtly realized in the form of such degree modifiers as very, extremely, 
how, more, and most. It also can be a covert POS morpheme that behaves on a par with overt 
degree morphology (Kennedy, 1999, 2007a). The general structure of intransitive degree 
morphology can be represented as in (1), in which I use the covert POS morpheme for illustration1. 
In the definition of the morpheme (2), STND is a function that yields the contextual standard of 
comparison for a gradable predicate. Transitive degree morphology involves an extra level of 
projection corresponding to the second argument (e.g. the than constituent for comparative 
sentences) 
 
                                                             
1 Degree morphemes such as very, extremely, a bit, and POS involve the degree of one individual argument, and in 
this sense, they are all intransitive. By contrast, degree morphemes like more and as…as involve degrees of two 
individuals and are transitive. 
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(1) a. John is tall.  
b. STND (tall) ≤ tall (John)                  
 
     DPe                     VP: λx. STND (tall) ≤ tall (x)                                           
                      
              John               is                         DegP<e, t> : λx. STND (tall) ≤ tall (x)                  
 
                                                        Deg<<e, d>, <e, t>>                 AP<e,d> 
                                                           [[ POS ]]                                  [[ tall ]]     
                                                  λg<e, d> λx. STND (g) ≤ g(x)       tall        
(2) [[ POS ]]  = λg<e, d> λx. STND (g) ≤ g(x)     
1.2.2. Ontology of degrees 
Another important hypothesis often employed in the literature on degree and gradability is that 
degrees are intervals on a scale, rather than points (von Stechow, 1984; Kennedy, 1999, 2001; 
Schwarzschild and Wilkinson, 2002, among others). Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002) 
motivated this ontological representation of degrees by considering sentences in which a 
quantifier occurs in the scope of a comparative (e.g. He is taller than exactly three friends are.). 
Kennedy (1999, 2001) made a similar proposal by discussing the Cross-polar Anomaly (CPA), 
comparative sentences formed out of a pair of antonymous adjectives (e.g. *The table is heavier 
than the book is light.). The interval-based formalization makes a structural distinction between 
positive degrees and negative degrees. In particular, antonym pairs of gradable predicates “map 
identical arguments onto the same degrees… but they introduce the opposite ordering relations” 
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(Kennedy, 2001: p38). For example, the “positive” and “negative” degrees (e.g. length vs. 
shortness) of an entity x on some scale S correspond to complementary regions on S.   
 
S: 0                       poss(x)                      ●                               negs(x)                       ∞ 
Figure 1: ontology of degrees 
  
The formalization has conceptual and theoretical import. For instance, it provides 
appealing explanation of the puzzle that negative adjectives are incompatible with measure 
phrases (e.g. *six feet short vs. six feet tall). Intuitively, measure phrases are understood to have 
positive polarity and cannot combine with an adjective of the opposite polarity. Degree 
comparison is meaningful only when the degree arguments have the same polarity of ordering.  
CPA sentences involve comparison of degrees of opposite polarities, and that is why they are 
unacceptable. 
1.3.Outlines 
1.3.1. Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 provides a syntactic-semantic interface analysis of a construction in which possessive 
verbs take degree expressions in the surface object position. Empirical data on which my 
analysis is based are the degree use of the Chinese possessive verb you ‘have’, because the verb 
is more productive in taking a degree expression than its English counterpart “have”. More 
specifically, you can appear in the “X + you + Y + G” construction to express comparison 
between two individuals X and Y with respect to the property associated with the gradable 
predicate G (3). The comparative relation shows similar patterns to the English as…as equative 
construction and essentially expresses an equative one. I will propose that the degree use of you 
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specifies a subset/subinterval relation between X and Y along the dimension specified by G. The 
syntactic representation and semantic function of the equative use of you are closely parallel to 
its other uses. 
 
(3) zhangsan    you     ta         gege               da/gao/mang/jiji/taorenxihuan       
    John       have    his    elder brother     big/tall/busy/active/pleasing 
‘John appears to be as big/tall/busy/active/pleasing as his elder brother.’ 
 
My analysis of the degree use of you is based on the assumption that you, whether in the 
degree use or non-degree uses, takes a small clause complement and assumes the semantic role 
of abstraction (Sæbø, 2009; Iatridou, 1996; Ritter and Rosen, 1997; among others). The surface 
object of the degree use of you, “Y + G”, is covertly augmented by a covert predicate P which 
provides a variable for the variable binder introduced by the Quantifier Raised subject of you. In 
addition, the predicate P contains some relation that eventually links X and Y by way of 
comparing the two entities along the dimension specified by G. Given the nature of comparative 
constructions in Chinese, the relation necessarily specifies that Y be a subset/subinterval of X 
along the dimension specified by G. My analysis captures the meaning of the “X + you + Y + G” 
construction, viz. that X’s degree of being G equals or exceeds Y’s degree of being G. My 
analysis suggests that the degree use of possessive verbs has similar syntactic representation and 
semantic interpretation to their other uses. 
1.3.2. Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 deals with the phenomenon in which a size adjective modifies a gradable noun and 
characterizes the degree to which the latter holds of an individual (4). There are two constraints 
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that regulate this degree use of size adjectives. According to Morzycki (2005, 2009), the so-
called Position Generalization requires that degree modification of gradable nouns by size 
adjectives is available only for size adjectives that appear in the attributive position, but not for 
size adjectives that appear in the predicate position (5). The Bigness Generalization says that 
only positive size adjectives like big, huge, and enormous can have degree uses when they 
modify gradable nouns, while negative size adjectives like small and tiny cannot (6). Morzycki 
(2005, 2009) took both generalizations to be categorical and adopted a purely semantic approach 
to analyzing them. 
 
(4) He is an enormous enthusiast of replica Rolex.       
=degree His enthusiasm for replica Rolex is enormous. 
(5) The idiot standing over there is big.   
!= The person standing over there is a big idiot. 
(6) John is a small idiot.  
!= John’s degree of idiocy is small. 
 
In Chapter 3, I will cite empirical evidence to suggest that the Bigness Generalization is a 
violable constraint. Negative size adjectives indeed can degree-modify gradable nouns in some 
contexts. Morzycki’s purely semantic analysis of size adjectives as degree modifiers cannot 
account for the violability. In addition, his analysis crucially relies on the unjustified assumption 
that measure phrases such as six feet receive the “at least” interpretation. It also makes several 
wrong predictions. I will propose an alternative analysis that lies at the interface between the 
semantics and pragmatics of gradability. Positive size adjectives always can act as degree 
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modifiers for gradable nouns, because the modification has well-defined semantics no matter 
what the pragmatic contexts are like. The scale structure of a negative size adjective differs from 
its positive counterpart in terms of polarity. The standards for an antonym pair of size adjectives 
each stand in a relation to the standard of the gradable noun they modify. What the relation is 
like depends on how large the extension gap between the standards for the antonym pair of size 
adjectives is. The negative size adjective can serve as a degree modifier when the extension gap 
between the standards for the antonym pair does not exist or is contextually small. In such cases, 
the standard of the negative adjective with respect to the gradable noun falls above the standard 
for the gradable noun. The modification of the gradable noun by the negative size adjective does 
not denote an empty set and, as such, is acceptable. On the other hand, when the contextual 
extension gap between the standards for the antonym pair of size adjective is contextually large 
so that that the standard of the negative adjective with respect to the gradable noun falls below 
the standard of the gradable noun, the negative size adjective cannot act as a degree modifier for 
the gradable noun. My analysis makes use of the contextual notion of “extension gap” and is 
more pragmatic in nature. It correctly allows room for contextual variation in negative size 
adjectives used as degree modifiers.   
1.3.3. Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4, I will address a small subset of generic sentences of the form Ks are Q that are best 
represented by the Port Royal Puzzle sentence in (7). This subset of generic sentences is special 
in having rather weak truth conditions: most Dutchmen do not know how to sail, and a fortiori 
do not sail well. I take the sentence in (7) as being representative of generic sentences with weak 
truth conditions. I attempt to answer two interrelated questions about the semantic interpretation 
of this particular sentence. The first question is which sub-group of Dutchmen is relevant for 
 10 
 
evaluating the sentence, and the second question is how good at sailing this sub-group of 
Dutchmen should be to verify the sentence.  
 
(7) Dutchmen are good sailors.                                           
 
I will first show that the most crucial entailment pattern often taken to provide crucial 
evidence for refuting a quantificational analysis of weak generic sentences can receive an 
alternative explanation. It does not argue against an analysis of generic sentences that makes 
reference to the GEN(eric) operator. Then I will review two proposals about the semantic 
interpretation of weak generic sentences, by Cohen (1999, 2001) and Nickel (2009, 2010a) 
respectively. Both analyses face theoretical flaws and empirical challenges, but each provides 
some good motivations for the analysis that I would like to pursue. My analysis employs the 
GEN quantifier, restricts the domain of generic quantification, and incorporates degree 
comparison in the underlying predicate. In the interpretation, I make use of two alternative sets, 
ALT(K) and ALT (Q), which play an essential role in determining two standards. One of the two 
standards, the “internal” one, specifies the threshold for those individuals in the denotation of K 
˄ ALT(Q) to meet in order for them to qualify as being Q evaluated within the population 
denoted by Ks. The other standard, the “external” one, specifies the threshold for those 
individuals in the denotation of ALT(K) ˄ ALT(Q) to meet in order for them to qualify as being 
Q evaluated within the population denoted by ALT(K). The restriction on the quantification 
domain makes reference to the “internal” standard, and the degree comparison in the underlying 
predicate makes reference to the “external” standard.  
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The semantics of the Port Royal Puzzle sentence in (7) requires that there be generic-
many Dutchmen whose sailing skills are good relative to their fellow countrymen exceed the 
Dutch-external standard of having good sailing skills, and at the same time the Dutch-internal 
standard of having good sailing skills exceeds the Dutch-external counterpart. My “dual-





Degree Expressions as Surface Objects of Possessive Verbs 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter is devoted to examining the degree use of possessive verbs. I will mainly focus on 
what I call the possessive equative construction in Chinese. I choose to draw on Chinese data 
because the Chinese possessive verb you appears to be more productive than “have” in the 
degree use. This use of possessive verbs has so far received little discussion in descriptive or 
theoretical literature. Therefore, in this chapter I will devote some space to providing a detailed 
description of the use and its most essential linguistic properties. I will also offer an analysis of 
the syntactic representation and semantic interpretation of the phenomenon.  
2.1.1 Diverse meanings of “have” 
Before introducing Chinese data, let us start with some more familiar data involving the English 
possessive verb “have”. It has been observed that “have” can appear in a variety of constructions 
and have a rather unconstrained range of meanings (Cowper, 1989; Belvin, 1993; Iatridou, 1996; 
Ritter and Rosen, 1997). The surface object of “have” can be an indefinite nominal phrase that 
denotes an individual, an event, a time, or even a phrase supplemented by a predicate (1-4). 
 
(1) a. John has a new car.                                                                       
      b. John had a shock just now.    
      c. John has three visitors today.                                                    
(2) a. John had a talk with his son.                                                      
      b. The fans are having a party in celebration of the team’s victory. 
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(3) a. I finally had a few minutes to formulate a thought.                         
      b. They had the whole morning to revise the document.      
(4) a. Mary still has a grandparent alive. 
      b. The boy had his bicycle stolen. 
 
The verb “have” prima facie has different meanings in the various contexts. Though a 
most common reading of the verb is a possessive one, it only accounts for one reading among the 
broad range of meanings that have-sentences can express. On the intuitive level, the verb appears 
to mean “to possess” in (1a), “to experience” in (1b), “to receive as a guest” in (1c), “to engage 
or take part in” in (2a), “to carry out or hold” in (2b), “to make at one’s disposal” in (3a) and (3b). 
What the verb means in (4a-b) is not as clear. It seems that the two sentences can be paraphrased 
without any trace of “have”. The former means that “Mary’s grandparent is still alive”, and the 
latter means that “The boy’s bicycle was stolen”.   
2.1.2 “Have” taking a degree object        
The four different categories of objects that “have” takes in (1) through (4) correspond to, on a 
pre-theoretical level, individuals, events, intervals of time, and states of affairs. They are notions 
of different basic semantic types. There is still another basic semantic type that plays an 
important role in understanding natural language: degrees. In spite of the vast syntactic and 
semantic differences that exist among all the different semantic types, the domains they represent 
show strong cognitive and linguistic similarities (Chierchia, 1984, 1998; Partee, 1973; Heim, 
2000; Rett, 2008b). Since “have” can take a surface object that denotes an individual, an event, a 
temporal interval, or a state of affairs, a natural question to ask is whether it also can take a 
surface object that denotes a degree. 
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The answer appears to be positive, a point which is already hinted in Bierwisch (1989: 
p110). The sentences in (5-7) all involve a phrase that prima facie denotes a degree. There are 
reasons to claim that the objects of have in the sentences denote some degree notions, rather than 
individuals. First, have usually cannot take a bare definite individual-denoting phrase as its 
surface object (8). The sentences in (5-6) both involve definite phrases embedded under have. 
This suggests that the two phrases do not denote artifacts of the individual type. Second, it is not 
acceptable to coordinate, say, a height of 4 feet and a toy teddy bear. If the former phrase has the 
same individual type of semantic interpretation as the latter, the coordination should be 
acceptable. This further suggests that a height of 4 feet does not have a denotation of the 
individual type. Third, the object of this particular use of have can be an argument of a 
comparative sentence that compares degrees, as evident by the sentence in (10). Given all the 
evidence, it is natural to conclude that the object denotes not an individual, but a degree notion. 
 
(5) Due to malnutrition, the boy only has the weight of a nine-month-old baby. 
(6) Joan’s three kids are all short. None of them has their mother’s height.  
(7) The river has a depth of 50 meters and a width of 25 meters.  
(8) *John has Peter’s friends.                                                (Gutiérrez-Rexach, 2006:  (60a)) 
(9) *The boy has a toy teddy bear and a height of 4 feet. 
(10) ?The river has an average depth of 50 feet, which is less than a depth of 50 meters.  
 
The sentences in (5-7) involve dimension nouns (weight and width). Degrees associated 
with these dimensions usually can be measured by measure phrases (e.g. 6 lbs, dozens of meters, 
etc). The scales of such dimensions are often assumed to contain units of measurement 
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(Bierwisch 1989). There are another set of nominal phrases that are associated with scales on a 
dimension but with units of measurement. They can take an argument of the individual type to 
yield a degree on the relevant dimension. Expressions that express such degrees, which generally 
cannot be measured by a measure phrase, also can serve as the surface object of have. For 
instance, his love of the land in (11) measures the extent of affection that the old man shows for 
the land. However, there is no natural unit to measure degrees of affection. The most natural 
interpretation of (11) is a degree one: the old man’s son did not love the land as much as the old 
man did. For (12), the object of have means something like “the degree to which a preschool 
teacher is patient”.  
 
(11) The old man’s only son did not have his love of the land and left to work in the city. 
(12) If you cannot have the patience of a preschool teacher, you should not apply for the job. 
 
The claim that the object of this particular use of have denotes a degree becomes even 
clearer against the observation of such sentences as in (13-14). The objects of have in the 
sentences are both headed by the noun degree, and as such they unequivocally denote degrees.  
 
(13) Everyone has some degree of instinctive cruelty. 
(14) Not all bamboo has the same degree of hardness.  
 
 Given my claim that have can take an object that denotes a degree, a natural ensuing 
question is whether a measure phrase, which canonically denotes a degree, can appear as the 
object of have. The answer is negative, as evident by the ungrammaticality of (15). However, the 
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ungrammaticality of such sentences does not undermine the claim. Rather, I hypothesize that the 
ungrammaticality of sentences like (15) arises from a syntactic requirement of the English verb 
have: it cannot sub-categorize for measure phrases.  
 
(15) *The machine needs to have at least ten meters. 
 
There has been extensive discussion in the literature with regard to the syntactic structure 
and semantic function of have. However, little attention has been devoted to the use of have 
which embeds a degree-denoting expression as the surface object. The phenomenon raises 
several interesting questions. Is the underlying object of have the same as its surface degree-
denoting object? If so, how does the subject enter into a relation with the object in a 
compositional manner? If not, what extra covert element is involved in the underlying object? 
What is the syntactic configuration and semantic function of the degree use of have?  Is this use 
the same as the other uses in terms of the structure and meaning? In this chapter, I extend Sæbø’s 
(2009) small clause-based analysis of have to the degree use of have. The gist of the idea is that 
the object of this use of have is covertly “supplemented” by a predicate that specifies a 
subset/subinterval relation between degrees for two individuals. The verb takes a small clause as 
its real object. It makes no real semantic contribution to the meaning of the sentence in which it 
appears. My analysis suggests that have has a uniform syntactic and semantic function regardless 
of what type of surface object it takes.   
My analysis of possessive verbs embedding a degree-denoting expression primarily 
draws data from Chinese. I choose to use Chinese data because the counterpart of have in the 
language is more productive in taking a degree-denoting expression as its surface object. In 
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addition, by drawing on Chinese data I hope to bring some hitherto under-discussed 
crosslinguistic data on possessive verbs to the attention of theoretical linguists.  
In the next section, I will first describe the construction in which the Chinese counterpart 
of the English have (i.e. you) taking a degree expression as its surface object. In Section 3 I show 
that the construction expresses an equative relation between two degrees. It has similar properties 
to the as…as equative construction in English. Reflecting this similarity, I call the construction 
the possessive equative construction. In Section 4, I review Sæbø’s analysis of the English have 
(in its non-degree uses). The essence of his analysis is that the object of have is always a small 
clause, either overt or covert; have contributes abstraction and transforms its small clause object 
into a predicate. In Section 5, I show that the non-degree uses of you show similar empirical 
patterns to the non-degree uses of have, and the small clause analysis, originally developed based 
on the English have, applies to cases in which you takes various kinds of non-degree objects. In 
Section 6, I will extend the small clause analysis to the possessive equative construction: the 
construction denotes a subset/subinterval relation between two degrees on the same scale.  
Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Chinese data on the degree use of you 
2.2.1 Introduction  
In English, have is just one of the several lexical items that can express possession. Other such 
lexical items include own, possess, and be in possession of. These lexical items do not have the 
same range of uses as have. As indicated above, the English verb have can take various types of 
objects and appears to have a diverse range of meanings. By contrast, own, possess, and in 
possession of are restricted to express ownership, either in the strict sense or in a broadly-
construed sense (such as physical access as in He possesses magic powers). In particular, while it 
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is perfect for have to take a degree-denoting object, the other possessive predicates cannot be 
used in a parallel fashion (16-17). 
 
(16) *The boy does not own/does not possess/is not in possession of his mother’s height. 
(17) *Everyone owns/possesses/is in possession of a degree of desire to seclude.  
            
Chinese behaves in a parallel fashion in this respect. Several lexical items in the language 
have possession as their core meaning: you ‘have’, yongyou ‘possess’, zhanyou ‘possess, occupy’ 
and xiangyou ‘possess and enjoy (rights, prestige, privileges, etc). Of these verbs, you is the only 
one that expresses meanings other than ownership or possession in a rather broad sense. The verb 
you can take objects of different basic types and express possession, location, existence, the part-
whole relation, etc. The sentences in (18-20) illustrate some uses of you that lack equivalents for 
the other possessive verbs. More examples will be given later in the chapter when I discuss the 
similarity between the Chinese you and the English have. 
 
(18) xuexiao  tiyuguan  mingtian    hui    you/*zhanyou/*xiangyou/*yongyou   yi  chang  bisai.  
          school    stadium   tomorrow   will   have/*occupy/*enjoy/*possess        one    CL  match 
         ‘There will be a game in the school stadium tomorrow.’      
(19) yisheng  jintian  zhi   you/*zhanyou/*yongyou  ban  ge   xiaoshi   de     kongxian  shijian. 
       doctor   today   only   have/occupy/*possess       half   CL    hour   MOD    free         time 





(20) na    ge    fangjian  you//*zhanyou/xiangyou/*yongyou   si       shan   chuanghu 
         that   CL   room     have/*occupy/*enjoy/*possess          four      CL      window 
         ‘The room has four windows.’ 
    
One particularly interesting aspect about you is that it is very productive in taking a 
degree expression as its surface object. More specifically, you can appear in the construction “X 
+ you + Y + G(radable predicate)”, to express comparison between X and Y with respect to their 
degrees along the dimensions specified by the gradable predicate G. The sentences in (21-22) 
illustrate the general pattern. For the sentence in (21), zhangsan ‘John’ corresponds to the X 
element, ta gege ‘his brother’ the Y element, and gao ‘tall’ the G element. The sentence means 
that John exceeds or equals his brother in terms of height. For the sentence in (22), the Y element 
is liu yingchi ‘six feet’. Its meaning is that John’s height equals or exceeds six feet, with an 
implicature that John is exactly six feet tall.  
 
(21) zhangsan    you      ta        gege       gao    
   John        have     his     brother     tall 
‘John is as tall as his elder brother.’ 
(22) zhangsan   you     liu    yingchi     gao.    
          John         have    six      feet         tall 
          ‘John is at least six feet tall.’ 
2.2.2 Comparability between X and Y 
The properties of the possessive equative construction have been rarely discussed in the literature. 
It is worthwhile to spend some space discussing a few essential properties of the individual 
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components in the construction. They will prove to be helpful in the later analysis. First, on the 
intuitive level the construction compares X’s degree on the dimension specified by the gradable 
predicate G against Y (when Y is a measure phrase) or against Y’s degree on G (when Y denotes 
an individual, an event, etc). When X and Y both denote an individual, an event, etc, for the 
comparison to be meaningful, X and Y must be comparable with respect to the dimension or 
dimension perspective specified by G 2. If X or Y cannot be associated with a degree on the G 
dimension, the resulting sentence is either infelicitous or has to be interpreted in some 
metaphorical sense. The internal beauty of a person is different from the external beauty of an 
astronomical phenomenon. This explains the oddness of the sentence in (23) 3. In order to make 
the sentence acceptable, you in it can be changed to xiang ‘like’, a preposition which is often 
used to introduce metaphors. The sentence in (24) is at best marginal. To the extent it is 
acceptable, it only can be interpreted as an emphatic way to say that John’s sister is not smart. 
 
(23) %tade   xinling    you     tian   shang   de    xingxing    name     mei 
    her    heart       have    sky     in     MOD     star         that    beautiful 
(24) %shitou      dou      you     zhangsan     de        jiejie    congming 
     stone      even     have     John        MOD     sister     smart 
‘Even stone is as smart as John’s sister.’  
 
When the comparability requirement is met, the exact denotations of X and Y are flexible. 
They can be expressions that denote an individual (25-26), an event (27), or even a time (28).  
                                                             
2 A gradable predicate can be ambiguous and associate with more than one dimension perspective. For example, mei 
‘beautiful’ can describe the inner beauty of an individual or the external beauty of a thing. I take them to be two 
separate dimension perspectives.    
3 In this chapter I use the ‘*’ symbol to indicate ungrammaticality, and the ‘%’ symbol to indicate infelicity. When 
the two cases converge, I use the ‘*’ symbol. 
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(25) zhangsan    mei      you       mali       xihuan     xue        yuyanxue 
John        not      have      Mary         like      study       linguistics 
‘John does not like linguistics as much as Mary does.’ 
(26) zhe     zhong     pingguo     zhi     you    pingpang      qiu     da 
          this     kind       apple        only    have   pingpong     ball    big 
          ‘This kind of apple is only as big as a Ping-Pong ball.’ 
(27) paobu     zenmehui     you         tiqiu            youqu? 
             run        how come    have     play soccer     fun 
           ‘How come running is as fun as playing soccer?’ 
(28) xianzai         henduo     jiating       dou     mei     you    guoqu     youqian      le 
            nowadays      many       families     all      not     have   before    wealthy       LE. 
             ‘Nowadays many families are not as wealthy as before.’ 
 
In addition, the Y element can be a relative clause (29). I do not think that this case causes a 
challenge to the claim that X and Y must be able to be compared with respect to G, because 
Mary’s height and the height that I thought to be associated with Mary are comparable.  
 
(29) mali    mei    you      wo   xiangxiang    de      piaoliang 
            Mary  not      have      I       imagine    MOD    beautiful 
           ‘Mary is not as beautiful as I thought.’     
2.2.3 Y being a measure phrase 
In addition to being a phrase that denotes an individual, an event, etc, the Y element also can be a 
measure phrase. In such cases, the possessive equative construction says that what X measures 
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on the dimension specified by G equals or exceeds the denotation of Y. For example, the 
sentence in (30) specifies the thickness of the book to be at least 20 centimeters, and the sentence 
in (31) says that the sword weighs tens of kilograms.  
 
(30) na      ben    shu     you    ershi        limi            hou 
      that    CL   book   have   twenty   centimeter    thick 
    ‘The book is as thick as 20 centimeters.’ 
(31) zhe  bing   duanjian   you      ji          shi     gongjin      zhong 
            this   CL    dagger    have   several    ten     kilogram     heavy 
           ‘The dagger weights tens of kilograms.’ 
 
 When the Y element is a measure phrase, the gradable predicate G can be omitted if the 
linguistic or extra-linguistic context precludes ambiguity with regard to what dimension X is 
measured against. For (32), the first clause makes depth of the river solely relevant in the 
utterance context, the dimensional adjective shen ‘deep’ does not have to appear in the 
complement of you in the second clause. For (33), because “kilogram” can only associate with 
the dimension of weight, the dimensional adjective zhong ‘heavy’ is omissible. 
 
(32) bingquan    xiao     hu     de       shui     hen   qian,       zhi    you    yi    mi    (shen). 
Bingquan   small   lake  MOD  water  very  shallow  only  have  one   meter  deep  





(33) na     ge   baobao   chusheng   shi      zhi      you     liang     gongjin     (zhong)       
         that   CL   baby       born        when   only     have   two       kilogram   heavy 
          ‘The baby weighed just two kilograms when he was born.’ 
2.2.4 Omissibility of Y 
When the speaker describes a degree with the use of gestures, or when the linguistic context has 
already made some degree prominent, the Y element can be omitted. In such cases, a 
demonstrative pronoun, such as zheme/zheban/zheyang ‘this’ and name/naban/nayang ‘that’, is 
mandatory and normally receives focus intonation. In addition, the gradable predicate G can no 
longer be omitted. The sentence in (34) can be used when the speaker shows a ping-pong ball to 
the hearer and intends for the hearer to know that she is comparing the size of pears to the size of 
the ball. For the sentence in (35), name da in the second clause refers to 18 years old, which has 
been made prominent by the first clause.  
 
(34) houyuan      li         de         lizi       yijing      zhang   de    you    zheme   da     le    
         backyard   inside   MOD    pear     already    grow    DE   have     this     big   LE 
        ‘The pears in the backyard have grown as much as this big.’ 
(35) ta   sahuangshuo   ziji    shiba      le;   zhaogongde   zhidao   ta   mei   you   name   da 
         he     tell a lie       self   eighteen  LE     recruiter      know     he   not   have   that    big 
       ‘She lied that she was already 18, but the recruiter knew that she was not that old.’ 
2.2.5 G must be gradable 
Because the possessive equative construction compares X and Y with respect to their degrees on 
the dimension specified by G, G has to be an element that expresses a gradable notion. The 
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sentence in (36) is ungrammatical precisely because a thing is either imported or domestic, and 
nothing can fall between. Similarly, the ungrammaticality of the sentence in (37) is due to the 
fact that the adjective bingleng ‘ice-cold’ is not a gradable adjective, as evidenced from the fact 
that the adjective cannot be modified by degree modifiers like youdian ‘somewhat’, feichang 
‘extraordinarily’, and jile ‘extremely’.  
 
(36)  *zhe    ge      paizi     de    kafei   mei    you     na     ge    paizi      jinkou.  
               this    CL    brand    DE   coffee  not   have   that   CL   brand    imported 
            ‘*This brand of coffee is at least as imported at that one.’ 
(37) *tade    shou      you      shitou          bingleng.  
              his       hand    have      stone      ice-cold, freezing  
           ‘His hand is as cold as a stone.’ 
 
When this gradability requirement is met, the G element can be an adjective, adverb, or 
verb phrase, as indicated by the example sentences above. The sentences in (21), (26), and (27) 
all involve an adjective as the G element. The sentence in (25) has a verb phrase as the G 
element4,5. The sentences in (38-39) illustrate cases where the G element is an adverb phrase. 
                                                             
4  It has been a wide-spread idea that in Chinese adjectives can be analyzed as belonging to the category of 
intransitive stative verb. Evidence crucial for this idea includes adjectives functioning as a predicate without a 
copula and the presence of the modification marker de before adjectives used as adnominal modifiers. Paul (2005) 
argued that adjectives should be recognized as a separate part of speech in Chinese. I adopt Paul’s analysis here.  
5 Examples of gradable verbs include like, want, understand, and respect. They can be modified by degree modifiers 
like very much and a lot, for example. These verbs are gradable and determine an associated scale on their own. For 
example, like is associated with a scale on which elements are degrees of being kind and friendly, and understand 
with a scale whose elements correspond to how well a person comprehends something. There are other verbs which 
prima facie express gradable notions but are not gradable on their own. For example, the verb work can be modified 
by a lot, but it is not a gradable verb, because there is no inherent scale associated with it. It can be modified by 
degree modifiers, because there are other elements in the event structure that may be gradable. For example, the 
sentence in (i) can be true when the speaker worked on many things or for a long time. It is the number of things or 




(38) Zhangsan    pao     de      you      lisi    (pao   de)    kuai 
             Zhangsan    run     DE    have    Lisi     run   DE    fast 
           ‘Zhangsan runs at least as fast as Lisi does.’  
(39) Na     jian    shiqing    zhangsan     chuli     de     you     lisi    (chuli     de)    tuodang. 
         That   CL    matter      Zhangsan   handle   DE    have   Lisi    handle   DE   properly 
        ‘Zhangsan handled the matter as properly as Lisi did.’  
2.2.6 The optional presence of demonstrative pronouns  
A demonstrative pronoun such as zheme/zheyang/zheban ‘this’ and name/nayang/naban ‘that’ 
can intervene between Y and G, and their presence does not affect the meaning of the sentences. 
The sentence in (40) minimally differs from the sentence in (21) in containing the demonstrative 
pronoun name ‘that’, and the two sentences have the same meaning. As in many other languages, 
Chinese demonstrative pronouns have an additional use as a degree modifier roughly meaning 
‘so, very’. This additional use is not the meaning at stake in the possessive equative construction. 
The evidence is obvious: changing the demonstrative pronoun in a possessive equative sentence 
to similar degree modifiers like hen ‘very’ and feichang ‘extraordinarily’ would yield an 
ungrammatical sentence.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
(i) I worked a lot today.  
 
Of course, real gradable verbs can act as the G element in the possessive equative construction. For a verb that is not 
inherently gradable, only predicates describing the relevant gradable elements (e.g. duration and quantity) in its 
event structure can be the G element. The verb itself cannot serve as the G element. For example, while (ii) is an 
acceptable sentence in Chinese, (iii) is ungrammatical.  
 
(ii) zhangsan   jingtian   gongzuo   mei      you         ta        gege               duo                 /  shijian   chang 
John             today     work        not      have       his   elder brother    many/much           time      long 
‘John did not work as much/long as his elder brother.’ 
(iii) *zhangsan   jingtian     mei      you       ta         gege               gongzuo 
    John         today        not      have      his    elder brother       work 
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(40) zhangsan    you     ta      gege      name   gao    
   John        have   his     brother    that    tall 
‘John is as tall as his elder brother.’ 
(41) zhangsan   mei     you       mali     name   xihuan   xue    yuyanxue 
John       not     have      Mary    that        like    study   linguistics 
            ‘John does not like linguistics as much as Mary does.’ 
2.2.7 G cannot be modified by a degree modifier  
As indicated in the previous subsection, the G element in “X + you + Y + G” cannot be subject to 
modification by adverbial degree modifiers like hen ‘very’, youdian ‘a bit’, or feichang ‘very 
much’ (42-43). The overall ban of degree modifiers in the construction points to the conclusion 
that demonstrative pronouns, when appearing in the construction, do not modify the degree to 
which G holds. Rather, they behave like a pronominal to identify a degree available in the 
linguistic context.  
 
(42) zhangsan   you       ta           gege            (*hen)       gao. 
            John       have    his     elder   brother      very        tall 
(43) zhangsan   pao   de     you     mali    kuai     (*de    duo)    /  (*yidian)  
   John       run     DE     have   Mary   fast    DE   much         a  bit 
2.2.8 The status of dimension nouns as G  
It has been pointed out above that the gradable predicate G specifies the dimension against which 
to measure X’s and Y’s degrees. However, the G element generally cannot be a dimension noun 
like zhongliang ‘weight’ and gaodu ‘height’. Changing a G element that is a gradable adjective 
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to the corresponding noun expressing the same dimension information would generally give rise 
to ungrammaticality. For instance, the sentence in (44) involves the dimension noun gaodu as the 
G element. The phrase yaoming de gaodu is acceptable on its own. The ungrammaticality of the 
sentence is attributable to yaoming de gaodu being embedded under the possessive verb you. Its 
ungrammaticality stands in clear contrast with the sentence in (21). Likewise, the Chinese 
sentence in (45a) is not grammatical. Comparing it to (45b), its unacceptability appears to stem 
from the object of you containing a dimension noun.  
 
(44) zhangsan     feichang            gao,   */?? ta     you        yaoming        de     gaodu  
  John       extraordinarily      tall            he    have      Yao Ming    MOD     height 
 ‘John is extraordinarily tall. He has Yao Ming’s height.’ 
(45) a. *wo    laopo     dui          che      mei      you     wo      de      reqing       (chengdu) 
                  my   wife     towards     car       not      have     me   MOD   passion        degree 
              ‘My wife does not have the same (level of) passion for cars as I have’  
           b.  wo   laopo     dui        che   mei     you    wo     reqing 
                my   wife    towards   car   not      have     me     passionate 
              ‘My wife is not passionate about car as I do.’ 
       
In the meantime, it is worthwhile to point out that a special type of dimension nouns 
indeed can appear as the G element. In Chinese, some dimension nouns are formed out of a pair 
of antonymous gradable adjectives. For reasons irrelevant for the present purpose, such nouns do 
not require the presence of the modification marker de to introduce the modifier. They can 
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appear immediately after the Y element without de 6. A possessive equative sentence with a noun 
of this class as the G element generally has the same meaning as its equivalent with the 
unmarked positive element of the antonymous pair. For example, the sentence in (46) has the 
same interpretation as the counterpart in which the G element is da ‘big’. Similarly, replacing cu-
xi ‘thick-thin’ with cu ‘thick’ does not affect the meaning for the sentence in (47). Other such 
dimension nouns include changduan ‘long-short, length’ and shenqian ‘deep-shallow, depth’.  
 
(46)  na       ge       mugu         you     zuqiu             da-xiao  
 that    CL   mushroom   have    soccer ball    size (= big-small) 
 ‘The mushroom is as big as a (typical) soccer ball.’ 
(47) mei         ke     shu     dou     you      wankou             cu-xi 
         every     CL    tree     all     have    bowl-mouth     thickness(=thick-thin) 
          ‘Every tree is as thick as a bowl.’ 
 
Not all nouns that are formed out of a pair of adjective antonyms can appear in place of 
the corresponding positive size adjective in the possessive equative construction. For example, 
heibai ‘black-white’ and meichou ‘beautiful-ugly’ cannot be used in such a way, as suggested by 
the ungrammaticality of (48). They differ from daxiao ‘size’ and cuxi ‘thickness’ in that they are 
not dimension nouns. It is no surprise that they cannot appear in the same construction. For 
example, heibai means either “black-white” as in heibai dianshi ‘black and white TV’ or “good 
                                                             
6 The claim that such combinations are nominal (dimension nouns) rather than adjectival is evident in the fact that 
they can be used as the head of a relative clause. It is an intuitive assumption and theoretical postulation (e.g. del 
Gobbo, 2010) that the head of a relative clause is nominal.  
 
(i) shangchuan  weijian   de    daxiao  bixu   zai  shangchuan zhiqian queding 
         upload      files      MOD   size      must   at     upload        before   certain 




and bad” as in heibai bu fen ‘cannot tell bad (black) from good (white)’. It does not determine a 
scale which measures (say) the degree of lightness or darkness of the color of an entity. Likewise, 
meichou generally cannot denote the dimension against which to measure an individual’s degree 
of being beautiful or ugly. 
 
(48) *ta      de      huzi       you      zhi       name      heibai 
              he  MOD   beard      have    paper    that    black-white 
              intended: ‘His beard is as white as the paper .’    
2.2.9 Different contexts of use 
The possessive equative construction is compatible with various linguistic contexts. The 
sentences in (25), (28), (35) and (41) show that the construction can be negated by affixing mei 
‘not’ to you.  The negative form of the construction expresses that X falls below Y with respect 
to their degrees on the dimension specified by the gradable predicate G. For instance, (28) 
expresses that many families are less wealthy nowadays than before. 
X and Y also can be a quantificational phrase, and the presence of you does not bring any 
extra complexity to the scope relation. For example, the sentence in (49a) says that for each male 
student there is one corresponding female student such that the former “has the heights” of the 
latter. It cannot mean that there is a female student such that every male student “has the height” 
of this particular female student. The scope relation is the same as the sentence in (49b), which 






(49) a. (?) mei    ge     nan     sheng      dou     you    yi      ge     nv        sheng     gao 
                    every  CL    male   student     all     have    one   CL  female  student   tall 
              ‘Every male student is as tall as a female student.’ 
           b. (?) mei    ge     nan     sheng     dou     xihuan    yi    ge     nv        sheng    
                   every  CL    male   student     all        like     one   CL  female  student  
                ‘Every male student likes a female student.’ 
 
Both X and Y can be questioned with an appropriate wh-word. One caveat, however, is 
that the wh-word usually has to be D(iscourse)-linked (Pesetsky, 1987, 2000) for the question to 
be felicitous. The specification of the two questions in (50-51) explicitly restricts the domain of 
answers and requires the answers “to be drawn from a set of individuals previously introduced 
into the discourse, or when the set forms part of the “common ground” shared by speaker and 
hearer.” (Pesetsky, 2000: p16).   
 
(50) zhe       ji        ge    haizi  zhong,  shei    mei   you   zhangsan  congming? 
            this   several   CL    kid    among   who   not   have     John          smart 
            ‘Among the several kids, who is not as smart as John?’ 
(51) ni      juede    zhangsan  mei   you    tade      naxie    tongxue       yonggong? 
         you   think       John       not    have    his      which    classmate  hard-working 
        ‘Who, among his classmates, do you think John is not as hard-working as?’  
2.2.10 Interim summary 
In this section I introduced the degree use of the possessive verb you in Chinese. The possessive 
equative construction “X + you + Y + G(radable predicate)” expresses comparison between X 
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and Y with respect to their degrees along the dimension specified by G. I discussed some 
empirical properties of the construction. X and Y must be comparable with respect to the 
dimension specified by G. Y can be a measure phrase, in which case the G element can be 
omitted if the context is clear with regard to the dimension for the measure phrase. G must be a 
phrase that expresses some gradable notion or another. Non-gradable phrases are barred from the 
position. When the gradability requirement is met, G can be an adjective, adverb, verb phrase, or 
even a noun of a certain class. G cannot be modified by any degree modifier. A demonstrative 
pronoun can optionally intervene between Y and G, without affecting the meaning of the 
sentence.  The construction can be used in a variety of contexts. 
So far I have described some empirical linguistic facts about the degree use of you in 
Chinese. During the discussion I assumed that the “X + you + Y + G” expresses an equative 
relation between two degrees. In the next section I will justify the assumption by showing that 
the construction shows similar behaviors to the English as…as equative construction. 
2.3  An equative construction 
2.3.1  Previous proposals 
To the best of my knowledge, there has been little discussion in the existing literature regarding 
the precise meaning of the “X + you + Y + G” construction. The only consensus that the limited 
literature has agreed on appears to be the intuition that the construction expresses some relation 
between degrees. Under this broad umbrella, different writers take different positions about what 
the construction exactly means. According to Li and Thompson (1981), the construction is 
restricted to negative contexts to expresses inferiority of X to Y in terms of the degrees on the 
dimension specified by G.  Zhu (1982: pp169-170) distinguished the construction into two cases 
based on what the Y element is. One is where the Y element is a measure phrase or an expression 
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which denotes some typical measurement (e.g. “a pencil (long)”, “a soccer ball (big)”, “a story of 
building (high)”). In the other type, Y is an expression that denotes an individual, an event, etc. 
According to Zhu, for the former type of cases, the construction measures X against Y on the 
dimension specified by G. For the latter type of cases, the construction uses the measurement of 
Y on the dimension specified by G as a standard for measuring X on the same dimension. It says 
that X meets the standard. The dichotomization has two immediate issues. First, Zhu divided the 
construction into two types as if each corresponds to a distinguished interpretation. This division 
loses the intuition that the two types are essentially variants of the same construction. I would 
like to make this point clear via a crosslinguistic analogy to English comparative constructions, 
in which one of the comparative items can be either a measure phrase or some phrase of a 
different type. Among such construction are the –er comparative construction and as…as 
equative construction (52-53). For either construction, no matter what type of phrases it involves, 
it is just one uniform construction.  
 
(52) a. John is taller than his sister. 
            b. John is taller than five feet.   
(53) a. John is as tall as his sister. 
         b. John is as tall as five feet. 
 
Liu et al (2001) and Liu (2004) followed Zhu’s suit and divided the construction into 
exactly the same two types. However, they attributed different interpretations to the two types. 
When Y is a measure phrase, they held that the construction expresses epistemic approximation, 
that is, that the speaker believes that X approximately has reached the degree denoted by the 
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measure phrase on the dimension specified by G. By using the construction the speaker makes a 
subjective estimation about X’s degree, based on her knowledge or evidence available to her. For 
example, according to Liu et al, the sentence in (54) says that the speaker estimates John’s height 
to be in the proximity of six feet. For the second type, “Y + G” denotes a standard for 
comparison; and the construction says that X has reached this standard. 
 
(54) Zhangsan  you     liu   yingchi    gao. 
                  John       have   six    feet         tall 
                  ‘John is six feet tall.’ 
 
Lü (1980) also divided the construction into two different categories. But the 
interpretation he attributed is more or less the opposite of Liu et al (2001). When Y is a measure 
phrase, the construction expresses that X has reached what the measure phrase denotes on the 
dimension specified by G. On the other hand, when Y denotes an individual, event, etc, the 
construction has a subjective approximation component and expresses that X and Y are 
approximately the same in terms of the degree on the dimension specified by G. For instance, Lü 
(1980: p559) took the sentence in (55) to mean that the kid and the speaker are roughly of the 
same height. 
 
(55) zhe      ge     haizi     yijing    you    wo    gao    le. 
               this    CL     child    already   have   I      tall     ASP 




2.3.2 Illusionary epistemic approximation  
My criticism against Zhu (1982) applies to Liu et al (2001), Liu (2004), and Lü (1980) as well. 
In addition, epistemic approximation is not an essential part of the semantic meaning of the 
possessive equative construction, whether the G element is a measure phrase or not. When the 
speaker is absolutely certain regarding X’s degree on the dimension specified by G, she can still 
felicitously use the construction. For example, after measuring the heights of two individuals, 
John and Mary, during a physical check-up, the nurse read the scale and knew what their 
individual height was. She also was certain that the scale worked accurately. No epistemic 
approximation was involved in this case, but the nurse still could use the possessive equative 
construction to report their heights compared to a contextual reference height (56). She also 
could use the construction to compare the heights of the two individuals, especially when the 
context does not require the greater informativity whereby John is actually taller than Mary (57). 
The felicity of the two sentences suggests that epistemic approximation is not an essential part in 
the semantics of the construction, whether the Y element is a measure phrase or an expression 
that denotes an individual, an event, etc. 
 
(56) Zhangsan    you      liu    yingchi    gao,   keshi   mali   mei   you   name   gao. 
         John         have     six      feet        tall     but     Mary   not   have   that     tall 
      ‘John is at least six feet tall, but Mary is not as tall as that.’ 
(57) Zhangsan    you     mali      gao. 
             John       have    Mary      tall 




The scope relation between epistemic and root modals (e.g. deontic modals) provides 
some additional evidence for the absence of epistemic approximation in the “X + you + Y + G” 
construction. It has been established that epistemic modals necessarily scope over root modals 
(Cinque, 1999; Hacquard, 2009) and that the reverse scope relation is not possible. If the 
interpretation of the “X + you + Y + G” construction has an epistemic component, the modality 
most likely comes from you. Then you should not be able to appear under a deontic modal. But 
the prediction is not true, as suggested by the grammaticality of (58). It follows that you is not a 
modal. As far as I can see, there is nothing else in the construction that can contribute a modal 
component to the interpretation.  
 
(58) (yao   xiang    shenqing), zhangsan    bixu     you     mali     gao       /liu   yingchi   gao 
              if      want      apply          John         must     have   Mary      tall        six    feet       tall 
             ‘(If he wants to apply), John must be as tall as Mary / as tall as six feet.’ 
 
Moreover, if the “X + you + Y + G” construction encodes epistemic approximation in the 
semantic interpretation, modifying it with an adverbial phrase expressing epistemic uncertainty 
would give rise to two layers of epistemic modality or noticeable redundancy. This is not the 
case, however. In fact, when the construction is used to convey approximation, it generally 
explicitly includes adverbs like dagai ‘about’, chabuduo ‘roughly’ and guji ‘seemingly’. The 
presence of these epistemic modal adverbs does not introduce a second layer of modality or 




Nevertheless, epistemic approximation is often perceived to be associated with the “X + 
you + Y + G” construction. I propose that the perception is attributable to the Gricean 
conversational maxims of quality and/or quantity (59-60), depending on the knowledge and/or 
intention of the speaker. As later discussion will suggest, the “X + you + Y + G” construction is 
an equative construction which says X equals or exceeds Y in terms of the degree on the 
dimension specified by G. Meanwhile, there are two other comparative constructions in Chinese. 
The gen…yiyang-construction expresses exact identity between two comparative items (61). The 
bi-construction expresses a “more than” relation between two comparative items (62). Given the 
semantic interpretation of the “X + you + Y + G” construction, it functions like a combination of 
the two constructions and can be considered to be in competition with each of them. In certain 
contexts the speaker may lack adequate evidence to specify whether X equals Y or X exceeds Y 
with regard to their degrees on the dimension specified by G. The Maxim of Quality would 
prompt her to use the possessive equative construction, rather than the two competing 
constructions that convey more informative messages. This lack of knowledge can be perceived 
by the hearer as epistemic indeterminacy on the speaker’s side. On the other hand, the speaker 
may have perfect knowledge about whether X equals Y or X exceeds Y with regard to their 
degrees on the dimension specified by G. However, she may still use the ‘X + you + Y + G’ 
construction, because more informative contributions are not required for her purpose of 
communication (Maxim of Quantity). For instance, if the hearer only cares whether John is 
shorter than Mary, it is sufficient for the speaker to use the sentence in (56) to let the hearer 
know that John is NOT shorter than Mary. From the hearer’s perspective, this second case is 
often not distinguishable from the first case and may be taken to involve epistemic 
approximation as well.    
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(59) Maxim of Quality 
 Do not say what you believe to be false 
 Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
(60) Maxim of Quantity 
 Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of 
the exchange). 
 Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
(61) zhangsan      gen    ta          gege           yiyang      gao. 
           John       with    his    elder brother   the same    tall 
          ‘John and his elder brother are of the same height.’ 
(62) zhangsan      bi        ta      gege       gao. 
        John          than      his   brother    tall 
      ‘John is taller than his brother.’  
2.3.3 The nature of the comparative relation 
In this section I argue that the “X + you + Y + G” construction shows similar behavior to the 
as…as equative construction in English and is uniformly an equative construction that asserts 
that X equals or exceeds Y with respect to the property denoted by G. The starting point is the 
native intuition that the “X + you + Y + G” construction compares X and Y with respect to their 
degree on the dimension specified by G. After this comparative relation being taken a priori, 
there are just three possibilities regarding the exact nature of the comparison relation the 
construction expresses: an equative construction that expresses exact identity (“=“) between two 
comparative items (like the gen…yiyang comparative as illustrated in (61)), a comparative one 
(in the narrow sense of the word “comparative”) which expresses that one comparative item 
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exceeds (“˃”) the other in terms of their degree on the dimension specified by G (similar to the 
English –er comparative or its Chinese counterpart as illustrated in (62)), or the combination 
(“≥”) of the two construction (similar to the English as…as equative construction).  I will show 
that the “X + you + Y + G” construction behaves like the English as…as equative construction.   
The first piece of evidence is native intuition. When asked to translate the “X + you + Y + 
G” construction into English, the most immediate response from a native speaker of Chinese is to 
paraphrase it as the as…as equative construction (“≥”).  When X and Y are exactly the same with 
respect to their degrees on the dimension specified by G, native speakers of Chinese I consulted 
with all agreed that, besides using the gen…yiyang construction expressing exact identity, the “X 
+ you + Y + G” construction also can be employed to describe the situation. This suggests that 
the “X + you + Y + G” construction has an identity component in the semantics. 
However, exact identity does not account for the whole meaning of the “X + you + Y + G” 
construction. That is, the construction does not have exactly the same meaning as the 
gen…yiyang equative construction. One test to tell them apart involves the subject of an “X + 
you + Y + G” sentence being a quantificational phrase. The truth of the sentence in (63) does not 
require the boys to be of the same height. The boys only need to be no shorter than the teacher. 
By contrast, the truth of the gen…yiyang sentence in (64) requires that all the boys be of exactly 
the same height (i.e. the teacher’s height).   
 
(63) mei    ge      nanhai     dou     you     na     wei    laoshi      gao. 
              every   CL     boy       all        have    that    CL    teacher     tall. 




(64) mei      ge      nanhai     dou     gen    na     wei    laoshi    yiyang   gao. 
               every   CL       boy        all    with    that     CL    teacher  same   high 
               ‘Every boy is of the same height as the teacher.’ 
 
More specifically, the extra component differentiating the “X + you + Y + G” 
construction from the gen…yiyang construction is that the former (partially) involves the “>” 
relation that is expressed by the bi-construction. This is obvious from the fact that a bi-sentence 
entails the corresponding you-sentence (65). Taking the additional “=” component into 
consideration, the “X + you + Y + G” construction expresses the “≥” relation.  
 
(65) zhangsan     bi    ta      gege     gao.    =>     zhangsan    you    ta    gege   gao 
            ‘John is taller than his brother.’                   ‘John is as tall as his brother.’ 
2.3.4 Factor phrases and measure phrases 
Different types of gradable adjectives can occur in the “X + you + Y + G” construction, and the 
semantic interpretation of the construction shows sensitivity to what type of gradable element G 
is. In this respect the construction once again patterns with the as…as equative construction in 
English, rather than with the English –er comparative construction. According to Bierwisch 
(1989), there are two types of gradable adjectives: dimensional adjectives and evaluative 
adjectives. The former type of adjectives are those that measure some physical property of an 
individual, event, etc, such as tall, narrow, long and shallow. On the other hand, evaluative 
adjectives measure some subjective evaluation of an individual and carry the speaker’s judgment. 
Examples of evaluative adjectives include wonderful, lazy, ugly and pretty. The two types of 
adjectives show different syntactic and semantic properties. Within each type of adjectives, there 
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exists polar distinction. Adjectives such as tall and deep are positive dimensional adjectives, and 
short and narrow are negative dimensional adjectives. The adjectives wonderful and pretty are 
both positive evaluative adjectives, and lazy and ugly are negative evaluative adjectives. 
As far as the “X + you + Y + G” construction is concerned, if the gradable predicate G is 
a positive dimensional adjective or an evaluative adjective (either positive or negative), it can be 
modified by a factor phrase like liangbei ‘twice’ and shierbei ‘12 times’. A factor phrase in the 
construction expresses how many times X’s degree on the dimension specified by G is of Y’s 
degree on the same dimension. This is illustrated by the sentences in (66-67). If G is a negative 
dimensional adjective, then it cannot be modified in this way (68).  
 
(66) nvxing  chengshou  de      yali         you   nanxing   chengshou   de    sanbei            duo 
      female  undertake  MOD  pressure  have   male    undertake    MOD  three times   much 
     ‘The female undertakes pressure three times as much as the male does.’  
(67) Mali    hen    chou,   keshi    ta   meimei    you      ta       san     bei     chou 
          Mary  very   ugly      but     her   sister      have    she     three   time   ugly 
          ‘Mary is pretty ugly, but her sister is three times as ugly as her.’ 
(68) *wo     xie      de      wenzhang   you     ni     de         wubei        duan 
            I      write   MOD   article      have     you  MOD   five-fold      short 
          ‘*The article that I wrote was five times as short as yours.’  
            
As Bierwisch (1989) pointed out, if the relevant adjective in an as…as equative sentence 
is a positive dimensional adjective or an evaluative adjective, the sentence can be restricted by a 
factor phrase (69). By contrast, if the adjective is a negative dimensional adjective, the sentence 
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does not allow any factor phrase, as suggested by the ungrammaticality of the sentence in (70). 
Therefore, the distribution of adjectives in the “X + you + Y + G” construction exactly patterns 
with the English as…as equative construction7. On the other hand, the distribution is different 
from that in the English –er comparative construction. No matter what the gradable adjective in 
an –er comparative sentence is, the sentence is compatible with factor phrases (71-72). For some 
native speakers of American English, though it is not perfect for the comparative form of a 
negative dimensional adjective to be modified by a factor phrase, the resulting sentence (e.g. (72)) 
still fares better than the equative counterpart (e.g. (70)).  
 
(69) a. The movie was three times as long as the video game.   
         b. The manager was five times as bad as the front desk receptionist.  
(70) *The board is three times as short as the table. 
(71) The board is three times longer than the table.  
(72) (?)The board is three times shorter than the table.  
 
Another related empirical test has to do with the fact that the “X + you + Y + G” 
construction disallow modification by a measure phrase which is intended to measure the 
difference between two comparative items. This is true irrespective of the type of adjectives. In 
this respect, the construction again behaves just like the as…as equative construction in English 
(73-74) and differs from the English –er comparative construction (von Stechow, 1984; 
Bierwisch, 1989) and the Chinese bi-comparative construction. The sentences in (75) suggest 
that the comparative constructions can be felicitously modified by differential measure phrases.  
                                                             
7 The yiyang comparative construction in Chinese is not helpful here, because yiyang means ‘the same’ and is 
incompatible with modification by factor phrases. 
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(73) *zhangsan    (mei)     you      mali     gao     wu         limi. 
          John          not        have   Mary    tall      five   centimeter 
(74) *John is 5 inches as tall as his brother. 
(75) a. John is 10lbs heavier than his younger brother. 
         b. zhangsan   bi     ta             didi              zhong      shi     bang. 
               John        BI    his    younger brother    heavy     ten    pound 
             ‘John is 10lbs heavier than his younger brother.’ 
2.3.5 Negation 
The negative form of the “X + you + Y + G” construction means that X’s degree on the 
dimension specified by G falls below Y’s corresponding degree (Li and Thompson, 1981). For 
example, the sentence in (76) means that John is less happy than Mary today. They cannot be 
happy to the same degree. Once again, the construction patterns with the English as…as equative 
construction, as suggested by the similarity of (77) to (76) in meaning8.  On the other hand, the 
interpretation of the negative form of the “X + you + Y + G” construction differs from that of the 
negative form of the English –er comparative and the Chinese bi- comparative. The sentences in 
(78) are both compatible with a situation in which John and Mary are happy to the same degree.   
 
(76) zhangsan     jintian     mei    you      mali      gaoxing. 
                    John        today      not     have    Mary      happy 
                ‘John is not as happy as Mary today.’ 
(77) John is not as happy as Mary today = John is less happy than Mary today. 
                                                             
8 Mats Rooth (p.c.) pointed out to me that, though less naturally, the sentence in (77) can mean that John does not 
have exactly the same degree of happiness as does Mary. I believe that, in this case, the negation in the sentence is 
not a sentential one, but a meta-linguistic one. To get the reading, special intonation is needed.  
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(78) a. John is not happier than Mary today. 
               b. zhangsan  jintian   bu     bi     mali    gaoxing. 
                John       today     not    than   Mary    happy 
2.3.6 (Lack of ) evaluativity with gradable adjectives  
When the G element is not modified by a factor phrase, it can be either a positive dimensional 
adjective (e.g. fast, tall, and expensive) or a negative dimensional adjective (e.g. slow, short, and 
cheap). If the G element is a positive dimensional adjective, the “X + you + Y + G” construction 
does not entail the proposition “Y is G” (79). However, when G is a negative dimensional 
adjective, the equative you-sentence consistently entails both “Y is G” (80). The construction 
again patterns with the English as…as equative construction (81-82) and the gen…yiyang 
equative construction in Chinese (83-84). In this regard it differs from the English –er 
comparative construction and the Chinese bi-comparative construction. Neither of the two 
constructions shows a similar pattern, whether the relevant predicate is a positive dimensional 
adjective or negative dimensional adjective. For example, neither (85) nor (86) entails John’s 
brother is tall/short.  
 
(79) zhangsan    you    ta    gege    gao           !                                              
            John’s brother is tall.           
(80) zhangsan  you    ta      gege    ai                
John’s brother is short. 
(81) John is as tall as his brother.                   !                                  




(82) John is as short as his brother.                         
            John’s brother is short. 
(83) zhangsan   gen    ta       gege            yiyang   gao            ! 
           John       with   his   elder brother   same     high                               
               John’s brother is tall.           
(84) zhangsan    gen   ta         gege           yiyang     ai               
         John      with   his    elder brother   same     short      
              John’s brother is short. 
(85) John is taller/shorter than his brother.                              ! 
            John’s brother is tall/short. 
(86)  zhangsan    bi     ta     gege      gao    /   ai                        ! 
             ‘John is taller/shorter than his brother.’ 
             John’s brother is tall/short. 
 
In addition, negating the sentences in (79-86), to the extent that the resulting sentences are still 
grammatical, doesn’t affect the original entailment pattern. The insensitivity to negation suggests 
that the relation between the “X + you + Y + G” sentence and the “Y + G” sentence, when G is a 
negative dimensional adjective, is one of entailment, rather than one of semantic or pragmatic 
implicature.  
When G is a negative evaluative adjective, the “X + you + Y + G” construction is 
consistently evaluative (87). When it is a positive evaluative adjective, whether the construction 
is evaluative 9or not depends on the individual lexical items. For example, both hao ‘good’ and 
                                                             
9 Bierwisch (1989) called this type of evaluativity context-related, in order to set it apart from norm-related cases. In 
this chapter, I subsume the two types of ‘relatedness’ under the umbrella of evaluativity.  
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piaoliang ‘pretty, beautiful’ are positive evaluative adjectives, but possessive equative sentences 
containing them have opposite evaluativity (88-89). The entailment pattern is the same as with 
the English as…as equative construction (Bierwisch, 1989; Rett, 2008a, 2008b). The similarity is 
evidenced from the fact that in (87-89) the English translations also (dis)entail the corresponding 
(a-b) sentences.  
 
(87) zhangsan       you       mali       lan.                      
            John          have      Mary     lazy 
           ‘John is as lazy as Mary.’ 
a. John is lazy. 
b. Mary is lazy. 
(88) Mali     de       chengji     you     ta        meimei             de       hao.         !  
            Mary   MOD    grade       have   her   younger sister    MOD   good 
           ‘Mary’s grades are as good as her younger sister’s.’ 
a. Mary’s grades are good. 
b. Her younger sister’s grades are good. 
(89) Mali    de       wanju      you    ta       meimie            de         piaoliang.      
            Mary  MOD    toy        have   her   younger sister   MOD    beautiful  
           ‘Mary’s toys are as beautiful as her younger sister’s.’ 
a. Mary’s toys are beautiful. 
b. Her younger sister’s toys are beautiful. 
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2.3.7 An equative construction  
Based on all the above similarities between the “X + you + Y + G” construction and the English 
as…as equative construction, I conclude that the “X + you + Y + G” construction is an equative 
construction that expresses the “≥” relation between X and Y with respect to their degrees on 
the dimension specified by G. This is why in this chapter I call the “X + you + Y + G” 
construction the possessive equative construction. 
Before I conclude this section, I would like to address one potential criticism against my 
claim that “X + you + Y + G” is an equative construction. It has been pointed out that one 
property of equative sentences is that the two comparative items are reversible in order with no 
noticeable change in their grammaticality or interpretation. For example, (90a) and (90b) are 
both grammatical, and to some people they appear to have the same interpretation. The Chinese 
“X + you + Y + G” construction, however, does not pass the reversibility test. In fact, (91a) and 
(91b) express two exactly opposite propositions. The two sentences generally cannot be true at 
the same time, except in the special contexts in which the brother and the sister happen to be of 
the same height.  
 
(90) a. The brother is as tall as the sister. 
         b. The sister is as tall as the brother.  
(91) a. gege       you     meimei  gao 
             brother   have    sister     tall 




This irreversibility, however, does not undermine my conclusion that the “X + you + Y + 
G” construction is an equative construction. The reversibility test only holds for specificational 
constructions that establish an identity relation. Often, specificationality occurs when a property 
uniquely picks out one individual. For example, because “the smallest even number” uniquely 
describes the number “2”, the sentence in (92a) is specificational. Reversing the order of the 
subject and object still yields a sentence (92b) which has roughly the same meaning as the 
original sentence. 
 
(92) a. The smallest even number is two. 
           b. Two is the smallest even number. 
 
An equative construction is specificational only under the “exactly” interpretation, viz. 
the compared individuals are identical with respect to the relevant property against which the 
individuals are compared. It collapses when an equative sentence has the “at least” or “at most” 
interpretations. I will use “non-identity” reading as a cover term for “at least” and “at most” 
interpretations. The literature has observed that the as…as equative construction is ambiguous 
between the “exactly” reading on one hand and the “non-identity” reading on the other (Rett, 
2009). This can be seen from the felicity of the two responses to the sentence in (93). The one in 
(93a) takes the “exactly” reading of the sentence at stake and overtly denies it. On the other hand, 
(93b) takes the “at least” reading and denies it. If the as … as equative construction only has the 
“exactly” interpretation, (93b) would be an infelicitous response. The “at most” reading of the 
construction can be observed in (94), which most naturally mean that the university planned to 
hire at most 20 new assistant professors. According to Rett (2009), whether a particular as…as 
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equative sentence allows the “at least” or the “at most” interpretation depends on the scalar 
ordering of its internal argument (e.g. “20 new assistant professors”). 
 
(93) John is as tall as Sue is. 
a. No, he is taller than Sue is. 
b. Yes, in fact he is taller than Sue is. 
(94) The university plans to hire as many as 20 new assistant professors this year. 
 
When the “non-identity” interpretation is the most prominent for an equative sentence, 
the two comparative items cannot be reversed. Take the sentences in (95) for example. Suppose 
that the relevant contexts include five boys of varied heights. The most natural reading of the 
sentence in (95a) is that the shortest boy among the five is no shorter than Sue. Clearly, in such a 
context the reversed version of the sentence (i.e. (95b)) has the opposite truth value.  
 
(95) a. The boys are as tall as Sue. 
            b. Sue is as tall as the boys. 
 
The “exactly” reading and “non-identity” reading of the as…as equative construction do 
not have the same status. In this chapter I adopt the position that the “non-identity” reading is 
assigned by the semantics of the equative construction, while the “exactly” reading is derived via 
pragmatic scalar implicature (Horn, 1972; Klein, 1980; Chierchia, 2004). There are several 
reasons for taking the “non-identity” reading to be the semantic default interpretation of the 
as…as equative construction. The first one has to do with how the interpretation of a negative 
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as…as equative sentence relates to its positive counterpart. When a sentence that expresses an 
“exactly” proposition is negated, the resulting sentence is compatible with all “non-exactly” 
cases. For example, for the sentence in (96) to be true, John can have two children or four 
children. The only excluded number of children is three. If the as…as equative construction has 
the “exactly” reading as the default interpretation, it should behave the same. But this is not the 
case. The sentence in (97) does not mean that John’s degree of being qualified for the job is not 
exactly the same as Mary’s degree of being qualified for the job. Rather, it means that John is 
less qualified than Mary. Similarly, for the sentence in (98), it is not the case that we will hire 
John only under the condition that he has the same degree of being qualified for the job as Sue. 
The employment can also be granted when John is more qualified than Sue is.   
 
(96) John does not have exactly 3 children.   
(97) John is not as qualified for the job as Sue. 
(98) We will hire John only if he is as qualified as Sue. 
 
Rett (2009) 10 argued that the interpretation of the as…as equative construction “is 
sensitive to the scalar ordering of its internal argument.” Her analysis of the construction 
implicitly assumes that the “non-identity” interpretation to be the semantic default. If the 
“exactly” reading is the semantic default, reversing the ordering of the internal argument 
presumably will not switch the interpretation between “at least” and “at most”. There would be 
no conceivable way to explain why some as…as equative sentences have the “at least” 
interpretation and some others have the “at most” interpretation. Out of the two possible “non-
                                                             
10
  Rett (2008) assumed that the as…as equative construction has the ‘exactly’ interpretation. In Rett (2009), she 
changed her position.  
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identity” readings (“at least” and “at most”), the “at most” reading is marked compared to the “at 
least” reading.   
 The possessive equative construction has the “at least” interpretation. As far as this 
interpretation is concerned, the construction is not a specificational one. The requirement 
whereby the reversibility test need to go through does not hold for the possessive equative 
construction. In this respect, the construction patterns with the as…as equative construction.  
Nevertheless, a difference exists between the as…as equative construction and the 
possessive equative construction with regard to scalar implicature. The former is specificational 
in contexts where the “exactly” interpretation is derivable by scalar implicature. In such contexts 
the construction passes the reversibility test. By contrast, the possessive equative construction 
does not have the “exactly” implicature. It does not pass the reversibility test.  
With regard to where the difference comes from, there are two potential proposals. One 
proposal hypothesizes that it roots from the observation that the former involves the copula be 
and the latter uses the possessive verb you. The copula be can be specificational, but you 
specifies a subset relation, which generally is not reversible (Xie, 2011). The other proposal 
makes use of the fact that the possessive equative construction is marked compared to the 
gen…yiyang construction and the bi-comparative construction. In this regard, it contrasts with 
the as…as construction, because the as…as construction is not marked compared to the the 
same…as construction or the er-comparative construction. Due to its markedness, the possessive 
equative construction precludes the “exactly” scalar implicature. I will leave it open to decide 





2.3.8 Interim Summary 
I hope that through all the discussion above I have established that the “X + you + Y + G” 
construction is indeed an equative construction similar to the as…as equative construction. In 
addition to the possessive equative use, the verb you can denote possession, existence, part-
whole relation, and so on. A natural question to ask is whether and how the equative use is 
different from the other uses in terms of the syntactic structure and semantic meaning. 
Descriptive works, like Lü (1980) and Zhu (1982), treated the various uses of you as being 
separate from each other. Liu (2004) and Zhang (1998), on the other hand, considered all the 
uses cognitively related in the sense that all of them express some notion or another that is 
related to possession or inclusion. Thought their intuition is essentially on the right track, as 
descriptive linguists they did not specify how and why they are related.  
In the rest of this chapter, I will formalize the intuition of Liu (2004) and Zhang (1998) 
by offering a syntactic-semantic analysis of the equative you which draws on a small clause-
based analysis of have (Sæbø, 2009). The basic idea is that for a possessive equative sentence of 
the form “X + you + Y + G” to be true, the degree of X on the dimension specified by G is a 
subset/subinterval of the degree of Y on the same dimension, under the ontological 
representation of degree as intervals on a dimension.  
2.4  Sæbø’s small clause-base analysis of have 
2.4.1 Motivations 
It is not the goal of this chapter to come up with a brand new analysis of possessive verbs which 
can successfully explain the possessive equative construction. It would be most ideal if a proper 
extension of an existing analysis of non-equative uses of possessive verbs, coupled with 
opportune recourse to some empirical properties of degree constructions, can provide a 
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satisfactory explanation of the possessive equative construction. This, hopefully, would align the 
syntax and semantics of the equative you to the other uses of the verb. Towards this end, it 
deserves some space to review the particular line of analysis which leads to the proposal that I 
would like to adopt for tackling the possessive equative construction. And this is the small 
clause-based analysis of possessive verbs.  
It has been frequently observed that the verb have can appear in a variety of surface 
constructions and have a rather unconstrained range of meanings (Cowper, 1989; Belvin, 1993; 
Ritter and Rosen, 1997). On the intuitive level, the meanings of the verb range from being very 
clear, to being less clear, and to being pretty vague. This can be seen from the sentences in (99), 
in which the clarity of intuition regarding the meaning of have gradually diminishes from the (a) 
sentence to the (g) sentence. While have in the first sentence can be paraphrased as “to possess”, 
the same verb in the last sentence appears to defy a precise intuitive definition. Its meaning 
appears to be far away from anything related to possession, especially given that the popped-off 
button is not part of the shirt any more.  
 
(99) a. John has a new car.                                                          (possession) 
 b. John has a headache today.                                             (experience) 
 c. John had a talk with his son.                                           (event) 
      d. The room has four windows.                                           (part-whole) 
      e. The couple’s income had a big increase last year.            (existential) 
 d. John had many visitors today.                                         (receiving?) 
 e. John had a guy shouting at him.                                      (event?)  
 f. The baby often has a story at bedtime.                             (?) 
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 g. The shirt had a button pop off of it.                                 (?)  
 
It is obvious from the sentences in (99) that in some uses have makes no concrete 
semantic contribution to the sentence in which it appears. Removing have from the sentence, 
mutatis mutandis, often has little effect on the meaning. For instance, the sentence in (99g) has 
the same meaning as the trivially transformed one in (100). Therefore, it is very likely that have 
is a lexical item with only a functional meaning. In spite of the diverse contexts in which have 
can be used, there may well be just one single underlying structure and one single “meaning core” 
for all the uses. 
 
(100) A button popped off of the shirt.   
2.4.2 Earlier small clause-based attempts 
There indeed exists a large body of syntactic and semantic literature that pursues an analysis of 
have along the lines that the verb only has a functional import. Ritter and Rosen (1997) took a 
syntactically-oriented approach to pursuing this analytical intuition. They argued that there is just 
one single verb have, and that its diversified interpretations are derived from the syntactic 
structure that it projects. In spite of its many surface interpretations, have itself is not directly 
attributed with this semantic diversity on the lexical level. Rather, it is a functional item with no 
specific thematic content to assign. Rather, the verb provides an additional syntactic structure 
that makes it possible for have to have a variety of surface interpretations. The subject of have is 
interpreted either in accordance with the role it plays in the event depicted by the sentence or via 
co-referring with some element (overt or covert) in the complement of have. The verb furnishes 
the additional syntactic structure that supports the insertion of a covert argument or the activation 
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of an event structure. The exact interpretation of have in a sentence depends on what kind of 
syntactic structure and relation the verb sets up.  
According to Ritter and Rosen, there are two functional projections for a have-sentence. 
The tree structure in (101) demonstrates the skeleton of the projections.  For uses of have that are 
not as a perfect auxiliary, the specifier of the lower projection, YP, moves from the complement 
in the lower projection and corresponds to the DP in the object. The specifier of the higher 
projection, XP, is based-generated in the specifier position and corresponds to the subject DP. 
The F1 head manifests as have. The subject of have receives interpretation by receiving roles in 
an event or by co-refering. For the auxiliary perfect use of have, YP is empty, and XP moves 
from the complement in the F2P projection.   
 
(101)                                      F1P 
                      
                       XP                                         F1’ 
                   John                                 
                                                 F1                                     F2P            
                                                had                
                                                                         YP                                  F2’ 
                                                                  His sister                        





More specifically, when have embeds an eventuality, XP is assigned the role of 
instigator/causer. This holds both for cases in which have takes a verbal event argument (102a) 
and for cases in which have takes a nominal event argument (102b).  
 
(102) a. John had the students read the paper again. 
      b. John had a lot fun in the reception. 
 
The subject of non-eventive uses of have acquires an interpretation via co-reference with 
some constituent in the complement of have. Take for example the sentence in (103a) with a 
locational have and its syntactic structure as represented in (103b). Intuitively, the sentence 
means “A hat is on it” with the pronoun “it” referring to the table. The preposition phrase “on it” 
is predicated of the DP “a hat”. Hence, the argument of have appears to express a proposition 
which roughly is the same as the meaning of the whole sentence. The location interpretation of 
the sentence derives from the relation between the prepositional phrase predicate “on it” and the 
phrase “a hat”. The subject of the sentence “the table” co-refers with the pronoun “it”. The 
surface object “a hat on it” is subject-predicate construction without verbal inflection. It parallels 
canonical cases of small clauses, as represented by the sentence in (104).  Thus, for (103), the 
surface object of have can be understood to be a small clause.  
 
(103) a. The table has a hat on it.                             (Ritter and Rosen, 1997: ex.26a) 
            b.[F1P the table1 [F1’ F1 [F2P[Spec [F2’[F2 [SC a hat  on it1]]]]]]] 
 
(104) I consider John smart. 
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Ritter and Rosen (1997) pointed out that the predicate in the small clause can be 
“phonetically null” (p315). For example, they analyzed the sentence in (105a) (their example 
(45a)) as having the LF in (105b) (their example (46a)). Through the null element pro, the matrix 
subject can co-refer with a covert constituent in the object. Ritter and Rosen also discussed 
various other uses of have to support their co-reference analysis, which I will not review here. 
 
(105) a. Johni has Billj’s book. 
            b. Johni has  [sc Billj’s  book  [pp P  proi]] 
 
The relevance of the notion of “small clause” to analyzing the syntax and semantics of 
have has been further entertained by Iatridou (1996). She posited that have “behaves as if it 
wants a variable in its complement”, which comes either from an indefinite NP or the predicate. 
When have has an indefinite DP alone in its complement, the DP often can provide a variable for 
the subject of have to bind. When the object DP is definite, however, it cannot provide such a 
variable. In this case, the verb “makes use of its ability to take a small clause complement”, so 
that the object DP is predicated of by an element that can provide such a variable. The predicate 
can be either overt or covert. The sentence in (106) is an example that involves an overt small 
clause “my car in his garage”. Here the pronoun “his” provides a variable for the subject “John” 
to bind. On the other hand, when the predicate is covert, Iatridou (1996) called it TEMP/LOC to 
“indicate that it has temporal or locative properties”. For (107), the TEMP/LOC predicate can be 
“under his custody” or “for his temporary use”, the choice depending on the contexts in which 




(106) John had my car in his garage.  
(107)  John had my car (TEMP/LOC). 
2.4.3 Sæbø’s small clause-based analysis of have 
Though Ritter & Rosen (1997) and Iatridou (1996) both made use of the observation that have 
can take a small clause argument that provides a variable which co-refers with the subject, they 
did not address “the more important question of why HAVE needs a variable in its complement” 
(Iatridou, 1996: p199). Sæbø (2009) picked up this question by way of providing a formal 
analysis of the syntactic representation and semantic interpretation of have. His analysis is 
inspired by two essential analytical intuitions. One is that have is a lexical item that only has a 
functional meaning with no thematic role to assign. The other is that the subject of have-
sentences not only can but also must bind a variable in the complement of have. These two 
points are made explicit in Sæbø’s summarization of two most prominent problems that have to 
be addressed for a sufficient analysis of have.  The “Redundancy Problem” is best illustrated by 
cases where the subject of have cannot saturate the internal argument of a relational noun in the 
complement of have. In such cases, the complement of have appears to contribute the whole 
“meaning core” of the sentence. The matrix subject appears redundant except for providing 
information about what the pronoun in the complement of have refers to, and the verb have just 
provides such a mechanism to make the referring possible and necessary. For example, the 
sentence in (108) simply means that Joan’s grandparents are all alive. The subject specifies what 
the pronoun “her” in the complement of have refers to, and have seems to assume no concrete 
content.  
 
(108) Joan has all her grandparents alive.                   (Sæbø, 2009: ex. 11) 
 58 
 
The other problem, called the “Pertinence Problem”, states that the subject of have has to 
be related to the object, via binding a variable in the object. Though oftentimes such a variable 
explicitly exists in the surface object, the binding also can be implicit. For instance, for the 
sentence in (109) to make sense, the speaker has to be either the operative overseeing the spy or 
the captain of the ship. In either case, the subject binds an implicit variable in the complement of 
have and is pertinent to some entity (the spy or the ship). If the sentence in (109) is modified in a 
way such that the surface DP in the object of have cannot have a variable for the subject of have 
to bind, the speaker can only be the captain of the ship, but not the spymaster. This is illustrated 
by the sentence in (110), where the quantifier phrase “every local CIA agent” allows no variable 
for the subject to bind. 
 
(109) I have a spy aboard.                                            (Sæbø, 2009: ex. 13) 
(110) I have every local CIA agent abroad. 
 
Motivated by the two problems, Sæbø (2009) proposed that have always takes a small 
clause as its underlying object. It does not have a thematic role to assign directly. It only 
contributes abstraction over an individual variable, by way of transforming the small clause into 
a predicate. The variable is necessarily co-indexed with the subject, so that the subject can bind 
something in the small clause object of have. Otherwise, both the subject and the verb would be 
vacuous and have no semantic import (either in terms of content or formally). Schematically:  
 
(111)        Q9                          λx9                    […x9 …] 
            The poor boy       has      his fingers chopped off. 
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Given the representation in (111), on the one hand, have guarantees its subject to bind an 
indexed variable in its object. On the other hand, have supplies an abstractor over the variable in 
the object. The abstraction introduces a theta role to the subject of have; otherwise, the subject 
would have no thematic information and be truly redundant.  An alternative way to construe it is 
that the subject of have starts out somewhere in the small clause object, with no theta role 
assigned to it. It moves to the matrix subject position. In this way, have-sentences are similar to 
passive sentences in English.   
In Sæbø’s final implementation of the idea, have achieves abstraction in a roundabout 
manner. He chose to do so in order to “avoid co-indexing have with its subject”. I do not think 
that this co-indexing would cause any conceptual problems. In fact, Sæbø avoided co-indexing 
have to its subject at the cost of bringing other complexities (especially vacuous binding) in his 
actual final implementation. However, for simplicity of comparison with Sæbø’s analysis, in this 
chapter I will follow the final version of Sæbø’s implementation, which does not involve co-
indexing have with its subject. 
According to Sæbø, the abstraction is achieved in the following way. The subject of have 
undergoes Quantifier Raising, which leaves a trace and introduces a trace variable binder. The 
trace is absorbed by have. The object of have is necessarily an overt or covert small clause which 
contains a variable. This variable needs to be bound. However, after absorbing the trace of the 
QR-ed subject, have “melts away”. As such, have no longer can bind a variable. However, the 
variable in the small clause object of have still needs to be bound. This imposes pressure on the 





(112)      Q                             λx9          x9        λx                      […x9 …] 
            The poor boy                               has          his fingers chopped off. 
 
Specifically, when the complement of have contains a DP alone, this DP is 
“supplemented” by a covert predicate, even if the predicate is trivial. This guarantees the 
underlying object of have to be always a small clause. The small clause provides a variable that 
bears the same index as on the trace of the subject; otherwise the abstraction discussed above 
would be vacuous, and both have and its subject would be redundant. The variable can be present 
either in the surface (relational) DP object or in the predicate of the small clause. When the 
predicate is covertly supplied, it is generally sensitive to the properties of the DP object and 
subject to conventional restraints (Gutiérrez-Rexach, 2006). Such conventional considerations 
restrict the range of possible interpretations of “have” sentences to under one’s custody, at one’s 
disposal, in one’s possession, as part of one, etc. Because of the co-indexing of the variable with 
the subject, the semantic value of the small clause with respect to the individual that is predicated 
of depends on the semantic value of the subject.  
In his analysis, Sæbø (2009) adapted the version of Quantifier Raising proposed by 
Reinhart (1983) and further extended by Büring (2004): DPs freely receive indices and undergo 
Quantifier Raising which involves three steps11.  
 
(113) i. substituting a trace ti for an indexed DP Qi;  
      ii. adjoining Q (without the index) to a dominating node;  
      iii. adjoining a trace binding operator ui to the sister of Q.  
                                                             
11 The choice of this version of QR makes the function of have more obvious, via providing an explicit semantics for 
the variable binder. Choosing the version proposed by Heim and Kratzer (1998: p184-188) can give the right 
semantic derivation but obscures the function of have. 
 61 
 
The LF in (114) outlines the general representation of QR and variable binding in have-
sentences. The underlying object of have is a small clause. The small clause contains an indexed 
variable ti. The verb have itself does not bear any indexing. The subject of have undergoes QR, 
leaving a trace ti and introducing a trace variable binder ui. To capture the requirement that the 
variable in the small clause necessarily co-indexes with the subject of have, ui bears the same 
index as with the variable in the small clause. 
 
(114) [XP [DP Subj.] [XP [μi [XP … ti …[VP HAVE [SC …αi…]]]]]] 
 
The representation in (115b) gives the LF of a case in which the variable in the small 
clause comes from an anaphoric pronoun. The variable also can come from the internal argument 














(115) a. Most cars have their engine in the front.                        
            b.                S                                                            
 
most cars                           S 
   
                          u3                              S 
                                              
                                              t3                             VP 
                                                             
                                                               have                        SC 
                                                                                   
                                                                                their3 engine        in the front 
 
Sæbø (2009) proposed that have denotes a function that transforms its (underlying) small 
clause object into a predicate that involves the same proposition that is expressed by the small 
clause12, 13. The semantic definition is constant regardless of variable assignment.  
 
(116) [[ have]]  = λф λx. ф                           
 
In the small clause-based analysis of have-sentence, the most essential semantic function 
of have is to provide a lambda over an individual variable in the small clause object of have. In 
order for the variable to be co-indexed with the subject, the most direct way is to co-index have 
                                                             
12
 Sæbø (2009) took ф to be a set of state. For the sake of simplicity, in this chapter I take ф to denote a proposition. 
13 The abstraction mechanism of have is similar to that of a relative pronoun (Heim & Kratzer 1998: chapter 5), 
except for that the latter does not involve vacuous binding.  
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with its subject. However, in the definition given in (116), no such (co-)indexing exists. Even 
worse, there is no variable that is bound by the λx. The potential problem of vacuous binding 
arises. The vacuous binding, however, is necessary for the technical setup. It does not persist 
through the whole derivation. Specifically, the lambda introduced by the semantics of have 
serves to “throw away” the trace left by the QR of the subject. By doing so, have paves the way 
for the real abstraction to take place through the trace variable binder μi introduced by the QR 
(117). By way of variable assignment, the definition introduces an un-indexed lambda for the 
variable in the small clause object of have. The real abstraction introduces a theta role for the 
subject of have. 
 
(117) [[ ui]] 
f =  λф λz. [[ Ф ]] 
f[iz]                                              
 
The small clause object of have transforms into a predicate without any index. After the 
subject of have combines with the predicate via function application, it saturates the individual 
argument in the predicate. As such, the subject is naturally pertinent to the complement of have. 
Because a small clause object of have necessarily contains a variable, the pertinence is not only 
possible but also obligatory. This explains the “Pertinence Problem”, which requires that the 
subject of have bind some variable in the complement. 
When the surface object of have is a bare DP, the DP is generally supplemented by a 
covert predicate. Sæbø, however, did not address the question of how to determine the covert 
supplementing predicate. Of course, the issue is important for an explanatorily adequate analysis 
of the meaning of have. If an overt DP object can be supplemented by any predicate, we would 
expect a have-sentence to be multiple-way ambiguous. However, this is not the case. For 
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example, the sentence “John has a sister” does not mean something like that “John has under his 
custody a girl who happens to be his sister”, a reading which would be possible if the covert 
predicate supplementing the object of have is unrestricted.   
In this chapter I choose to follow Gutiérrez-Rexach (2006: p300-303) in proposing that 
the predicate is subject to linguistic and contextual constraints. When a cover predicate is called 
for to form a small clause with an overt DP object of have, the predicate establishes a relation 
that links the subject and the DP object. The relation either characterizes some essential property 
for the object or some property conventionally supplied by extra-linguistic contexts. The former 
type of relation includes existence, kinship, part-whole, etc, and the latter type includes location, 
custody, etc. The (in)animateness of the subject and the (in)definiteness of the object are two 
crucial factors in determining the range of possible relations (Jensen and Vikner, 1996). In this 
chapter I take a step further to hypothesize that a contextual, accidental relation kicks in only 
when the relation involved cannot be essential, such as when an essential relation leads to 
tautologies or contradiction.  For instance, when have takes just a definite DP (like “my car” or 
“the red apple”) as its object, the relation cannot be one of existence, because, being definite, the 
DP itself presupposes existence. Supplementing the DP with a predicate specifying existence 
would yield to a tautological statement. Rather, in such cases, the covert predicate should be 
contextually determined, most likely to specify some temporal and locative information, along 
the lines of suggestions by Iatridou (1996) and Ritter and Rosen (1997). For instance, the same 
phrase “have my car” is supplemented with a different predicate in (118a) than in (118b). The 





(118) a. To go to work today, you can have my car. 
                b. My mechanic sometimes has my car for several weeks.  
 
To illustrate Sæbø’s small clause analysis of have, let us consider the sentence in (119a), 
in which the verb have only embeds a surface DP “a boat”. The LF of the sentence is in (119b), 
and detailed derivation is given in (119c). Because the DP does not involve a relational noun and 
does not contain a variable for the subject to bind, the variable is provided by the covert 
predicate “belong to her3” that supplements the DP. The predicate, which specifies an essential 
possessive relation, is determined by considering how a boat could relate to an individual. There 
are many possible such relations. No contextual information requires the relation to be an 
accidental one, so an essential relation is kicks in by default. The most inherent relation between 
a person and a boat is that the former owns the latter14. 
 
(119) a. Mary has a boat.                                                 (Sæbø, 2009: (44)) 





                                                             
14 I should acknowledge that the discussion is a bit stipulative and has potential issues. For example, while the 
sentence in (119a) is perfect and has a possessive interpretation as discussed, its counterpart with a definite DP is 
generally not grammatical and, to the extent it is, it does not have the same interpretation as (119a). The contrast 
illustrates the ‘definiteness effect’ often discussed in the literature on possessive verbs. The interested reader can 
refer to Gutiérrez-Rexach (2006) for some relevant discussion. 
 
 





            c.      S: ∃xboat(x)  ˄ belong-to(x, Mary)                             
    
        Mary                                S: λz.∃xboat(x) ˄  belong-to(x,z) 
                  
              u3
 :   λф λz. Фf[iz]                                 S: .∃xboat(x) ˄ belong-to(x, f(3)) 
                        
                                           t3                                     VP: λy.∃xboat(x) ˄ belong-to(x, f(3)) 
                               
                                                 have: λфλy.ф                     SC: ∃xboat(x) ˄ belong-to(x, f(3)) 
                                    
                                                                                                 a boat                          λx. belong-to(x, f(3))   
                                                              λP.∃xboat(x)  ˄  P(x)             
                                                                                      λyλx.belong-to(x,y)                              her3 
 
The sentence in (120a) is another example. One difference between (119a) and (120a) is 
that for the latter the covert predicate specifies an accidental property of the object in relation to 
the subject (e.g. “under his custody”). Except for this difference, the syntactic representation and 
semantic derivation of the two sentences are the same.  
 
(120) a. John has all of Mary’s pets. 
         b. [John [u5 [t5 have [all Mary’s pets [under his5 custody]]]]]  




The verb have also has an auxiliary perfect use. The use often causes trouble to attempts 
for a unified analysis of have. De Acosta (2006) suggested that from a historic perspective, the 
construction in which Latin habeo takes a perfect participle small clause serves as the basis for 
the perfect in modern-day English. Towards the end of his paper, Sæbø (2009) entertained this 
suggestion and showed that the semantics of the perfect auxiliary use of have can indeed be 
derived from his treatment of have as taking a small clause object and abstracting over a variable 
in the object.  
2.4.4 Interim  Summary 
The small clause-based approach to the syntactic representation and semantic interpretation of 
have has long been entertained in the literature. Sæbø’s version is probably the most spelled-out 
one. According to his analysis, all have achieves is abstraction, which (indirectly) turns its object 
from a small clause to a predicate. Such treatment provides a uniform analysis of the various 
(non-degree) uses of have. However, none of the literature pursuing the small clause-based 
approach, Sæbø (2009) included, considered the possessive degree construction. In order to 
determine whether the small clause-based approach is explanatorily adequate, the possessive 
equative construction should be examined. This is especially important given that the small 
clause-based approach is just one of the several analyses of have that have been proposed in the 
literature. In the next section I will show that Sæbø’s analysis can be readily extended to the 
possessive equative construction.  
 
2.5 The small clause analysis and the Chinese you in its non-degree uses 
Obviously, Sæbø’s discussion was primarily based on English data. Even within English, he 
considered only the non-degree uses of have. There are two closely-related questions that still 
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remain to be tackled. The first one is whether his small clause-based analysis is extendable to the 
non-degree use of the Chinese you. The other one is whether the analysis can be applied to the 
possessive equative construction. In this section, I will focus on the first question. In particular, I 
will observe some similarities between non-degree uses of you with non-degree uses of have. 
These observations are compatible with or even point to the essential analytic intuitions that 
drive the small clause-based analysis: (i) the verb you is a lexical item that has a mere functional 
meaning with no semantic role to assign (i.e. the “Redundancy Problem”), and (ii) the subject of 
non-degree you binds a variable in the complement of the verb and has not other semantic import 
(i.e. the “Relevance Problem”). I believe that the similarities would establish that Sæbø’s 
analysis of non-degree uses of have can be applied to non-degree uses of you.   
2.5.1 The diverse uses of you 
On the intuitive level, the Chinese you appears to have a wide range of meanings. The 
heterogeneity of intuitive meanings of you is very similar to the case with have. The sentence in 
(121) says that John is in possession of some new car. (122a-b) specify what exists on the table. 
(122a) involves the subject zhuozi shang ‘table-top’. Following Huang (1987) I assume the 
subject is not a prepositional phrase, but a locative DP/NP. (122b) does not have an overt subject. 
The two sentences have very similar interpretations. (123) can be understood to involve an 
existential reading, as suggested by the English translation with there be. It is different from 
(122a) in that the subject does not denote a location. (124) expresses a part-whole relation 
between the windows and the room. (125) means that John being to the Great Wall has 
happened15. However, for some other uses, their intuitive meaning is not clear. Does the sentence 
                                                             
15 The use of you as an aspect marker is grammatical only in some dialects and registers of Chinese. Compared to 
the regular guo perfect maker, you is often used to stress “something has been done” in an attempt to dispute a 
previous claim that the thing has not been done. 
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in (126) mean the doctor will have the experience of seeing many patients today? Does the 
sentence in (127) mean they somehow possess or experience some relevant interest? Still for 
some other sentences, their intuitive meanings of you are even murkier. The verb you in (128) is 
absolutely optional and appears to contribute nothing to the structure and meaning of the 
sentence. For the sentence in (129), you takes a clause as its surface object and cannot have the 
hypothetically most likely “existence” or “part-whole” meaning, because the button has already 
fallen off from the shirt. The examples represent a broad range of contexts where the Chinese 
verb you can be used.  
 
(121) Zhangsan   you   yi      liang     xin     che                                  (possession) 
            Zhangsan  have  one     CL       new    car 
            ‘Zhangsan has a new car.’ 
(122)  a. zhuozi   shang     you      san       ben     shu                    (location/existence) 
           table       top        have    three     CL      book 
         ‘There are three books on the table.’ 
             b. you     san    ben    shu    zai    zhuozi    shang. 
                 have   three   CL   book   at      table        top 
                 ‘There are three books on the table.’ 
(123) zhe    ge   anzi     zuijin    you    le     xin     de    jinzhan                      (happening) 
            this   CL   case   recently  have  LE   new MOD  progress 





(124) zhe       ge      fangjian     you        si        shan     chuanghu                (part-whole) 
              this     CL      room        have     four      CL         window 
             ‘The room has four windows.’ 
(125) zhangsan      you     qu     guo      changcheng.                                        (aspectual) 
                John         have    go    GUO    the Great Wall 
              ‘John has been to the Great Wall.’ 
(126) Wang    yisheng    jintian   you     henduo   bingren                   (relational? experience?) 
        Wang    doctor     today    have    many     patient  
     ‘Dr. Wang has many patients today.’ 
(127) tamen  you   xingqu   nadao  suoxu    de     wenjian.             (possession? experience?) 
  they  have  interest  obtain  needed  MOD  document 
‘They are interested in getting all the required documents.’    
(128) ta    guang    Beijing    jiu    qu    le    you     haoji           tang.                (?) 
            he   alone     Beijing   EMP  go   LE  have   quite a few  round of trip 
          ‘He went to Beijing quite a few times, (let alone other places.)’ 
(129) ta      chenyi     you     ge      niukou   diao       le                                       (?) 
            his      shirt      have    CL    button   pop off    LE 
     ‘His shirt has a button pop off of it.’ 
2.5.2 The “Pertinence Problem” with you 
Not only do have and you share a similar range of uses, but also in their shared uses, they display 
very similar properties. For the purpose of this chapter, I will discuss some similarities that are 
most relevant for extending the small clause-based analysis to the non-degree uses of you. In 
particular, I will examine whether and how the two general problems that motivate the small 
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clause analysis are relevant to the Chinese you. Let us start with the “Pertinence Problem”, which 
says that the subject of the possessive verb has to the pertinent to an element in the object. This 
holds for the canonical possessive use of you, because the subject must be related to the object by 
possessing it. The sentence in (130) will express a false proposition if any of the three books 
belongs to anyone else. 
 
(130) zhangsan    you      san    ben    shu 
   John        have   three    CL   book 
‘John has three books.’ 
 
Things are more complex for the existential use of you. As discussed in Huang (1987), a 
you-existential can contain an overt locative DP subject (as in (122a)) or nothing overt occupies 
the subject position (as in (122b)). When the locative subject is overt, it denotes a location which 
relates to the object such that the location is where the object is asserted to exist. The pertinence 
relation between the subject and the object is obvious. When nothing overt is in the subject, there 
are two sub-cases, in which the pertinence relation is less obvious.  In the first sub-case, the 
subject is contextually implied. This is possible because Chinese is a pro-drop language. The 
object of you can be pertinent to this pragmatically supplied subject. For instance, the sentence in 
(131) has an understood subject depending on the context of use (e.g. chufang li ‘kitchen-inside’, 
zhe’er ‘here’). The understood subject is the place where the object is located. In the second sub-
case, the subject is a semantically empty expletive (132), and the pertinence relation is satisfied 




(131) you       gui! 
               have   ghost 
               ‘There are ghosts (here).’                     (Huang, 1987: p227) 
(132) you    san     ge     ren        zai    fangjian    li         shuohua. 
have  three   CL  people     at       room     inside    talking 
‘There are three people talking in the room.’ 
  
In addition, when there is more than one way for the subject of a you sentence to be 
pertinent to an element in the object, the sentence is ambiguous. For example, the referent of 
tamen ‘they’ in (133) can bear a relation either to mitan ‘spies’ or to chuan ‘ship’. Just like the 
English sentence in (109), (133) is ambiguous between the situation in which the referent of 
tamen are operatives of the spies and the situation in which they are captains or owners of the 
ship. 
 
(133) tamen   you       ji         ming   mitan   cang    zai    chuan  shang 
              they    have   several    CL       spy     hide     at      ship     in 
            ‘They have several spies hidden on the ship.’   
 
Furthermore, if the pertinence requirement for the subject of you is not satisfied, 
unacceptability would arise. In (134), the noun phrase shizhengting ‘town hall’ is hard to be 
conceived as being pertinent to the subject tamen. Nor can there be a covert supplementing 




(134) %tamen   you     ji         ge    moshengren   zai    shizhengting   waitou     shuohua 
they    have   a few    CL      stranger        at       town  hall      outside        talk 
‘%They have a few strangers talking outside of the town hall building.’ 
2.5.3 The “Redundancy Problem” with you 
One essential characteristic of the small clause-based analysis of the possessive verb have is that 
it is a functional item without content contribution. If the syntax of a construction that contains a 
function item does not require overt presence of the item, then the item is optional. For you, there 
indeed exist cases where its semantic contribution is so trivial that it can be totally omitted 
without affecting the meaning of the sentence. For such cases, the subject has to be a clause 
which denotes a state or repeatable event that can be measured, and the object denotes the 
temporal duration of the state or the number of units (times, rounds of trips, etc) that the event 
happened. The omissibility of you in such cases suggests that it is most likely a functional item 
and makes no contribution to its semantic content. In (135) ta dai yanjing is a clausal subject; 
hao ji nian in the object position of you specifies how long the state of his wearing glasses has 
lasted16. The sentence means the same as its counterpart without you. The same remark applies to 
the sentences in (136). 
 
(135) ta      dai      yanjing   yijing     (you)     hao      ji         nian     le 
            he     wear    glasses   already   have   some  several     year   ASP 
            ‘He has worn glasses for quite a few years.’ 
 
                                                             
16
 The verb you in (135) is not a perfect auxiliary. If it were, it would require a main verb in the predicate of the 
sentence. The subject is a clause, and the verb dai cannot be the main verb for the whole sentence. Therefore, you is 
the predicate for the whole sentence. 
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(136) a. zhangsan  guang  Beijing   jiu    qu    le     (you)     san         tang 
          John         alone   Beijing  EMP  go   LE   have      three    round of  trip 
               ‘John has made quite three trips to Beijing, (and he has done other things).’ 
             b. ta   bing   le     you        san       ge    yue       le. 
                 he   ill      LE   have     three   CL    month    LE 
               ‘He has been ill for three months.’ 
2.5.4 you taking a surface small clause object 
Just like the English have, you also allows a surface small clause as the object. Huang (1987) 
already argued that in an existential you-sentence in which a DP object is supplemented by a 
predicate, the object and the predicate together can be understood as a small clause. When an 
overt small clause is involved, the subject in the small clause can be either a weak or a strong DP. 
The sentence in (137) involves a weak DP, while (138-139) a strong DP.  When the object is a 
weak DP, the supplementing predicate can be a stage-level or an individual-level one. However, 
when it is a strong DP, it can only be a stage-level predicate.  
 
(137) na      ge   lao    ren   xianzai   zhi    you   ge     nüer        hai    huozhe 
            that   CL  old    man    now    only  have  CL  daughter     still    alive 
           ‘Now the old man only has a daughter still alive.’         
(138) ta   you   naxie    zhengju  zai  shou,  yinggai  gao   na    jia    gongsi. 
            he  have   those  evidence  in   hand  should   sue   that  CL   company 





(139) zhangsan    mingtian      you      zhe      san     fen    wenjian      yao     qian      
                  John        tomorrow     have     this    three   CL    document    need   sign 
               ‘John has these three documents to sign tomorrow.’ 
 
Moreover, it has been repeatedly observed in the literature that the preposition with in 
English allows a small clause as its argument (van Riemsdijk, 1978; Fabricius-Hansen, 2006). 
The Mandarin verb you can be used very similarly, just as if it is just a preposition taking a small 
clause complement. The Chinese sentence in (140) has exactly the same meaning as the English 
sentence in (140). This parallel behavior provides additional evidence that a small clause can 
figure in as the object of you in Chinese.    
 
(140) you    moshengren   aichang,  na    ge   haisi   mei  gan   changge. 
 have    stranger      present    the   CL  child   not   dare    sing 
(141) With strangers present, the kid didn’t dare to sing. 
2.5.5 Some differences between you and have 
The two verbs, you and have, do not have exactly the same range of uses or the same linguistic 
properties. Each has uses that the other does not share. For example, you does not have the 
causative use as English have does, as illustrated by the grammaticality contrast between (142a) 
and (142b). However, the absence of such a use per se poses no challenge to extending Sæbø’s 
analysis to the Chinese possessive verb. Sæbø took the causative have to be a separate lexical 
item, citing the evidence that in Mainland Scandinavian and German the causative reading 
corresponding to causative have in English is expressed by a verb different from the non-
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causative correspondent of have. It is reasonable to assume that in Chinese the two lexical items 
do not converge into one either. 
 
(142) a. Yesterday the teacher had the students read the article three times. 
            b. zuotian     laoshi   *you/rang/shi  xuesheng   du    (le)    na   pian wenzhang  san   bian. 
            yesterday  teacher   have/let/make   student    read  ASP  that  CL  article      three  time 
 
On the other hand, the Chinese verb you has its own peculiar uses that are absent from 
have. We have already seen that English does not have the equivalent of the sentences in (135-
136). Here is an additional peculiar use of you that have lacks. You can be used to divide a group 
of individuals into subgroups based on distinguishing properties. The sentence in (143) involves 
this use of you. It enumerates groups of kids based on what activities they are doing. The English 
have has no equivalent use. Without getting into formal details, I hypothesize that this particular 
use of you is just a special case of its existential use. The sentence in (143) means that there are 
kids who are running, there are kids who are jumping, and there are kids who are playing 
basketball, and no kids are doing other activities. If the hypothesis is on the right track, this 
special use does not challenge the small clause-based analysis of possessive verbs, because the 
analysis is able to cover the existential use of possessive verbs.   
 
(143) na’er   haizi    hen    duo,   you   pao    de,    you    tiao     de,      you   da   qiu  de 
         there     kid    very   many  have  run  MOD, have  jump MOD  have play ball MOD 




Even in the same use, you and have may exhibit distinct properties. For example, both 
verbs can take an overt small clause as its surface object. However, as discussed by Iatridou 
(1996), for the English have, the predicate in the small clause is a stage-level/episodic one. The 
restriction is much looser in the case of the Chinese you, as is evident from the grammaticality 
contrast between (144) and (145). 
 
(144) a. *He has a student very smart.     
                b. He has a student standing over there. 
(145)  ta    you     ge      xuesheng   hen  congming 
       he    have   CL      student    very   smart    
       ‘He has a student who is very smart.’ 
2.5.6 Extending the small clause analysis to non-degree uses of you 
I have shown in sections 2.5.2-2.5.4 that the “Pertinence Problem” and “Redundancy Problem” 
also hold for the Chinese you.  It is right the two problems that motivate Sæbø’s analysis of have 
as an abstractor. The similarities between you and have point to that the small clause-based 
analysis of the English have can be extended to you, (at least) as far as their shared non-degree 
uses are concerned.  
 It already has been observed that non-degree uses of you can take an explicit small 
clause as the object. In this case, the small clause must contain a variable which the subject of 
you can bind. This variable can be the internal argument of a relational noun in the small clause. 
For example, in (146) the overt object of you, yixie lingjian huaile ‘some parts broken’, 
expresses a proposition on its own and constitutes a small clause. The noun lingjian ‘a 
(mechanical) part’ expresses a relational notion because a part is always a part to some host (a 
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computer, a car, etc). The internal argument of the relational noun lingjian can be construed as a 
variable that needs to be bound by the subject of you. The sentence can be paraphrased as (147), 
which does not contain the verb you and has the internal argument position of lingjian ‘a part’ 
filled by jiqi ‘a machine’. The noun jiqi ‘a machine’ modifies, and forms a constituent with, 
lingjian ‘a part’. This claim is supported by the fact that the modifier marker de can be inserted 
between them (jiqi de yixie lingjian ‘some parts of the machine’) without affecting the meaning 
of the sentence. The equivalence of meaning indicates that in the original sentence in (146) you 
has no semantic role to play. The verb only provides a mechanism such that the matrix subject 
can saturate the internal argument of the relational noun. Sæbø argued that, for the English have, 
the saturation is achieved through the matrix subject binding a variable in the small clause object. 
I propose that for Chinese you, the saturation is realized in a parallel fashion.  
 
(146) jiqi         you     yixie   lingjian      huai      le 
          machine  have    some     part        broken   ASP 
         ‘The machine has some parts broken.’ 
(147)  jiqi          (de)        yixie   liangjian     huai         le 
             machine    MOD     some    part           broken    ASP      
 
Second, when non-degree uses of you take a definite phrase in its object, the phrase has to 
be followed by an overt predicate, and the overt predicate has to include a variable for the matrix 
subject to bind. For example, in (148) xiachang bisai ‘the next competition’ refers to one 
particular competition in a context and is a definite expression. Its presence in the sentence is 
ungrammatical unless it is supplemented by a predicate such as yao canjia ‘has to attend’. 
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Crucially, the predicate itself contains a variable which corresponds to the agent for canjia 
‘attend’. The matrix subject binds the covert variable, and you makes the binding possible and 
necessary. The sentence can be paraphrased as (149) without the verb you but with the subject of 
you filling the subject position of the resulting clause. Again, the equivalence of the two 
sentences suggests that you makes no semantic contribution to the meaning of the sentence, 
except for providing a formal mechanism whereby the subject of you binds a variable in the 
small clause object.  
 
(148) ta     hai    you      xia    chang    bisai          *(yao  canjia). 
            he    still   have    next    CL    competition    must  attend 
           ‘He still has the next competition *(to attend).’ 
(149) ta   hai    yao   canjia    xiachang   bisai. 
 
The above two cases of you both involve an overt small clause as the object of you. There 
exist many cases in which you embeds a bare DP object without an overt supplementing 
predicate. Just as with English have sentences, in such cases the surface DP can be understood to 
be supplemented by an implicit predicate. For instance, for the canonical possessive use of you, 
its surface object is a DP (150a). With the small clause-based analysis of possessive verbs, the 
possessive interpretation does not come from the verb you per se. It is contributed by a covert 
predicate. This predicate cannot be a random one, but is restricted by some essential relation 
between the object and the subject. A person and a book, for example, are essentially related by 
the possessor-possessee relation (Gutiérrez-Rexach, 2006). The covert predicate for the 
canonical possessive interpretation of possessive verbs is something like “in her possession”. 
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Adopting the formal representation proposed by Sæbø (2009), the Logical Form and semantic 
derivation of (150a) is given in (150b). 
 
(150) a. mali     you     yi    ben    shu      [ shuyu    ta ]. 
               Mary   have   one  CL     book    in her possession 
              ‘Mary has a book.’ 
b. S: ∃x.book(x) ∧ belong-to(x, Mary)                             
    
      Mali          S: λz.∃xbook(x) ∧ belong-to(x, z) 
                  
              u3 : λф λz. Ф
f[iz]     S: ∃xbook(x) ∧ belong-to(x, f(3)) 
                        
                                           t3         VP: λy.∃xbook(x) ∧ belong-to(x, f(3)) 
                               
                                               you: λфλy.ф        SC: ∃x.book(x) ∧ belong-to(x, f(3)) 
                                    
                                                                  yibenshu              VP:  λx. belong-to(x, f(3)) 
                                                             λP∃x.book(x) ∧ P(x)                    
                                                                                          shuyu                    her3 
                                                                                    λyλx.belong-to(x, y) 
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This brief examination of the applicability of the small clause-based analysis of have to 
the Chinese you further suggests that the analysis successfully captures non-degree uses of you. 
In the next section, I will show that the possessive equative construction receives a natural 
explanation under the same analysis.  
 
2.6 Analyzing the possessive equative construction 
Recall that in Chinese there is a possessive equative construction of the form “X + you + Y + G”, 
as illustrated in (151). The construction means that X’s degree on the dimension specified by G 
exceeds or equals Y’s degree on the same dimension. Now that I have established that the small 
clause-based analysis of have is applicable to the non-equative uses of Chinese you, the question 
is reduced to whether this analysis can be extended to the possessive equative construction. 
Given how the small clause-based analysis works, the question further boils down to whether 
there can be an appropriate variable that can be bound by the subject of you. The variable is co-
indexed with the subject and is present in “Y + G” or in a covert predicate which exists within or 
supplementing “Y+G”. If “Y + G” contains such a variable, or a variable can be naturally 
construed in a covert supplementing predicate, then the small clause-based analysis can be 
maintained for the possessive equative construction. Otherwise, an alternative analysis should be 
sought for to explain the use of you in the possessive equative construction. 
 
(151) zhangsan   you    ta      gege       gao    
   John       have   his   brother     tall 




2.6.1 “Y + G” is not a small clause 
It is worth pointing out first that “Y + G” itself is not a small clause. There are many pieces of 
evidence in support of this claim. First, a small clause differs from a full-fledged clause only in 
that the former lacks an inflectional category. Because the missing inflectional category does not 
have semantic import, a small clause also denotes a proposition. Therefore, if “Y + G” itself is a 
small clause, it would have the same semantic interpretation as “Y is G” or “Y is G-er”, 
depending on what morph-syntactic properties of G (see Grano, 2011). The verb you does not 
affect entailment. We can expect the possessive equative construction to necessarily entail “Y is 
G” (or “Y is G-er”).  However, the construction does not have such an entailment pattern17. For 
example, Rhode Island is the smallest state in terms of area among the 50 US states. Thus, 
“Rhode Island is big” and “Rhode Island is bigger” are both false in a context of comparing 
states in the US.  If luodedao zhou da ‘Rhode Island is big(ger)’ in the sentence in (152) is a 
small clause, then the whole sentence would entail luodedao zhou da. Because the entailed 
proposition is false, the entailing sentence should also express a false proposition. But this is not 
the case. From this, we can conclude luodedao zhou da in (152) cannot be a small clause. 
 
(152)   xinzexi         zhou     de     mianji   you      luodedao        zhou     da   
           New Jersey     state    MOD   area    have   Rhode Island    state     big 
           ‘The state of New Jersey has an area as big as the state of Rhode Island.’ 
 
                                                             
17  When the relevant adjective is inherently evaluative, the entailment pattern does exist. However, in this case the 
entailment does not come from the specification of the possessive equative construction per se, but from the inherent 
evaluativity of the adjective.  
 
(i) zhangsan  you    ta       gege              name  ben 
   John      have   his   elder brother   that  stupid 
‘John is as stupid as his brother.’ 
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In addition, when the Y element is a measure phrase rather than a phrase denoting an 
individual, event, etc, it is even more obvious that “Y + G” cannot mean “Y is G” or “Y is G-er”. 
No matter how big or small the degree denoted by the measure phrase Y is, G can appear after Y. 
If “Y + G” was a small clause, it would be equivalent to saying that any degree on the dimension 
associated with G exceeds the standard of being G. Obviously, this cannot the case. 
Second, a demonstrative pronoun such as name ‘that’ and zheme ‘this’ can optionally 
intervene between the Y element and G element, whether Y is a phrase denoting an individual, 
event, etc, or a measure phrase (153). What such a demonstrative pronoun refers to is dependent 
on the immediate context in which it is used.  In Chinese, a demonstrative pronoun such as name 
and zheme cannot refer to a proposition. This is another piece of evidence that “Y + G” does not 
denote a proposition and thus cannot be a small clause. 
 
(153) zhe   ben    shu    mei     you     na    ben    na’me      youyisi. 
this   CL    book   not     have   that   CL     that      interesting 
‘This book is not as interesting as that one.’ 
(154) yuanzi   li        de      shu    yijing     you    men   zheme   gao   le    
 yard   inside  MOD  tree   already    have   door   this      tall    ASP 
‘The tree in the yard is already as tall as the door.’ 
 
Still another piece of evidence has to do with modifying of the G element with a factor 
phrase like half and three times. The sentence in (155) is grammatical. However, ta meimei yiban 
yonggong is ungrammatical if it is used as an independent clause (156). The ungrammaticality is 
attributable to the fact that the adjective yonggong ‘diligent’ has an open scale and cannot be 
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modified by “half” when it is used as a predicate (Kennedy and McNally, 2005). The 
grammaticality of (155) suggests that yonggong in the sentence is not a predicate, and as such ta 
meimei yiban yonggong cannot be a small clause.  
 
(155) zai  xuexiao, zhangsan   zhi     you     ta     memei             yiban  yonggong  
             at   school      John        only    have   his  younger sister    half    diligent 
            “John is only half as diligent as his younger sister at school.’ 
(156) *ta meimei  yiban  yonggong 
 
A closely related piece of evidence is that G cannot be modified by a degree modifier in 
general such as hen ‘very’ and feichang ‘extraordinarily’ (157). This is obviously different from 
a simple degree sentence, in which the gradable predicate can be modified by a degree modifier 
(158). The fact provides further support to the claim that G is not used as a predicate in the 
possessive equative construction, and that “Y + G” is not a small clause. 
 
(157) wo     zoulu    you      wo    baba     qi      che       (*hen)    kuai. 
                 I       walk     have    my    dad      ride   bicycle    very     fast 
                ‘I walk as fast as my dad rides a bicycle.’ 
(158) wo    baba     qi      che      hen     kuai. 
2.6.2 Two restrictions on the dimension 
In the possessive equative construction “X + you + Y + G”, the “Y + G” chunk does not denote a 
proposition. Furthermore, the chunk does not involve an anaphor, pronoun, relational noun, etc 
that can contribute a variable which eventually co-indexes with the subject X. In order for the 
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small clause analysis of possessive verbs to extend to the possessive equative construction, there 
has to be a variable in the complement of you. I propose that for the construction the variable is 
supplied by a covert predicate P that augments “Y + G”. The remaining task is to explore 
whether an appropriate predicate with a variable can be proposed from independent facts.  
The previous discussion has already established that the possessive degree construction 
expresses some comparative relation. For a comparison to make sense, the two comparison items 
have to be comparable in the first place. It is valid to compare an apple to an apple, not an apple 
to an orange. On the intuitive level, the possessive degree construction “X + you + Y + G” 
compares X and Y with respect to the dimension specified by G. But is there any empirical 
evidence beyond intuition to motivate the claim that X and Y are compared with respect to one 
common dimension, i.e. G-ness? 
There are indeed two restrictions, one crosslinguistically general and one Chinese-
specific, to warrant the claim. The first one has to do with what is called degree 
incommensurability (Kennedy, 1999). Adjectives that have different dimensional properties are 
anomalous in comparative and equative constructions. This anomaly exists both in English and 
in Chinese (159-160). Therefore, for the possessive equative construction, the dimension against 
which Y is measured has to be the same as X is measured. More concretely, for (161), the 
dimension used to measure John has to be the same dimension to measure his brother, and this 
common dimension is the physical extent of entities. The sentence cannot mean, say, that John’s 
degree of intelligence equals or exceeds John’s brother’s height. 
 
(159) a. *The book is more expensive than the computer is heavy. 
             b. *John is as happy as Mary is clever. 
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(160) a. *zhe   ben   shu     gui           bi      na    tai     diannao    zhong 
                 this   CL   book  expensive  BI  that   CL   computer  heavy 
                a. *zhangsan  kuai   gen   mali   congming   yiyang 
                      John      fast    with   Mary    clever     the same 
(161) zhangsan    you      ta        gege       gao    
   John        have     his     brother     tall 
‘John is as tall as his elder brother.’ 
 
There is another firmer restriction in Chinese. In Chinese, even when two adjectives 
express the same dimension (e.g. physical extent) but different dimensional perspectives (e.g. 
height vs. width), they are prohibited from appearing in a comparative or equative sentence. This 
particular constraint manifests itself in the subdeletion construction, a comparative/equative 
structure in which the embedded clause involves a predicate of a different dimensional 
perspective than the main clause does, and can stand on its own as an independent clause. 
Subdeletion is allowed in English, as evidenced by the grammaticality of the sentences in (162).   
 
(162) a. The space telescope is longer than it is wide. 
            b. The Mars rock called “Barnacle Bill” is as wide as it is tall.         
 
Kennedy (2007b) attributed the crosslinguistic variation regarding the availability of the 
subdeletion construction to different comparative strategies used in different languages. 
Comparatives in English express ordering between individuals and degrees, while comparatives 
in Chinese express ordering between individuals with respect to a property. This is why Chinese 
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disallows the subdeletion construction, as illustrated by the sentences in (163). Therefore, in 
Chinese not only cross-dimensional comparison is disallowed from being expressed via the 
comparative and equative constructions, but subdeletion within the same dimension yet across 
different dimensional perspectives is prohibited18.  
 
(163) a. *tianwenwangyuanjing    chang    bi     ta     kuan 
          space-telescope           long     BI     it     wide     
    intended: ‘The space telescope is longer than it is wide.’ 
             b. *tianwenwangyuanjing    gen    ta    kuan     yizhang   chang 
                     space-telescope           with    it    wide       same      long 
                intended: ‘The space telescope is as wide as it is long.’ 
2.6.3 The exact nature of the relation in the small clause 
The two restrictions above independently require the dimension against which X is measured to 
be exactly identical to the dimension (perspective) against which Y is measured. Now the task 
narrows down to specifying the exact nature of the relation that can hold between X and Y along 
the dimension specified by G, i.e. X’s degree of being G and Y’s degree of being G. 
                                                             
18 Lin (2009) analyzed that the sentences in (163) involve proposition comparison, and that proposition comparison 
is not possible in Chinese (also see Xiang (2003, 2005), Li (2008)). Though I agree with the general analysis in his 
paper, I believe that his explanation of the ungrammaticality of (163) is on the wrong track. Clausal comparatives 
should not be identified with proposition comparison; they are two separate notions. To see this, compare the 
sentences in (i) with (ii). The former involves proposition comparison. The two sub-clauses in the sentence both 
express propositions and involve a POS morpheme, which contributes the positive interpretation. The sentence means 
that it is more important for her to be happy than for her husband to be wealthy. It does not compare the degree of 
her being happy and the degree of her husband being wealthy.  On the other hand, the sentence in (ii) does not 
involve a POS morpheme. It compares the table’s length to the table’s width, but not the proposition that the table is 
long to the proposition that the table is wide. I think that the sentences in (166) are parallel to (ii) but not to (i). They 
do not involve propositional comparison.  
 
(i) That she is happy is more important than her husband is wealthy. 




Towards this end, it is helpful to consider the ontology of degrees. Traditional analyses 
took degrees as points on a scale. Kennedy (1999, 2001) and Schwarzschild and Wilkinson 
(2002), among others, showed that such a model fails to capture several important patterns 
regarding comparative constructions. One of them is the so-called Cross-polar Anomaly (CPA): 
comparative constructions formed out of a pair of antonymous adjectives are semantically 
anomalous. The anomaly is exemplified by such sentences as in (164). Treating degrees as points 
cannot explain the anomaly. Based on such facts, Kennedy proposed that degrees should be 
formalized as intervals on a scale that ranges from the minimum point on that dimension to 
where the degree ends. It is not the maximum point of the degree interval. In addition, in the 
interval-based representation, degrees are classified into two types: positive degrees (for fast, 
expensive etc) vs. negative degrees (for slow, cheap, etc). The CPA construction is anomalous 
because it involves comparison of degrees of opposite polarity (Kennedy, 1999, 2001). 
 
(164) a. *The computer is more expensive than the book is cheap. 
               b. *The downtown area is dirtier than the suburb area is clean. 
 
The possessive equative construction compares X and Y on the dimension specified by G. 
This amounts to saying that the construction compares X’s degree of being G and Y’s degree of 
being G. Because degrees are intervals, the construction compares two degree intervals that fall 
on the same scale. In addition, the two degree intervals have a common starting point (Bierwisch, 
1989: p112-115).   
Recall our assumption that possessive verbs generally characterize essential relations (e.g. 
possession, kinship, part-whole, etc.) between the subject and the object. Only when an essential 
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relation is impossible will an “accidental” relation (e.g. location, custody) come to the rescue 
(Gutiérrez-Rexach, 2006). The most essential relation that can exist between two intervals that 
have the same starting point is one interval being the sub-interval of the other. This is in 
agreement with Bierwisch’s idea (1989: p112-115) that the two degree intervals for comparison 
have a common starting point and enter into an overlapping relation. The question is which one 
is the sub-interval, and which one is the super-interval. 
In order to answer this question, it is useful to look at some other uses of possessive verbs 
for possible hints. When doing so, I would like to maintain an informal discussion that mainly 
draws on native intuition. Both the subject and object of have/you can be a bare DP. The subject 
and the object can be type-shifted to denote a set whose elements are determined with reference 
to how the subject and the object are related to each other. With respect to the relation between 
the two sets, I hypothesize that the set corresponding to the object is always a subset of the set 
corresponding to the subject.   
More concretely, for the canonical use of a possessive verb to denote possession or 
ownership, the set that contains the referent of the object is a subset of the set that contains the 
referent of the subject. For example, the sentences in (165) express that among the things that 
belong to John are two books written by Russell. For the existential use of possessive verbs, the 
same subset relation holds between the set containing the referent of the object and the set that 
specifies entities located within the referent of the subject. For the eventive use of have in (166), 
the reception is just one of all the things or events that will take place in the library tonight 
(whatever they will be). Possessive verbs can express the part-whole relation. The part-whole 
relation clearly coincides with the subset relation. The sentences in (167), for example, say that 
the three relevant doors exist as part of the house. It is equivalent to saying that the set whose 
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elements are the three doors is a subset of the set that contains all the constituents of the house. 
Possessive verbs can characterize the kinship relation as well. The kinship relation can also be 
construed as a subset relation. For the sentences in (168), the set that contains the three cousins 
of John is a subset of the set that contains, say, all John’s relatives.  
 
(165) a. John has two books written by Russell. 
            b. Zhangsan   you     liang   ben    luosu       xie        de        shu  
 John       have     two    CL    Russell   written   MOD   book 
(166) a. The library will have a reception tonight. 
             b. tushuguan   jintian   wanshang    you    zhaodaihui. 
 library        today      evening     have     reception     
(167) a. The house has three doors. 
               b. na       ge     fangzi    you    san        shan    men. 
                   that    CL     house     have   three       CL    door 
(168) a. John has three cousins. 
               b. zhangsan     you      san       ge     tangxiongmei 
                      John          have    three    CL     cousins 
 
Even for the intuitively most remote present perfect use of possessive verbs, the subset 
relation as depicted above holds. The complement of the perfect auxiliary usually denotes an 
event. The event yields a resultant state that succeeds the running time of the event (Kamp and 
Reyle, 1993). This state is one of the states in which the subject has experienced or brought 
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about through instigating an event.  In (169), for example, the relevant state in which the apple 
has been consumed is one of the states which resulted from Mary’s eating the apple. 
 
(169) a. Mary has eaten the apple. 
             b. (?) Mali   you   chi     le      na     ge   pingguo 
                       Mary  have  eat    LE    that   CL   apple 
 
It is clear that the set associated with the object is the subset of the set associated with the 
subject. In this sense, the subject of possessive verbs is “super-ordinate” to the object. I assume 
that the same consideration applies to the degree use of you in the possessive degree construction. 
Given that degree intervals can be defined set theoretically as a convex, nonempty subset of a 
scale (Kennedy, 2001), the subinterval relation between the two degrees in the construction is 
tantamount to the subset relation observed with non-degree uses of possessive verbs. For the “X 
+ you + Y + G” construction, Y’s degree on the dimension specified by G is the subinterval/ 
subset of X’s degree on the dimension. For the sentence in (161) to be true, John’s brother’s 
height has to be a subinterval of John’s height. 
Under the small clause-based analysis of possessive verbs, the degree use of you does not 
directly set up the subinterval/subset relation between the two degrees. Rather, the relation is 
contributed by the predicate of the small clause. At the same time, the predicate should contain a 
variable that is co-indexed with the subject X. Given all the considerations, the predicate should 
be something like “being a subinterval/subset of ei’s degree on the dimension specified by G”, 
where the index i comes from the subject. The covert predicate for the sentence in (161) is 
“being a subinterval of ei’s height”.  
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2.6.4 Zooming in on the small clause  
Now that it is clear about the surface form of the small clause in the possessive equative 
construction, what is the syntactic structure of the small clause? To answer the question, there 
are two issues that need to be taken into consideration. One has to do with the lack of 
comparative subdeletion with the possessive equative construction in Chinese. The other 
concerns the relation of the possessive equative construction to another comparative construction 
in Chinese. Addressing the two issues will provide clues to analyzing the syntactic structure of 
the possessive equative construction.  
Comparative subdeletion is not allowed with the “X + you + Y + G” construction, as 
evidenced from the ungrammaticality of the sentences in (174-175). Kennedy (2007b) proposed 
that languages show parametric variation between individual comparison and degree comparison. 
Individual comparison expresses ordering between two individuals along a common dimension, 
and degree comparison expresses ordering between an individual and an arbitrary degree. 
Kennedy correlated the absence of comparative subdeletion to individual comparison. Individual 
comparison lacks degree abstraction, and as such, cannot compare degrees directly. Comparative 
subdeletion involves two degrees on different dimensions which need to be compared and is not 
possible with individual comparison. Under the dichotomization, the Chinese “X + you + Y + G” 
construction should involve individual comparison.  
 
(170) *na     zhang     zhuozi      you     shujia    gao   kuan  19 . 
              that     CL         table      have      shelf     tall   wide 
             ‘The table is as tall as the shelf is wide.’ 
 
                                                             
19 Changing the order of ‘gao’ and ‘kuan’ or moving them around in the sentence will not make it grammatical. 
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(171) *zhe     tiao   he     you     na    tiao    he     shen   kuan. 
              this    CL    river  have   that    CL   river  deep   wide 
            ‘This river is as deep as that river is wide.’  
 
The discussion in section 3 has suggested that semantically the possessive equative 
construction patterns with the English as…as equative construction. However, structurally, the 
possessive equative construction appears similar to the bi-comparative construction in Chinese. 
The only surface difference is that the former construction involves the verb you and the latter 
involves the preposition bi: “X + you + Y + G” versus “X + bi + Y + G”. The bi-comparative 
construction has been shown to involve individual comparison as well (Xiang, 2005; Lin, 2009; 
cf. Liu, 1996). Do the two constructions have parallel syntactic structure? 
The question can be further narrowed down to whether the syntactic position of you in 
the possessive equative construction is identical to that of bi in the bi-comparative position. The 
answer is negative. In a bi-comparative sentence of the form “X + bi + Y + G”, bi and Y form a 
single constituent (Lin, 2009). For the possessive equative construction, you and Y do not form a 
syntactic consistent. The difference is illustrated by the contrast between (172) and (173). 
 
(172) zhangsan  jintian    bi   wo   mang,  bi   mali    jiu      geng         bu    yong    shuo   le. 
                John     today     BI   me   busy    BI  Mary  then  even more  not     need   say   ASP 
            ‘John is busier than me today; compared to Mary, there is no need to say.’ 
(173)    *zhangsan  jintian   you  wo  mang, you  mali     jiu      geng         bu    yong   shuo  le  
                   John       today   have  me  busy   have  Mary  then  even more  not   need     say  ASP 
                ‘John is as busy as me today; compared to Mary, there is no need to say.’ 
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Lin (2009) proposed that the bi-comparative construction has the following syntactic 
structure (174)20. The representation reflects the postulation that bi forms a constituent with Mali. 
The semantics of bi expresses individual comparison, as it takes two individuals and a gradable 
predicate as its arguments (175). 
 
(174) a. zhangsan   bi    mali    gao. 
                  John        BI   Mary    tall 
                ‘John is taller than Mary.’ 
             b.                                                                  S 
                                           
                                                       Zhangsan                                 AP 
 
                                                                                     DegP                                  AP 
                                                                                                                                gao 
                                                                     Deg                              NP 
                                                                      bi                               Mali       
(175) [[ bi ]]  = λxλPλy. P(x) < P(y) 
 
The possessive equative construction expresses individual comparison as well. The 
difference between bi and you with regard to constituency suggests that you cannot occupy the 
same position as bi in its syntactic structure. In addition, I have argued that you does not directly 
account for the equative interpretation of the possessive equative construction. Moreover, I 
                                                             
20 The Chinese bi can be used not only for monoadic comparison, but also for dyadic comparison. The structure in 




assume that the degree use of you shares a similar syntactic representation to the other uses of the 
verb. Obviously from the discussion in the previous sections, in its non-degree uses you occupies 
a different syntactic position that bi does in the syntactic structure in (174).  
It is reasonable to hypothesize that, for the possessive equative construction, some covert 
element occupies the position comparable to that of bi. This covert element introduces the 
individual comparison. The discussion in the previous section has suggested that the construction 
involves a small clause which, in turn, involves a covert predicate being a subinterval/subset of. 
This predicate is a good candidate to occupy the same position in the syntactic structure of the 
possessive equative construction as bi does in the bi-comparative construction.   
In addition, the small clause object of you contains a covert variable that is eventually 
saturated by the matrix subject of you. The variable occupies the complement position of the 
predicate being a subinterval/subset of. Given all the considerations, the syntactic structure for 
the covert small clause in the sentence (161) can be given in (176). The semantics of the Deg 
head being subinterval/subset of can be defined in a comparable fashion to bi.    
 
(176)                                              S 
                             
                        DP                                     AP 
                      ta gege 
                                               DegP                               AP 
                                                                                       gao  
                                  Deg                       NP                       
           being a subinterval/subset of        ei 
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(177) [[ being subinterval/subset of ]] = λxλPλy. P(y) ≤ P(x) 
 
Given the syntactic representation, a DegP projection intervenes between the Y element 
(“ta gege”) and the G element (“gao”). The two do not directly combine together to denote a 
degree value. This explains why you cannot embed such degree phrases as yaoming de gaodu 
‘Yao Ming’s height’ or wo de reqing chengdu ‘my degree/level of passion’ (178-179). At the 
best approximation, for (178) yaoming corresponds to Y, and gaodu corresponds to G. The use 
of the modifier marker de between yaoming and gaodu suggests that they form one constituent 
and denotes a degree. This contradicts with the specification that “Y” and “G” cannot form one 
constituent to directly denote a degree. 
 
(178) zhangsan     feichang            gao,   */?? ta     you        yaoming        de       gaodu  
  John       extraordinarily      tall            he    have      Yao Ming     MOD   height 
 ‘John is extraordinarily tall; nevertheless, he still does not have Yao Ming’s height.’ 
(179) a. *wo    laopo     dui          che      mei      you    wo   de      reqing      chengdu 
                  my   wife     towards     car       not      have   me  MOD   passion     degree 
               ‘My wife does not have the same (level of) passion for cars as I have’  
 
It was observed in section 2.2.8 that some dimension nouns formed out of a pair of 
antonymous gradable adjectives can serve as the G element (180-181). On the surface, such 
sentences appear to be similar to the sentences in (178-179), but they involve different syntactic 
structure. Most crucially, zuqiu and daxiao in (180) do not form a constituent. If they do, zuqiu 
would necessarily modify daxiao. Then zuqiu daxiao would be equivalent to zuqiu de daxiao, 
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with the modifier marker de linking zuqiu and daxiao. However, adding de between them would 
make (180) ungrammatical. The phrase zuqiu de daxiao is a grammatical on its own (182), so the 
intervening de should not be held responsible for the ungrammaticality.  
 
(180) na       ge       mugu         you       zuqiu             da-xiao  
           that    CL   mushroom   have    soccer ball    size (= big-small) 
 ‘The mushroom is as big as a (typical) soccer ball.’ 
(181) mei         ke     shu     dou     you      wankou             cu-xi 
          every     CL    tree     all     have    bowl-mouth     thickness(=thick-thin) 
          ‘Every tree is as thick as a bowl.’ 
(182) tade    duzi     gen   yi   ge        zuqiu       de      daxiao        chabuduo 
              his    belly  with  one   CL  soccer ball  MOD   size       almost the same 
           ‘His belly is almost as big as a soccer ball.’ 
 
Therefore, the sentence in (180) should have the same syntactic structure as the 
counterpart in which daxiao is replaced by da. Semantically, daxiao provides the dimension 
along which two entities, the mushroom and the generic soccer ball, are compared. 21  Therefore, 
it assumes the same function as does da. 
 
 
                                                             
21 My analysis of the possessive equative construction may face the potential criticism that it requires too much of 
covert elements: an implicit predicate AND an implicit variable. Some may suspect that proposing all the covert 
elements creates undue pressure on the syntax and/or semantics of the possessive equative construction. In addition, 
there exists no overt counterpart for the covert elements. I believe that the criticism is not a valid one. In linguistic 
analyses, proposing a covert element is justifiable when there are legitimate need and ground to do so. In my 
analysis, the implicit predicate and variable were posited out of reasonable motivations. They were not proposed just 
for the sake of convenience of argument. Besides, not all covert elements should correspond to an overt counterpart. 
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2.6.5 Deriving the semantics of the possessive equative construction 
In this subsection I will show how to derive the semantics of the possessive equative 
construction. I follow Kennedy (1999, 2007a) and many others in assuming that a gradable 
predicate denotes a function from individuals to their degrees on the dimension specified by the 
predicate. For instance, the gradable adjective gao, or its English equivalent “tall”, denotes a 
function from individuals to their height22.    
 
(183) [[ gao ]]  =  λx.ɩd[x is d-tall] 
 
The interpretation of the covert small clause involved in the LF for the sentence (161) is 
given in (184). The final result of the derivation shows that the small clause compares the height 
of his brother and the height of an individual which is to saturate the variable ei. The small clause 
is the underlying object of you. The verb contributes the necessary abstractor by absorbing the 
trace of the QR-ed subject and pressures the variable trace binder to do the real abstraction over 
the individual variable e7 in the small clause. This guarantees that e7 is saturated by the matrix 
subject zhangsan and that the comparison relation occurs between John and his brother. (185) 






                                                             
22 There are alternative ways of defining the semantics of gradable adjectives. For instance, under some other 
systems, a gradable adjective A denotes a function from an individual to a set of degrees or from a degree to a set of 
individuals. I believe that the exact choice of the definition does not affect my overall argument.  
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(184)                      S: ɩd[his brother is d-tall] ≤ ɩd[ f(7) is d-tall] 
                             
                        DP                            AP: λy. ɩd[y is d-tall] ≤  ɩd[f(7) is d-tall] 
                    ta gege 
                              DegP: λPλy. P(y) ≤ P(f(7))                              AP 
                                                                                                       gao  
                          Deg                                        NP                      λx.ɩd[x is d-tall] 
           being a subinterval/subset of                e7 

















(185)  ɩd[his brother is d-tall] ≤ ɩd[ John is d-tall] 
                   
                zhangsan             λz.ɩd[his brother is d-tall] ≤ ɩd[ z is d-tall] 
 
                                 u7                  ɩd[his brother is d-tall] ≤ ɩd[ f(7) is d-tall] 
           λф λz. Ф
f[iz] 
                                               t7             λx. ɩd[his brother is d-tall] ≤ ɩd[ f(7) is d-tall] 
 
                                                           you                   S:  ɩd[his brother is d-tall] ≤ ɩd[ f(7) is d-tall] 
                                                      λф λx. ф      
                                                                                                                   (184) 
 
In this chapter, I follow Fox and Hackl (2006) in treating all scales as alike (in being 
dense). The canonical height and weight scales and the less typical quantity scale conceptually 
have the same structure. Quantity words like “many” and “much” are also associated with a 
dimension. I notate this quantity dimension by using the symbol μ. The sentence in (186a) has a 
similar derivation to (161):  
 
(186) a. zhangsan   de      shu      you        ta    gege        de      (shu)      duo. 
                  John      MOD   book   have     his   brother  MOD   book    many 
               ‘John’s books are as many as his brother’s.’ 




The discussion above focuses on possessive equative sentences where the Y element is a 
DP that denotes an individual. In the introduction it was observed that Y also can be a measure 
phrase. In such cases, the G element is optional, when the linguistic or extra-linguistic context 
specifies the relevant dimension for the measure phrase. For example, the measure phrase shi 
bang ‘ten pounds’ necessarily denotes a degree on the dimension of weight and cannot describe a 
degree on any other dimension. When the phrase is used in the possessive equative construction, 
it does not matter whether or not to follow it with zhong ‘heavy’ to specify the relevant 
dimension.  
 
(187) ta      gang       mai    de      na     tiao     yu     you     shi   bang     (zhong) 
            he   just now   buy  MOD   that   CL     fish    have   ten   pound    heavy 
            ‘The fish that he just bought is ten pounds.’ 
 
There are dimensions that can be associated with more than one dimensional perspective. 
Typical examples are such measure phrases as “five feet” and “three miles”. The degrees they 
denote are values on the dimension of physical extent. But the dimension can be seen from the 
perspectives of height, width, and height. Only when the context specifies which dimensional 
perspective such a measure phrase is located on can the G element be omitted. For example, 
because the context in (188) makes it clear that the relevant dimension for the measure phrase yi 






(188) zher  de     he    dou  hen   qian,      zhe   tiao  he     zhi    you    yi     mi      (shen) 
           here  MOD river all  very  shallow, this  CL river  only  have  one  meter   deep 
‘The rivers here are all very shallow. This one is just one meter deep.’ 
 
I assume that when there is no overt G element in a possessive equative sentence, a 
contextually determined covert G exists to specify the dimension against which X is measured. 
In addition, I assume that a language-specific type shifting rule to transform a measure phrase 
from the degree-type to the individual-type. The assumption is not a far-fetched one, given the 
strong parallels between degrees and individuals (Heim, 2000; Rett, 2008b). For example, 
measure phrases and individuals both can serve as the subject of a gradable predicate (189). The 
type shifting rule does not apply whenever a gradable predicate (of the type <e, d>) is modified 
by a measure phrase, which normally denotes some degree. Rather, I assume that it applies only 
when a “measure phrase + gradable predicate” chunk is not used as a predicate. The exact 
definition of the rule is irrelevant for the purpose of this chapter23. In the non-predicate use, the 
phrase liu chi gao ‘six feet tall’ denotes the height of six feet. In this sense, the phrase differs 
from the bare six feet just in that the former restricts the dimension on which the degree of six 
feet falls, parallel to the difference between six feet and six feet in height. 
 
(189) a. zhangsan  hen      gao. 
                   John       very    tall 
                ‘John is tall.’ 
 
                                                             
23 Alternatively we can assume that measure phrases are ambiguous between a degree reading and a less common 
individual reading.  
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b. 10     mi     hen    gao. 
    ten  meter  very   tall 
 ‘Ten meters is tall.’ 
(190)  [[ six feet tall ]]  = [[ tall]]  ([[ six feet]] ) = λx. ɩd[x is d-tall] (six feet) = ɩd[six feet is d-tall] 
 
Given all the set-up, the second clause in (188) (zhi ‘only’ is ignored for the sake of simplicity) 








                                                             
24 John Whitman (p.c.) suggested to me that for possessive equative sentences that contain a measure phrase as the Y 
element, the syntactic representation and semantic interpretation can be simplified. According to his suggestion, 
there is a covert variable between you and Y to serve as the subject for the Y predicate. The variable is ‘saturated’ by 
the matrix subject. The small clause has an overt counterpart. This suggestion makes a couple wrong predictions. 
First, because the covert small clause contributes the meaning of the whole sentence and you is only an abstractor, 
the suggestion wrongly entails that the sentence in (i) has the same meaning as (ii). The former sentence means the 
door is at least two meters wide. On the other hand, there are empirical, theoretical and experimental evidence that 
number words (measure phrases by extension) have the ‘exactly’ interpretation (König, 1991; Breheny, 2008; 
Huang et al, 2010, among others). Given this, the latter sentence means it is exactly two meters wide. The two 
sentences have different interpretation. In addition, it is not clear how to extend the suggestion to possessive 
equative sentences whose Y element is not a measure phrase. There is no natural overt sentence (iv) which can 
correspond to the covert small clause in (iii).  
 
(i) na       shan    men      you      liang      mi         kuan 
that      CL      door    have       two      meter      wide 
‘The door is at least two meters wide.’ 
(ii) na   shan   men    liang    mi   kuan. 
‘The door is two meters wide.’   
(iii) na       shan     men      you     zhe      shan     men      kuan 
that      CL      door      have    this       CL      door    wide 
‘That door is as wide as this door.’ 
(iv) (*)na    shan    men    zhe    shan     men    kuan 
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(191)  ɩd[1 meter is d-deep]  ≤ ɩd[ this river is d-deep]                                                            
                   
  zhe tiao he           λz. ɩd[1 meter is d-deep]  ≤ ɩd[ z is d-deep] 
 
                    [[ u4 ]]               ɩd[1 meter is d-deep]  ≤ ɩd[f(4) is d-deep] 
 λф λz. Ф
f[iz] 
                                    t4          λx. ɩd[1 meter is d-deep]  ≤ ɩd[f(4) is d-deep] 
 
                                    [[ you ]]                     ɩd[1 meter is d-deep]  ≤ ɩd[f(4) is d-deep] 
                                λф λx. ф                                                 
                                               yi  mi            AP: λy. ɩd[y is d-deep]  ≤ ɩd[f(4) is d-deep] 
 
                                               DegP:  λPλy. P(y) ≤ P(f(4))                        AP 
                                                                                                                  shen 
                              being a subinterval/subset of                         e4           λx.ɩd[x is d-deep] 
                                                λxλPλy. P(y) ≤ P(x)                                                                                             
2.6.6 Summary 
In this section I showed that the small clause analysis of possessive verbs can successfully be 
extended to the possessive equative construction. Just as in the non-degree uses of you, in the 
possessive equative construction the object of you is supplemented by a predicate and contains a 
variable that eventually gets saturated by the subject. The predicate specifies a subinterval/subset 
relation between X and Y along the dimension specified by G. In the degree use, you is a 
 105 
 
functional item that does not have semantic content on its own. It provides a formal mechanism 
for the subject to bind a variable in its small clause object.  
 
2.7 Final remarks 
To conclude, in this chapter I discussed the degree use of possessive verbs, which has received 
little attention in the literature. I primarily concentrated on describing and analyzing the Chinese 
possessive verb you ‘have’ appearing in the possessive equative construction “X + you + Y + G”, 
where the G element is normally a gradable predicate. I provided a fairly detailed description of 
the construction. The construction shows similar, though not identical, empirical patterns to the 
English as…as equative construction. I argued that the small clause-based analysis of possessive 
verbs can be extended to the degree use of you in the construction. The verb you functions as an 
abstractor over an individual variable which is eventually “saturated” by the matrix subject. The 
possessive equative construction involves individual comparison and sets up a subset/subinterval 
relation between X and Y in terms of their degrees on the dimension specified by G. My analysis 
suggests that the degree use of you has the same syntactic representation and semantic 
interpretation as its other uses. The various uses of you are not as different as many traditional 
descriptive works have assumed. 
There are many open questions that I did not address in this chapter. In particular, the 
possessive equative construction as discussed in this chapter is unique to Chinese, but the general 
degree use of possessive verbs has presence in other languages. How can my analysis 
accommodate crosslinguistic variation in the degree use of possessive verbs? For instance, the 
English verb have cannot appear in the exact equivalent of the Chinese possessive equative 
construction. But have can embed a degree-denoting expression of a certain type to make 
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comparison (e.g. The river has a depth of 50 feet.). A potentially plausible explanation of the 
contrast between you and have may lie in the assumption that different comparison strategies 
(individual comparison vs. degree comparison) are involved in English and Chinese. I will leave 





The Degree Use of Size Adjectives at the Semantic-Pragmatic Interface  
 
3.1. Two types of gradable nouns 
3.1.1 Gradability exists in all syntactic categories  
The previous chapter dealt with the interaction of degree with possessive verbs. In this chapter I 
will shift gears and turn to another realm in which it is not immediately obvious how gradability 
plays a role in understanding a phenomenon. It has to do with what gradability in the nominal 
domain means and how it is modified by a special category of gradable adjectives. It has long 
been observed since the earliest studies of gradation (e.g. Sapir, 1944; Bolinger, 1972) that 
linguistic elements of different morpho-syntactic categories have gradability as one of their 
features, either inherently or through interacting with other components of grammar or contexts. 
More specifically, though adjectives and adverbs have often been taken to be the canonical 
categories which involve gradability, the other grammatical categories, including nouns, verbs, 
and prepositions, all have members that can establish some ordering among individuals based on 
their degrees to which some relevant property holds of an entity. Moreover, gradable predicates 
of different categories share many similar scalar properties. Kennedy and McNally (2005), for 
example, used deverbal adjectives such as “acquainted”, “desired” and “loaded” to probe into the 
scale structure of gradable predicates. They showed that the scale structure of a deverbal 
gradable adjective shows a strong correlation either with the algebraic part structure of the event 
denoted by the source verb or with the algebraic part structure of the individuals that can serve as 
the arguments for the source verb. Degree modifiers such as “very”, “well” and “much” have 
semantic representations that are sensitive to the scalar distinctions among deverbal gradable 
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adjectives. This is the reason why such degree modifiers are often not interchangeable. For 
instance, while “very frightened” is grammatical, “much frightened” is not.  
3.1.2 A subset of gradable nouns  
This chapter specifically will address gradability in the nominal domain and its interaction with 
degree modification. There are a subset of nouns that share the same scale structure as, and show 
similar properties to, gradable adjectives (Morzycki, 2005, 2009; Sassoon, 2010). For example, 
the  nouns “idiot”, “joke” (meaning a thing or situation laughed at rather than taken seriously)”, 
and “hypocrite” all express gradable notions. This claim makes sense on the intuitive level. 
Presumably not all idiots have the same degree of stupidity. For the noun “joke”, some trifling 
matters are more laughable than others. Different hypocritical individuals are characterized by 
different levels of pretentious and deceptive characteristics.  
Beyond the native intuition, there is empirical evidence supporting the claim that such 
nouns are gradable. First, many such nouns have a corresponding adjectival form that is 
unambiguously gradable26. There is “idiotic” for “idiot”, “enthusiastic” for “enthusiast”, and 
“hypocritical” for “hypocrite”. The adjectives “idiotic”, “enthusiastic” and “hypocritical” are a 
gradable adjective, as suggested by the fact that they can be modified by canonical adverbial 
degree modifiers (1-2). I assume that the adjectival forms result from category transformation 
from the noun, and that the transformation process itself does not introduce an extra gradability 
component into the meaning. It follows that the source nouns “idiot”, “enthusiast”, and 
“hypocrite” should be gradable to begin with. 
 
                                                             
26 It should be noted here that an adjective and the corresponding noun does not have exactly the same range of uses. 
They should be compared under the same sense. For instance, the noun ‘idiot’ appears to have an epithetic use that 
is absent from ‘idiotic’. An individual can be an idiot epithetically, but without being really idiotic. In addition, 
‘idiot’ can be only used for humans, but ‘idiotic’ does not have such a requirement (‘an idiotic remark’).  
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(1) Luckily, I'm not idiotic enough to fall for the pitfall. 
(2) Some Americans think that democrats are more hypocritical than republicans.  
 
In fact, nouns can be modified by adverbial degree modifiers even without surface 
category transformation to adjectives. Because adverbial degree modifiers cannot directly 
combine with a noun due to categorial mismatch, the modification usually occurs with mediation 
by the preposition “of” (3-5). Obviously, the preposition itself does not contribute gradability. 
Thus the gradability has to come from the meaning of the noun (or its interaction with the 
pragmatic world). This is another piece of corroborating evidence in favor of the claim that 
(some) nouns are gradable. The test correctly predicts, modus tollens, that non-gradable nouns 
cannot be modified by an adverbial degree modifier. For example, the noun “monograph” is 
intuitively non-gradable and cannot be modified by a degree modifier (6).   
 
(3) Rick is more of a hypocrite than the politicians he despises.    
(4) He was too much of an idiot to understand or pass the exam. 
(5) The whole plan to stimulate the economy was just a bit of a joke. 
(6) *The book on the left is less of a monograph than the one on the right27. 
 
Furthermore, some nouns can be modified by such modifiers as “absolute”, “complete”, 
“real”, and “total”, subject to certain lexical restrictions which I will not go into in this chapter.  
These modifiers are degree modifiers. The modifiers for the boldface nouns in (7-9), for instance, 
characterize the large extent of the agenda being a joke, of the president being an idiot, and of the 
                                                             
27 In this sentence I am focusing on the meaning of ‘monograph’ to refer to books written by one single author rather 
than by co-authorship. In this sense, the noun is not gradable, because a book is written either by one person or by 
multiple authors.  
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board director being a hypocrite, respectively. If the modifier “complete” in (7), for example, 
does not have degree interpretation, it would be synonymous to “whole”, which is not a degree 
modifier. Replacing “complete” with “whole”, however, would make the resulting sentence quite 
bizarre, or at least it does not have the same interpretation as before the substitution. The 
modification of a gradable noun with the degree modifier “complete” suggests that the degree 
expressed by the gradable noun holds to the full extent (mutatis mutandis pragmatic inaccuracy). 
 
(7) The president’s whole agenda to revive the economy is an absolute joke. 
(8) Is the president  a complete idiot or does he simply hate his job? 
(9) The director of the school board turned out to be a total hypocrite. 
 
Nouns like “idiot” and “hypocrite” have corresponding adjectives (“idiotic” and 
“hypocritical”) that are clearly gradable. In the meantime, ad-adnominal modifiers like 
“complete” and “absolute” have adverbial cognates (“completely” and “absolutely”) which are 
clearly degree modifiers. Such gradable adjectives can be modified by the adverbial degree 
morphemes. This modification has, or at least can have, the same interpretation as the 
modification of the corresponding noun by the corresponding ad-adnominal modifier. For 
instance, changing the  nouns in (8-9) to the corresponding gradable adjectives and the ad-
adnominal degree modifiers to their adverbial counterparts at the same time does not change the 
meanings of the sentences in any noticeable manner (10-11). This is an additional piece of 
evidence that these nouns encode gradability. Furthermore, the similarity suggests that gradable 
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nouns like “idiot” and “hypocrite” have scale structures identical to their adjectival 
counterparts28.  
  
(10) Is Obama completely idiotic or does he simply hate his job? 
(11) The director of the school board turned out to be totally hypocritical. 
 
I hope that the above evidence is sufficient enough to establish that there are a subset of nouns 
that express gradable notions, and that they have scale structures similar to those of gradable 
adjectives.  
3.1.3 Distinguishing two types of gradable nouns 
I should point out that this particular subset of nouns of interest to this chapter are not the whole 
range of elements in the nominal domain that involve scalar properties. There are another subset 
of nouns that are often considered gradable. However, this latter subset of gradable nouns differ 
from such gradable nouns as “idiot” and “hypocrite” in that they have scale structures 
distinguished from gradable adjectives. My analysis in this chapter only deals with the former 
subset of gradable nouns. It is helpful to disentangle the two types, in order to avoid potential 
confusion about my discussion.  
According to Sassoon (2010), nouns like “bird”, “fruit”, and “vehicle” also come with a 
scale of some gradable property, e.g. how typical a vertebrate measures along the dimensions of 
being a bird (small size, feathered, can fly, etc). There exist distinctions between central/typical 
members of a category and peripheral/non-typical members (Lakoff, 1973). The distinctions are 
gradual and form a spectrum that can be perceived similar to scales for gradable predicates.  
                                                             
28 For the purpose of this chapter, I do not consider the differences of scale structure (open vs. closed, relative vs. 
absolute) among gradable adjectives. 
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These nouns can be modified by degree morphemes mediated by the preposition “of”, as 
evident from the grammaticality of the sentences in (12-13). The pattern is similar to what has 
been observed with such gradable nouns like “idiot” and “hypocrite”. The similarity suggests 
that nouns like “bird”, “fruit” and “vehicle” are gradable as well. 
 
(12) Robins are more of a bird than penguins or ostriches.  
(13) To cooks, tomatoes are more or less a fruit.  
 
However, gradable nouns of the second subset (“bird” and “fruit”) do not share the 
exactly same range of properties as gradable nouns of the first subset (“idiot” and “hypocrite”). It 
has already been observed that the first subset of gradable nouns can be modified by adnominal 
degree modifiers like “complete” and “absolute”. Modifying a gradable noun that belongs to the 
second subset with such degree modifier is ungrammatical under the degree reading29.  
 
(14) The animal in the cage is a(n) *absolute/*complete/*total/%real bird. 
(15) Apples are a(n) *absolute/*complete/*total/%real fruit 
  
I have argued that the first set of gradable nouns have scale structures similar to gradable 
adjectives. The second subset of gradable nouns, by contrast, have scale structures that are 
distinguished from gradable adjectives. According to Sassoon (2010), a gradable adjective has a 
single criterion of categorization or a set of such criteria integrated together through Boolean 
conjunction (for “normal” and “healthy” for example) or disjunction (for “different” and “sick” 
                                                             
29
 I use the ‘*’ symbol to indicate the ungrammaticality of a sentence, and ‘%’ to indicate the lack of degree reading 
of a size adjective or a sentence containing a size adjective. When the two cases collapse together, I will use * only. 
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for example)30. The use of the positive form of a conjunctive gradable adjective requires an 
individual to reach the standard for every dimension, and the use of the positive form of a 
disjunctive gradable adjective requires an individual to reach the standard for some dimension. 
The structure of the dimension(s) can determine the modification pattern of gradable 
adjectives (Kennedy and McNally, 2005). An individual can have impeccable (i.e. maximal) 
function in lung or (even) in every aspect of body and mind. It is reasonable to assume that the 
scale associated with “healthy” is upper closed. So the adjective can be modified by upper 
endpoint-oriented degree modifiers like “100%” and “completely” (16).   
 
(16) Mary is completely healthy with respect to lung function. 
 
I hypothesize that the first subset of gradable nouns, just as gradable adjectives, also have 
a simple categorization criterion or a set of such criteria integrated together via Boolean 
operations. An idiot is characterized by the criterion of intellectual deficiency or social 
inappropriateness depending on the sense in which the word is used in a context. Similarly, for 
automobile enthusiast, the distinguishing criterion is enthusiasm for (fancy) cars; for joke, it is 
inadequacy and ridiculousness of a plan, a situation, etc.   
For the second subset of gradable nouns, their scale structure clusters together multiple 
dimensions which are integrated through weighted-mean operations rather than Boolean 
operations (Sassoon, 2010; Kamp, 1975). For each entity in the category denoted by a gradable 
noun of the second subset, its weighted-mean of the values on all the dimensions relevant for the 
noun is a good indicator of its typicality among all entities in the category. The degree of 
typicality of an entity is generally identified with how similar the entity is to the prototype for the 
                                                             
30 The interested reader should refer to Sassoon’s original paper for some evidence based on language processing. 
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concept. The prototype often has a conceptual import only. There usually exists no entity that is 
considered exactly identical to the prototype, in spite of the central members vs. peripheral 
members distinction discussed in Lakoff (1973). I hypothesize that there is no maximum 
similarity to the prototype, and I take it to be the reason why the second subset of gradable nouns 
cannot be modified by such degree modifiers as “complete” and “total”. Take the noun “bird” for 
example. The dimensions for being a bird may include small size, feathered, winged, flying, 
eating insects, bearing young in a hard-shelled egg, and so on. Those dimensions do not have the 
same weight for the averaging operation: being feathered and winged, for instance, may be more 
definitive of a bird than eating insects. For some entity to be qualified as a bird, its weighted 
mean degree on the relevant dimensions for being a bird should be typical enough to meet the 
bird-membership threshold. Some animals are considered more representative of being a bird 
than others. However, no bird can be identified as being maximally representative member of the 
Aves class. That is why it is not grammatical to use “a complete bird” to mean “a bird to the 
maximum degree.” 
 Sassoon’s discussion of the differences between gradable adjectives (and the first subset 
of gradable nouns by extension) and the second subset of gradable nouns is based on conceptual, 
neurological and acquisitional evidence. The differences can be reflected in formal semantics, 
although this chapter will not pursue the task. The first subset of gradable nouns receive formal 
representations that are similar to gradable adjectives. The second subset of gradable nouns have 
semantics that is distinguished from gradable adjectives and the first subset of gradable nouns by 
extension. This chapter does not assume the task of distinguishing the two types of gradable 
nouns from a formal perspective. Rather, in the rest of the chapter I will consider how the first 
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subset of gradable nouns interact with one particular type of degree modifiers (i.e. the degree use 
of size adjectives).  
3.2. Size adjectives degree-modifying gradable nouns 
3.2.1  Size adjectives as degree modifiers  
It has already been observed that the first subset of gradable nouns can be modified by some 
adnominal degree modifiers, and the second subset of gradable nouns cannot. There is still 
another set of adjectives that are less often treated as degree modifiers but nevertheless can 
characterize the degree to which a gradable noun of the first subset holds of an individual31. They 
are adjectives that normally express size notions, such as “big”, “huge” and  “enormous”. This 
observation is illustrated by the sentences in (17a) and (18a) (both taken from Morzycki, 2009). 
Under the most natural interpretation of the two sentences, the size adjectives within them do not 
describe the physical size, age, significance, etc, of the referent of the subject. Rather, they 
specify that the gradable nouns that they modify hold of the relevant individual(s) to a big degree. 
This claim is evidenced by the fact that the (a) sentences in (17-18) have a reading that is clearly 
distinguished from the (b) sentences, where the size adjectives most naturally predicate of the 
physical size of the relevant individuals. The size adjectives in the (a) sentences characterize the 
high degree of George’s idiocy and of the three people’s enthusiasm for goat cheese, respectively 
(Morzycki, 2009).  
 
(17) a. George is a(n) big/enormous/huge/colossal/gargantuan idiot. 
   b. George is an idiot, and he is big/enormous/huge/colossal/gargantuan 
 
                                                             
31 Gradable nouns of the first subset may have differences in terms of scale structures. The differences restrict what 
degree morphemes can modify what gradable nouns. Morzycki (2011) discussed the issue and provided an 
explanation. I leave it open whether his proposal is on the right track or not. 
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(18) a. The three huge goat cheese enthusiasts were arguing in the corner. 
       b. The three goat cheese enthusiasts, who were huge, were arguing in the corner. 
 
The second subset of gradable nouns cannot be modified in a similar way to have the 
degree reading. Both “bird” and “American”, for example, are gradable nouns that belong to the 
second subset. Modifying them with size adjective like “big” and “enormous” is either 
ungrammatical or, if grammatical, does not yield degree interpretations comparable to (17a) and 
(18a). In the rest of the chapter I will only focus on size adjectives as degree modifiers for 
gradable nouns of the first subset. Because doing so will not give rise to any confusion, I will 
simply use “gradable nouns” to refer to the first subset of gradable nouns. 
 
(19) a. A robin is a(n) %big/%enormous/%huge bird. 
       b. The solder is a(n) %big/%enormous/%huge American. 
 
 Morzycki (2005, 2009) observed that the degree readings of size adjectives are licensed 
in a variety of syntactic and semantic contexts including comparatives, equatives, exclaimatives, 
and how-questions (20-23). He showed that the degree readings of size adjectives are not due to 
lexical vagueness or an extra-linguistic cognitive process of metaphor. Rather this use of size 
adjectives has an independent status.  
 
(20) The senator is a bigger idiot than his secretary. 
(21) Vincent is as huge an auto enthusiast as his brother. 
(22) What an enormous fan he is of healthy eating! 
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(23) How big an idiot is the senator?  
3.2.2 The “Position Generalization” for size adjectives as degree modifiers 
The degree use of size adjectives is syntactically and semantically constrained. Morzycki (2005, 
2009) discussed two generalizations regarding this particular use. The Position Generalization 
requires that degree modification of gradable nouns by size adjectives is available only for size 
adjectives that appear in the attributive position, but not for size adjectives that appear in the 
predicate position. This is illustrated by (24a) and (25a). The most natural readings of the two 
sentences describe the physical size of the idiot and of the Red Sox fans, respectively. They do 
not say that the relevant individual(s) has/have a high or big degree of idiocy or enthusiasm. By 
contrast, the (b) sentences both have the size adjectives in modifier positions and allow for 
degree readings. Morzycki held that the Position Generalization holds categorically and applies 
crosslinguistically, with which I concur.  
 
(24) a. The idiot standing over there is big. 
       b. A big idiot is standing over there. 
(25) a. These fans of the Red Sox are enormous.  
            b. These are enormous fans of the Red Sox. 
 
I would like to point out that the same generalization holds not just for size adjective as 
degree modifiers, but also for other adnominal degree modifiers such as “complete” and “total”. 
While the sentence in (26a) is grammatical and says that uselessness of the car is to a very high 
or even the maximum extent (whatever that might be), moving the degree modifier to a predicate 




(26) a. The car breaks down all the time and is a complete white elephant. 
   b.The car breaks down all the time. *It is a white elephant that is complete.    
 
The Position Generalization can serve as a suggestive test to tell whether a particular 
instance of size adjectives has the degree reading. If transforming a size adjective from a 
modifier position to a predicate position results in a grammatical sentence with the same 
meaning, then the size adjective cannot have degree reading in the original sentence. This test is 
particularly helpful in telling the degree use of size adjectives from the semantically similar 
“abstract size” use.  In the latter use, size adjectives can freely occur in modifier and predicate 
positions (27).   
 
(27) a. Suburban poverty is a big problem. 
   b. The problem of suburban poverty is big.  
       
 The test is not definitive, though. When transforming a size adjective from an attributive 
position to a predicate position leads to an ungrammatical sentence or a grammatical sentence 
but with a different meaning, the size adjective does not necessarily have degree reading in the 
original sentence. Size adjectives have another non-size reading which is very close to the degree 
use and are largely (though not always) subject to the Position Generalization. Morzycki (2009) 
called this particular use the significance reading, because this use of size adjectives always 
involves a notion of significance. The sentence in (28a), for example, has the size adjective “big” 
in the modifier position. Transforming the adjective to a predicate position yields a sentence (28b) 
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whose meaning is different from the original sentence. The pattern is the same as with size 
adjectives used as degree modifiers. The sentence in (28a) says that Mary plays a significant role 
in the Catholic Church but not in Protestantism. However, there exists no gradable property 
inherent in the noun “figure” that the adjective “big” can characterize, so “big” is not used as a 
degree modifier in (28a).  
 
(28) a. Mary is a big figure in the Catholic Church but not in Protestantism. 
  b. %As a figure in the Catholic Church but not in Protestantism, Mary is big. 
3.2.3 The “Bigness Generalization” for size adjectives as degree modifiers 
The other generalization observed by Morzycki (2005, 2009), the Bigness Generalization, says 
that only positive size adjectives like “big”, “enormous”, and “gigantic” can have degree uses 
when they modify gradable nouns, and negative size adjectives like “small”, “tiny” and “minute” 
cannot receive degree interpretation when they modify gradable nouns (29-30)32. As pointed out 
by Morzycki, the generalization does not arise from any conceptual difficulty in talking about 
low degrees, as suggested by the acceptability of talking about low degrees using other linguistic 
strategy (31). The generalization is systematic and productive. Morzycki (2009: p180) showed 
that coined size adjectives obey the generalization as well.  
 
(29) George is a %small/%tiny/%minuscule/%microscopic/%diminutive/%minute idiot. 
(30) Present in the party were just several %small/%tiny fans of the band. 
(31) A mineral has a very small degree of consciousness.  
                                                             
32 According to Morzycki, adjectives like ‘minor’ and ‘slight’ are not size adjective synchronously. The fact that 
they can be degree modifiers for gradable nouns (e.g. ‘a minor idiot’) does not challenge the validity of the ‘Bigness 
Generalization’. I assume that the same remark applies to ‘little’ and ‘petty’. 
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Morzycki (2005, 2009) took the Bigness Generalization to be a categorical restriction on size 
adjectives as degree modifiers. His analysis of the phenomenon reflects this assumption in that it 
is syntactic-semantic in nature and allows no contextual or pragmatic variability. In this chapter I 
will argue that Morzycki’s analysis is too strong and that the Bigness Generalization does allow 
contextually supported exceptions. It is exactly the exceptional cases to the Bigness 
Generalization that provide motivation to my analysis of the same phenomenon. Due to its 
violable nature, the Bigness Generalization cannot be used as a suggestive test to tell whether or 
not a size adjective is used as a degree modifier in a sentence.  
Any explanatorily adequate analysis of size adjectives modifying gradable noun, 
minimally, has to account for the two generalization and exceptional cases to the Bigness 
Generalization. This is the task that I undertake in the rest of the chapter. Here is the outline of 
this chapter. I have argued that gradable adjectives and (the first subset of) gradable nouns show 
similar properties. It is helpful for analyzing degree modification of gradable nouns to start with 
a review of some essential concepts used in the syntactic and semantic analysis of gradable 
adjectives. This is what I do in Section 3. Morzycki (2009, 2005) offered the first and (so far) 
only theoretical analysis of degree modification of gradable nouns by size adjectives. Though the 
analytical intuition that underlies his proposal is largely on the right track, his actual 
implementation of the intuition rests on an unjustified assumption and makes several wrong 
predictions. These problems provide empirical and theoretical motivations for my treatment of 
the phenomenon. Thus, in Section 4 I will offer a review of Morzycki’s analysis and discuss 
several issues that it is faced with. In particular, I will show that the Bigness Generalization is 
not categorical: negative size adjectives can serve as degree modifiers in some contexts. 
Morzycki’s proposal leaves no room for the exceptions. I will lay out my own proposal in 
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Section 5. My idea draws on the scale structures of size adjectives and gradable nouns, the 
relation between the standards of antonymous dimensional adjective pairs 33 ,  the ordering 
relation between the standards of size adjectives and the gradable nouns that they modify, as well 
as the semantic-pragmatic notion of “extension gap”. The Bigness Generalization receives an 
explanation at the semantic-pragmatic interface, instead of being a purely semantic phenomenon. 
My proposal allows room for contextual variation in negative size adjectives used as degree 
modifiers. The phenomenon of size adjectives serving as degree modifiers is not restricted to 
English.  Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
3.3. Gradability in the adjectival domain 
An adequate analysis of gradable nouns that are degree-modified by size adjectives requires a 
clear understanding of the semantic representation of gradable nouns. The similarity of scale 
structure between gradable adjectives and gradable nouns provides a hint that the semantics of 
gradable nouns may parallel that of gradable adjectives. There are two major approaches to 
gradable adjectives (or probably gradability in general). The first was developed in the super-
valuation analyses of vagueness (Klein, 1980; Kamp, 1975; among others). It makes no use of 
the notion of degree but rather treats gradable predicates just like other predicative expressions. 
The other, more recent approach assumes that gradable predicates have degree arguments 
(Rotstein and Winter, 2004; Kennedy, 1999; among others).  It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to give a detailed review or evaluation of the two approaches. I will adopt the now 
“standard” Kennedian approach in this chapter, though I will use the notion of “extension gap” 
which is more prevalent in the first approach. 
                                                             
33 Gradable adjectives are classified into two categories: dimensional adjectives and evaluative adjectives (Bierwisch 
1989). Pairs of dimensional adjective antonyms make reference to the same scale of some dimension and only differ 
in terms of the ordering on the scale. By contrast, pairs of evaluative adjectives make reference to different scales. 




Kennedy’s (1999, 2007a) theory of adjectival gradability can be extended to the domain 
of nominal gradability. Within the Kennedian framework, a gradable adjective A denotes a 
function from an individual to the degree of the individual’s having the property denoted by A. 
For example, the adjective “tall” take an individual of type e as its argument and yields the 
individual’s (actual, maximum) height (32).   
 
(32)  [[ tall]]  = λx. ιd [x is d-tall]       (= tall) 34 
                       
Given the semantic definition for gradable adjectives, such simple positive degree 
sentences as (33) would denote a degree (e.g. John’s actual height), rather than the desired truth 
condition that John’s height exceeds a contextual standard of being tall. Therefore, extra 
mechanisms are needed to derive the correct semantics for simple positive degree sentences. 
Gradable adjectives have to combine with some degree morphology to derive a property of 
individuals. Under the Kennedian framework of gradability,  such degree morphology can be 
overly spelled out as “very”, “more”, “as …as”, etc. Simple positive degree sentences do not 
have any overt degree morphology. To cope with the mismatch, it is assumed that there is a 
covert degree morpheme POS which has the same semantic function as the overt degree 
morphemes (von Stechow, 1984; Kennedy, 1999; among others).  
 
(33) John is tall. 
 
 The POS morpheme for gradable adjective (POSe
35) maps the function denoted by an 
adjective A to a set of individuals whose degrees of A-ness equal or exceed the contextual 
                                                             
34 During the discussion, I will put certain simple lexical items in bold face to denote their semantic interpretation.   
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standard of being A (Kennedy 1999, 2007a; Kennedy and McNally 2005). The function STND 
used in the definition of POSe (34) maps a gradable adjective to its standard of comparison. The 
standard is contextually determined and sensitive to the comparison class, the group of 
individuals against which the interpretation of a gradable predicate is relativized. The 
comparison class is often introduced by a for-clause such as John is tall for a six-year-old.  
Obviously, the standard of being tall for adult basketball players is different from the standard of 
being tall, say, for primary school students. Applying the function POSe to the function denoted 
by “tall” yields a set of individuals whose height does not fall below the contextual standard of 
being tall for the relevant comparison class (e.g. adults, college basketball players, seven year 
olds, etc) (35). According to the semantic derivation for the sentence in (33), the sentence means 
that John’s height equals or exceeds the standard of being tall.  
 
(34)  [[ POSe ]]  = λg<e, d> λx. STND (g) ≤ g(x)                       









                                                                                                                                                                                                    
35
 The subscript e on POSe stands for individual and serves to distinguish the POS morpheme for gradable adjectives 
from the the POS morpheme for size adjectives to be proposed in the next section. 
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(36)                 STND (tall) ≤ tall (John)                  
 
     DP<e>                     VP: λx. STND (tall) ≤ tall (x)                                           
                      
              John               is                         DegP<e, t> : λx. STND (tall) ≤ tall (x)                  
 
                                                        Deg<<e, d>, <e, t>>                 AP<e,d> 
                   
                                                           [[ POSe ]]                                  [[ tall ]]     
                                               λg<e, d> λx. STND (g) ≤ g(x)          tall            
 
There is another common use of gradable adjective: adjectives modified by measure 
phrases (MPs) like “six feet tall” and “two years old”. Morzycki (2009, 2005) made use of the 
insightful analytical intuition that the degree use of size adjective in some respects parallel 
measure phrases that modify gradable adjectives. He followed Svenonius and Kennedy (2006) 
and Kennedy and Levin (2008) in proposing that a degree morpheme MEASA licenses MPs 36. 
The  MEASA  morpheme, as defined in (37), requires that the degree to which the adjective holds 
of an individual equals or exceeds the minimum element of the set of degrees denoted by the MP 
modifying the adjective. MEASA makes reference to the minimality operator MIN, which implies 
that an MP is assumed to denote a set of degrees rather than a single degree. For instance, “6 feet” 
is assumed to denote the degree set {6 feet,… 7 feet, … 8 feet, …}.  Morzycki took an MP to 
have the “at least” interpretation, rather than the “exactly” interpretation (Horn, 1972, 1992). 
                                                             
36
 The superscript A on MEASA stands for adjectival and distinguishes this MEAS morpheme from its counterpart for 
size adjectives degree-modifying gradable nouns.  
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Given the above set-up, the semantics of “6 feet tall” denotes the set of individuals whose height 
measures 6 feet or more (38). Applying this predicate to the subject “John” yields the truth 
condition for the sentence “John is six feet tall”: it is true if and only if John’s height equals or 
exceeds 6 feet.  
 
(37)  [[ MEAS 
A]] = λg<e, d> λm<d, t> λx. MIN{d: m(d)} ≤ g(x) 
(38) [[ 6 feet  MEAS 
A tall ]] = λx. MIN{d: 6-feet (d)} ≤ tall(x) 
(39)     S: MIN{d: 6 feet(d)} ≤ tall(John)          
                      
    DP                  VP<e,t>:  λx. MIN{d: 6 feet(d)} ≤  tall(x)          
 
   John             V                                DegP<e, t>:  λx. MIN{d: 6 feet(d)} ≤ tall(x)          
                   
                                   is           MP<d, t>                    Deg’<<d,t>, <e,t>>:  λm<d, t> λx. MIN{d: m(d)} ≤ tall(x)          
                                                                                       
                                                  6 feet           Deg<<e, d>, <<d,t>, <e,t>>>                 AP<e, d> 
 
                                                                                                   MEAS 
A                                   tall  
                                                     λg<e, d> λm<d, t> λx. MIN{d: m(d)} ≤ g(x)         tall 
 
With this background on the syntax and semantics of gradability in the adjectival domain, let us 
turn to examine the degree modification in the domain of nominal gradability. In the next section 
I will start by reviewing Morzycki’s analysis of gradable nouns degree-modified by size 
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adjectives and point out some problems that it is faced with. The problems will serve to motivate 
my proposal to be laid out in section 5.  
3.4. Morzycki’s analysis and its problems 
3.4.1 Morzycki’s analysis  
According to Morzycki, gradable nouns receive interpretations which are parallel to gradable 
adjectives. A gradable noun N denotes a function from individuals to their degrees of N-iness. 
The gradable noun “idiot”, for instance, denotes a function from an individual to the individual’s 
degree of idiocy (43)37.  
 
(40) [[ idiot]]  = λxe. ιdd [x is d-stupid]      (= idiot) 
 
There is also covert degree morphology in the domain of nominal gradability. Gradable 
nouns denote measure functions. In a simple degree sentence, it has to transform to properties of 
individuals by the degree morpheme POSe as defined in (37). Thus, the sentence in (41a) has an 
LF parallel to the sentence in (36). (41a) has the interpretation in (42) and means that John’s 
degree of being an idiot equals or exceeds the contextual standard of being an idiot. 
 
(41) a. John is an idiot.                        
   b. John is an [POSe idiot]. 
(42)  [[  John is [POSe idiot]]]   = STND (idot) ≤ idot (John)     
     
                                                             
37 I have pointed out in a previous footnote that ‘idiot’ and ‘idiotic’ does not have exactly the same range of 
meanings, mutatis mutandis category difference. I use ‘stupid’ in the definition of ‘idiot’, in good faith to avoid the 
problem. I will not address whether this is a successful strategy or not.  
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Regarding the syntactic representation and semantic interpretation of gradable nouns 
degree-modified by size adjectives, Morzycki posited that the modification is parallel to AP-
modifying MPs. The intuition is that both the degree use of size adjectives and AP-modifying 
MPs somehow measure the degree to which a predicate (gradable nouns and gradable adjectives 
respectively) holds of an individual. For the phrase “six feet tall”, for example, the MP “six feet” 
characterizes the (minimum) degree of an individual on the scale of height. Similarly, for “big 
idiot”, the size adjective “big” characterizes the degree of an individual on the scale of idiocy.  
It has been mentioned that a degree morpheme MEASA is needed to mediate the 
interpretation of AP-modifying MPs. Pursuing the line of similarity between the degree use of 
size adjectives and AP-modifying MPs, Morzycki further posited that the interpretation of the 
degree use of size adjectives are also mediated by a MEAS morpheme. However, this MEAS 
morpheme differs from its counterpart for AP-modifying MPs in two major respects. First, the 
same size adjective can apply to degrees on many different scales. The size adjective “big”, for 
example, can modify idiocy (for “a big idiot”), enthusiasm (for “a big enthusiast”), 
ridiculousness (for “a big joke”), liking (for “a big fan”), and so on. Thus, there are many single 
minimum degrees along different dimensions that can satisfy a size adjective degree phrase. It is 
very likely that those minimum degrees are not comparable or commensurable among 
themselves. Relevant in the definition of the MEAS morpheme for degree readings of size 
adjectives (MEASN henceforth)38 are only degrees on the scale particularly associated with the 
gradable nouns that are modified by size adjectives. Therefore, the interpretation of size 
adjectives necessarily makes reference to the gradable nouns they modify. That is, the definition 
of MEASN should make reference to qualification from gradable nouns. As far as the 
                                                             
38




interpretation of a size adjective degree-modifying a gradable noun is concerned, a degree 
associated with the size adjective should be “restricted” by the scale associated with the gradable 
noun modified by the size adjective. 
Second, an MP that modifies an AP does not require the AP to absolutely hold of the 
individual that the AP predicates of. Whether someone who is five feet tall counts as tall or not 
depends on the contextual comparison class. By contrast, the degree use of a size adjective 
requires the modified gradable noun to hold of the individual that the noun predicates of. 
Someone who is a big idiot is necessarily an idiot. Therefore, MEASN should make reference to 
the standard of the modified gradable noun. In this sense, the MEASN morpheme appears to 
semantically encode a POS morpheme. Given these considerations, Morzycki defined MEAS
N as in 
(43). The variable “g” in the definition corresponds to the gradable noun, and “m” to the size 
adjective. The semantics of the morpheme requires that an individual x satisfy the gradable noun 
which the morpheme heads to some degree that: (i) “is at least as great as the smallest degree that 
satisﬁes the size adjective DegP”; and (ii) “is at least as great as the standard for the gradable 
predicate.” (Morzycki, 2009: p195).  
 
(43)   [[ MEASN]]   = λg<e, d>λm<d, t> λxe. MIN{d:d∊scale(g) ∧ m(d)} ≤ g(x) ∧ STND (g) ≤ g(x) 
                                                                                        
In addition to the MEASN degree head, the LF for “size adjective + gradable noun” 
involves still another degree head POSd. The latter degree morphology takes the size adjective as 
its argument and yields a set of degrees (44). It serves to capture the intuition that, say, a big idiot 
necessarily has a degree of idiocy that is contextually big, just like a tall man necessary has a 
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height that is contextually tall39. The POSd morpheme is identical to POSe as defined in (34) except 
for differences in type: POSe is of the type <ed, et>, and POSd is of the type <dd, dt>. The 
difference reflects the fact that size adjectives can predicate of the size of an individual (45) and 
the “size”, so to speak, of the degree (46)40. 
 
(44) [[ POSd]]  = λg<d,d>λrd. STND(g) ≤ g(r)            (The subscript d stands for degree.) 
(45) The boxing champion is huge. 
(46) The man’s enthusiasm for fancy cars is huge. 
 
With all the preliminaries, the general LF for gradable nouns being degree-modified by 
size adjectives is given in (47).  The Position Generalization, which states that degree readings of 
size adjectives are possible only in an attributive position but not in the predicate position, 
trivially follows from the syntactic configuration. Degree readings of size adjectives are licensed 
only when size adjectives appear in the specifier position of the nominal degree projection. It 






                                                             
39 This POSd morpheme is different from the POS morpheme that I suggested was covertly encoded in the MEAS
N 
morpheme. The purpose of the former is to guarantee that a big idiot is big on the bigness scale, and the purpose of 
the latter is to guarantee that a big idiot is necessarily an idiot. 
40 Morzycki used a novel type o to represent the conjunction of the individual type and the degree type, in an attempt 
to reflect that size adjectives can measure both individuals and degrees. In this chapter I do not use the conjunctive 
type, as doing so brings no obvious advantage for the discussion in this chapter. 
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(47)                                                 DegNP<e,t>    
 
                                DegP<d, t>                                           DegN’<<d,t>,<e,t>> 
         
         Deg<<d,d>, <d,t>>                       AP<d,d>                    DegN<<e,d>,<<d,t>,<e,t>>>             NP<e,d> 
 
                POSd            size adjective (big, huge, etc)    MEAS
N
            gradable noun (idiot, fan, etc)        
 
With regard to the Bigness Generalization, there are two related aspects. The first one is 
why a positive size adjective can modify a gradable noun, and the second one is why a negative 
size adjective often cannot. To see how Morzycki’s analysis explains the first question, let us 
take the phrase “big idiot” for example. The semantic interpretation of the phrase is given in (48). 
It says that “big idiot” denotes a set of individuals x such that the degree of x’s idiocy is at least 
as great as the smallest degree on the idiocy scale whose “bigness” size meets the contextual 
standard of being “big”, and at the same time x meets the standard of being an idiot. To simplify 
a bit, “big idiot” denotes the set of idiots who are not less idiotic than a standard-big idiot. There 
is no problem with this interpretation. Other similar combinations of positive size adjectives and 
gradable nouns receive a parallel analysis mutatis mutandis. Thus, the modification of gradable 
nouns by positive size adjectives consistently has well-defined semantics and is acceptable. 
 
(48)    [[  [POSd big] MEAS
N idiot]]   
      = λx. MIN{d:d∊scale(idiot) ∧ [[ POSd big]] (d)} ≤ idiot(x) ∧ STND (idiot) ≤ idiot(x) 
               = λx. MIN{d:d∊scale(idiot) ∧ STND (big) ≤ big(d)} ≤ idiot(x) ∧ STND (idiot) ≤ idiot(x) 
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Moving on to “small idiot”, its semantics can be defined in a parallel fashion to “big idiot” 
(49). In the semantics, the chunk MIN{d:d∊scale(idiot) ∧ STND (small) ≤ small(d)} corresponds 
to “not idiotic at all”. Because anyone who has any degree of idiocy is not less idiotic than 
someone who is not idiotic at all, MIN{d:d∊scale(idiot) ∧ STND (small) ≤ small(d)} ≤ idiot(x) 
satisfies vacuously. Then the semantics of “small idiot” can be reduced to (50), which, in turn, is 
equivalent to the semantics of “idiot”. Therefore, it amounts to saying that “small idiot” is 
semantically identical to “idiot”. The size adjective “small” melts away and has no contribution 
to the semantics of the phrase in which it appears. Because there are alternative ways (size, age, 
significance, etc) to construe negative size adjectives such that they do have an effect on the 
semantic interpretation, negative size adjectives are always interpreted in these alternative ways. 
Morzycki suggested that this is why negative size adjectives cannot have degree readings.  His 
analysis can be easily extended to other combinations of negative size adjectives and gradable 
nouns. In this way, the Bigness Generalization, as it was stated in Morzycki’s original paper, 
receives an explanation. 
 
(49) [[ [POSd small] MEAS
N idiot]]   
           = λx. MIN{d:d∊scale(idiot) ∧ STND (small) ≤ small(d)} ≤ idiot(x) ∧ STND (idiot) ≤ idiot(x)   
(50)  [[ [POSd small] MEAS
N idiot]]   
            = λx. STND (idiot) ≤ idiot(x)   
            = [[  POS idiot]]      
 
In summary, Morzycki’s analysis captures the Position Generalization, and it provides a 
seemingly appealing analysis to both aspects of the Bigness Generalization. However, a closer 
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scrutiny will reveal some problems with his analysis. Though his analogy of size adjectives as 
degree modifiers to AP-modifying MPs constitutes the right analytic intuition, there are several 
empirical and theoretical challenges to his proposal, especially his explanation of the Bigness 
Generalization. These challenges, to which I turn in the next section, undermine the explanatory 
adequacy of Morzycki’s analysis.   
3.4.2 Problems with Morzycki’s Analysis 
Morzycki’s analysis is insightful in drawing a parallel between the degree use of size adjectives 
and AP-modifying MPs. In spite of this intuitive appeal, his actual implementation has serious 
flaws that invalidate his analysis. In his analysis of size adjectives as degree modifiers, two 
degrees play an essential role. One is the minimum degree on the scale determined by the 
gradable noun that equals or exceeds the contextual standard for the size adjective. The other is 
the degree to which the gradable noun holds of an individual.  
According to Morzycki, the first (minimum) degree is introduced by a minimality 
operator. And the comparison relation between the minimum degree and the other degree is 
introduced by a “≤” operator. The minimality operator and the “≤” operator, in turn, are both 
introduced by the MEASN degree morpheme. This morpheme is defined in a close analogy to 
MEAS
A, which involves the minimality operator and the ≤ operator as well. The definition of 
MEAS
A is based on the assumption that AP-modifying MPs in English have the “at least” 
interpretation, i.e. “6 feet tall” means “at least 6 feet tall”. Though the assumption AP-modifying 
MPs has the “at least” interpretation is essential for his analysis to work, Morzycki simply took it 
for granted and provided no empirical or theoretical evidence in support of the assumption. But 
what if the assumption does not hold? I will show this is indeed the case. 
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Empirical evidence, theoretical argumentation as well as psycholinguistic and acquisition  
experiments all point to the conclusion that the semantics of AP-modifying MPs receives the 
“exactly” interpretation: “6 feet tall” means “exactly 6 feet tall” rather than “at least 6 feet tall”. 
The often-perceived “at least” interpretation of MPs arises via pragmatic considerations. Here is 
my scheme to argue for the position. An MP generally consists of a number word (e.g. “six”) and 
a measure word (e.g. “feet”). It is reasonable to assume that the measurement word in the MP 
does not contribute to the “at least” or “exactly” interpretation of the MP as a whole. What type 
of interpretation the MP receives (“at least” vs. “exactly”) correlates with the interpretation of 
the number word in it. If number words can be shown to have the “exactly” interpretation, then 
MPs should also have the “exactly” interpretation. This is indeed the case.   
First,  empirical data on downward scalar entailment (51) and upward compatibility (52) 
are most often claimed to provide support to the idea that number words are associated with the 
“at least” interpretation. However, such data only represent part of the picture. König (1991) 
observed that these empirical data consistently involve distributive readings of count phrases. 
For example, the sentence “Mary saw three men” can be paraphrased in the set talk as in (53). 
Because a non-empty set can have a proper subset and can be a proper subset of another set at 
the same time, the downward entailment and upward compatibility patterns associated with 
distributive readings of count phrases follow naturally. When Mary saw three individual men (at 
three different times), she necessarily saw two of them (at two different times).  
 
(51) Mary saw three men.    Mary saw two men.                                  (König, 1991: (9)) 
(52) Mary saw three men, in fact four.    
(53) Mary saw e, for each e in M, M a set of men of cardinality 3 exactly.  (König, 1991: (10)) 
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On the other hand, collective readings of count phrases cannot be similarly paraphrased 
in the set talk. They do not give rise to the same downward entailment and are not upward-
compatible. For example, the verb “share” is a collective predicate. It does not allow distributive 
reading of its subject. The contrast between (51-52) on one hand and (54-55a) on the other hand 
illustrates the difference. If “three” has the “at least” interpretation, (55a) should be valid, even 
on the collective reading. This is evidenced from the improved grammaticality judgment for 
(55b), where “three” is modified by “at least”.  König (1991) made theoretical significance out of 
this particular fact and argued that distributivity, rather than the semantics of number words, is 
the responsible factor for the “at least” interpretation of number words. 
 
(54) Three boys shared a pan cake  ??  Two boys shared a pan cake. 
(55) a. ??Three boys shared a pan cake, indeed four.  
   b. At least three boys shared a pan cake, indeed it was four. 
                                         (It is acceptable only if “indeed four” is used as after-thought.) 
 
Second, the disparate behaviors of number words versus scalar items in downward 
entailing environment suggest that number words are not scalar and that they do not have the “at 
least” interpretation in the semantics. This is essentially an argument proposed by Breheny 
(2008). According to his idea, the existential quantifier “some” is clearly a scalar term situated 
on a scale with the universal quantifier “all”: “some” can be paraphrased as something like 
“ranging from one to all”. Mary’s utterance (with “some” focused) in (56a) suggests that Mary 
thinks John did not get all of the questions right. With the response in (56b)42, Bill is suggesting 
that John got all the questions right. This implication is not available for Bill’s response in (56b’), 
                                                             
42 I follow the convention to use capital letters to indicate special rising, contrastive intonation. 
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where the auxiliary verb “did” is contrastively focused. Rather this response constitutes a denial 
of the existential claim made by Mary in (56a). Compare these utterances to those in (57). They 
are minimally different in that the latter set of utterances all use the number word “four”. (57a) 
most naturally means that John got exactly four questions right. Bill’s responses in (57b) and 
(57b’) both deny the proposition that John got just four questions right. The number of questions 
that he got right could be three, could be five, or any other number except for “four”. In 
particular, (57b) does not deny any upper-bounding inference which would arise if “four” was 
understood to parallel “some” meaning “at least one” and have the scalar meaning “at least four”. 
This suggests that “four” differs from “some” in being not scalar. It follows that number words 
cannot have the “at least” interpretation.   
 
(56) a. Mary:  John got SOMEF of the questions right. 
      b. Bill: He didn’t get SOMEF of the questions right. 
      b’. Bill: He DIDn’tF get some of the questions right.               (Breheny, 2008: 12) 
(57) a. Mary:  John got FOURF of the questions right. 
      b. Bill: He didn’t get FOURF of the questions right. 
      b’. Bill: He DIDn’tF get four of the questions right.                (Breheny, 2008: 13) 
 
Third, psycholinguistic and language acquisition experiments provide more evidence in 
favor of the “exactly” interpretation of number words (Huang et al, 2010; Papafragou and 
Musolino, 2003; inter alia). One core task for such experimental projects is to determine which 
interpretation(s) of number words arises from semantics and which (if any) through pragmatic 
inference. Huang et al (2010) tested adults and 2- to 3-year-olds using a cover box method that 
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can tease semantic aspects of interpretation apart from pragmatic aspects. They found that when 
scalar implicature get cancelled in an experiment task, adults and children alike give the “exactly” 
interpretation to number words. The results from their experiments provide psycholinguistic and 
acquisition evidence to the position that number words have the “exactly” interpretation as the 
semantic default and their “at least” reading arises from pragmatic implicatures. The interested 
reader can refer back to Breheny (2008) for discussion about factors of pragmatic inference in 
deriving the “at least” reading of number words. 
Given that number words have the “exactly” interpretation, it is conceptually implausible 
that they would somehow transform to an “at least” interpretation when they modify 
measurement nouns. Thus, MPs have the “exactly” interpretation. This raises serious theoretical 
issues for Morzycki’s analysis of size adjectives as degree modifiers, which rests on the 
assumption that AP-modifying MPs have the “at least” interpretation. In Morzycki’s analysis, the 
MEAS
A morpheme, which mediates the interpretation of MPs, encodes the “≤” relation to reflect 
the assumed “at least” interpretation. Obviously, though there are good reasons to propose such a 
degree morpheme, the exact definition that Morzycki (2009) proposed is not on the right track. 
The interpretation of size adjectives as degree modifiers for gradable nouns parallels that of AP-
modifying MPs. The definition of the MEASN morpheme for size adjectives as degree modifiers is 
exactly molded after that of the MEASA morpheme and contains the “≤” relation as well. It 
follows that MEASN should be redefined also. This is the first conceptual problem in Morzycki’s 
analysis of size adjectives used as degree modifiers for gradable nouns. 
There is another challenge. According to Morzycki’s analysis, negative size adjectives 
make no semantic contribution to the degree reading of the phrases in which they appear. They 
have to be interpreted in alternative ways in order for them to contribute to the semantic 
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interpretation. This is why negative size adjectives cannot be degree modifiers. Extending his 
logic of reasoning, when all non-degree interpretations of a negative size adjective are explicitly 
blocked, the adjective will have to “accept the fate”, so to speak, of making no semantic 
contribution. It is reasonable to assume that this vacuous interpretation, as last resort, fares better 
than total unacceptability. The prediction is not borne out, however. In (58a), given the explicit 
linguistic context, the physical size reading, the young age reading and the insignificance reading 
of “small” are all ruled out, the next possible interpretation for “small” in the sentence is 
probably the (vacuous) degree one. Morzycki’s analysis would predict that (58a) to have the 
same interpretation as (58b), as if the word “small” did not exist in the former sentence at all. 
However, the prediction is not borne out. On the intuitive level, the former is not equivalent to 
the latter. Similarly, (59a) does not have the same interpretation as (59b).  
 
(58) a. Michael Bloomberg, an old, tall media tycoon and mayor of NYC, is a %small idiot. 
   b. Michael Bloomberg, an old, tall media tycoon and mayor of NYC, is an idiot. 
(59) a. The gigantic basketball player who enjoys worldwide fame is a %tiny smoker.   
   b. The gigantic basketball player who enjoys worldwide fame is a smoker.   
 
The third problem with his analysis is an empirical one. Morzycki took the Bigness 
Generalization to be a categorical constraint on the use of size adjectives as degree modifiers for 
gradable nouns: positive size adjectives always can serve as degree modifiers, and negative size 
adjective are absolutely barred from being degree modifiers. His analysis reflects this assumption 
in that it is purely semantic in nature and leaves no room for pragmatic factors to come into play. 
Positive size adjectives are legitimate degree modifiers because they have perfect semantic 
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interpretation; and negative size adjective cannot serve as degree modifiers because they are 
vacuous on the degree reading. However, native speaker’s intuition is not as clear-cut as 
Morzycki’s description and analysis suggest. I agree with Morzycki that positive size adjectives 
can consistently modify gradable nouns. However, empirical data reveal that there are indeed 
cases in which negative size adjectives can serve as degree modifiers. This, of course, casts 
serious doubt on Morzycki’s analysis of the “negative” aspect of the Bigness Generalization. 
The first type of exceptional cases to the Bigness Generalization has to do with vagueness, 
a kind of uncertainty about what property or properties a linguistic expression ascribes to an 
entity or even about whether the expression can be applied to the entity to begin with (Kennedy, 
to appear). Adjectives often encode vagueness of one kind or another. For example, “big” can be 
vague with respect to what dimension on which it operates. Whether the sentence “China is 
bigger than Russia” is true depends on whether one is using “big” to talk about the population or 
the area of the two countries. “Tall” is vague because in a given context it is often not clear 
exactly how tall one should be to qualify as being “tall”.  It may be the case that, in a certain 
context, individuals who measures exactly six feet is neither definitely tall nor definitely not tall. 
That is to say, it is indeterminate with regard to whether such individuals fall in the extension of 
“tall” or not, and thus belong to what Klein (1980) called the “extension gap” for the adjective 
“tall”. This type of “extension gap” is most likely to arise from the lack of definite knowledge of 
the contextual standard for a gradable adjective. For example, if all one knows is that the 
standard for being tall in a context is somewhere between 5’8’’ and 6’3’’ but does not know 
where the standard exactly falls, she does not know whether an individual of 6 feet can count as 
being tall or not.  
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There is another type of vagueness which is similar to, but not the same as, the extension 
gap associated with one single gradable adjective. This corresponds to the “grey area” that 
potentially exists between the standard for a positive gradable adjective and the standard for its 
negative counterpart. Many things in the world are not classified based on two opposite polarities. 
For instance, there are entities that are neither hot nor cold, but lukewarm; a backpack can be 
neither heavy nor light in a context; a partially new building may not qualify as being new, but 
not being old either. The “grey area” for a pair of gradable dimensional adjectival antonyms is 
different from the extension gap for one single gradable adjective in that the former normally 
does not arise from epistemic indeterminacy with regard to the contextual standards for the 
antonym pair. Even when there are clear-cut standards for such a pair, the “grey area” may still 
exist. For instance, in a context in which any book of more than 400 pages is considered thick 
and any book of less than 250 pages is considered thin, a book of 300 pages is neither thick nor 
thin. In this chapter, in order to avoid using the informal and vague term “grey area” between 
standards of a pair of size adjective antonyms, I will use the (slightly verbose) “extension gap for 
the standards of an antonym pair” to express the notion.   
Obviously, the extension gap for the standards of an adjectival antonym pair does not 
exist in a context in which the contextual standards for the antonym pair are strictly 
complementary to each other. When there is no extension gap for the standards of “big” and 
“small”, everything that is not “big” is “small”, and vice versa.  
Now let us come back to the discussion of size adjectives as degree modifiers. When 
there is no extension gap with respect to the standards of a pair of size adjective antonyms, the 
contextually relevant individuals are exhaustively dichotomized into two opposite polar groups 
with respect to the “size” of their degrees associated with the gradable noun. In such a situation, 
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the adjective can modify the gradable noun. For example, the sentence in (60) involves 
“whether”, a question word that encodes exhaustivity (see Guerzoni, 2007 for some related 
discussion). The whether-clause classifies the degree of liking of music fans exhaustively into 
two opposite categories (“big” vs. “small”). This rules out the existence of a “grey area” with 
respect to the size adjective antonym pair evaluated against the gradable noun they modify 
(“fan”), and thus the sentence is acceptable in the intended degree reading. Similar remarks apply 
to (61). 
 
(60) Whether you are a big fan or a small fan, the Beatles music is familiar and classic.  
(61) There are two types of cycling enthusiasts: big ones and small ones.  
 
Some may suspect that the contrastive use of “big” and “small” in (60-61) is responsible 
for the acceptability of the two sentences. More specifically, according to this idea, “small idiot” 
and “small fan” are made acceptable via some process of analogy to “big idiot” and “big fan” 
respectively. The hypothesis cannot be right, however. The same process of analogy is involved 
in (62-63), but “a tiny fan” and “minuscule enthusiasts” in the two sentences are much less 
amenable to have a degree reading44.  
 
(62) ?%In the administration, Bush was a big fan of nuclear weapons, Cheney was a tiny fan. 
(63) ?%Some club members are big enthusiasts, but most are just minuscule enthusiasts. 
 
                                                             
44 My consultant reported that the sentences in (62-63) sound more like a word play. Though it is understandable, it 
is not grammatical. 
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With the potential possibility of analogy being ruled out, the two sentences in (60-61) 
clearly pose challenges to Morzycki’s analysis, which predicts that “small idiots” and “small fan” 
cannot have degree reading at all, and that “small” in them has to be interpreted in an alternative, 
non-degree way. When all non-degree uses are blocked for “small” in (60), Morzycki’s analysis 
predicts that the size adjective would have to “accept the fate” of being interpreted vacuously 
and the sentence would have the same meaning as (64). However, (64) is a pragmatically 
infelicitous sentence. The sentence in (60) does not suffer from the pragmatic infelicity. 
 
(64)    % Whether you are a big fan or a fan, the Beatles music is familiar and classic.  
 
Degrees associated with the size adjective modifying a gradable noun are evaluated 
relative to the scale for the gradable noun. For the phrase “big idiot”, the “size” characterized by 
“big” is necessarily one of the degree of an individual’s idiocy, not of something else. The 
extension gap for the standards of a pair of size adjective antonyms corresponds to individuals 
the sizes of whose degrees on the scale of the relevant gradable noun fall between the standards 
for the antonym pair. When such an extension gap does not exist or is small in a context, the 
negative size adjective patterns with the positive counterpart in being able to degree-modify the 
gradable noun. On the other hand, when the extension gap is big enough, the negative size 
adjective cannot degree-modify the gradable noun, for reasons to be specified in the next section.    
The second type of exceptional cases to the Bigness Generalization occur when the 
relevant gradable noun is specified to hold of the individual characterized by “negative size 
adjective + gradable noun” (65a-66a). The sentence in (65a) differs from (65b), in that the 
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former encodes the “background” information that the speaker is a fan of (of detective novels) in 
the first place. Similar remarks apply to (66a-b).    
 
(65) a. I am a fan of detective novels, but just a small fan. 
   b. %I am a small fan of detective novels. 
(66) a. They are all idiots, but some can congratulate themselves on being a small idiot. 
  b. %Some of them can congratulate themselves on being a small idiot.  
 
Under Morzycki’s analysis, gradable nouns modified by negative size adjectives cannot 
have degree readings because negative size adjectives make no contribution to the intended 
degree reading. If “small” in (65a) and (66a) “melts away” in the intended degree reading, the 
sentences would be semantically equivalent to their counterpart without “small”. However, the 
prediction does not hold. For example, the second clause in (66a) says some of them should feel 
lucky that their degree of idiocy is small. Without “small”, the clause would mean something 
different -- that some of them should feel lucky for being an idiot. 
The third type of exceptions to the Bigness Generalization occurs when a negative size 
adjective modifying a gradable noun receive some special contrastive focus intonation. Native 
speakers of English reported that focus intonation can make negative size adjectives an 
acceptable degree modifier for gradable nouns. For example, in (67) the size adjective “small” 
associates with the focus sensitive element “even”. The sentence fares better in the degree 
reading than its counterpart without “even” and focus intonation on “small”. In (68), “small” 
receives focus intonation, without associating with any overt focus sensitive element. The 
sentence can be used as an out-of-the-blue utterance. The negative size adjective also can have a 
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degree interpretation in the sentence. The sentence in (69) also involves a focus sensitive element. 
Though somewhat marginal, the word “small” modifies the degree of addiction to smoking. Such 
sentences pose problems to Morzycki’s analysis. Morzycki may dismiss such sentences by 
claiming that the extra focus intonation on negative size adjectives makes it impossible for them 
to melt away in the final semantic interpretation. Then he would have to specify an explicit 
mechanism for the purpose. 45 
 
(67) You can't go wrong with this CD if you are even a [small]F fan of the Monkees. 
(68) The group was established to help [small]F enthusiasts of gardening develop their skills. 
(69) I'm only a small smoker, a very small smoker; I'm not in the habit of smoking two 
pipes one on top of the other46. 
 
To summarize for the moment, Morzycki’s analysis is built upon an unjustified 
assumption that measure phrases receive the “at least” interpretation. It wrongly predicts that a 
negative size adjective can degree-modify a gradable noun when all non-degree interpretations of 
the size adjective are contextually blocked. It cannot explain why negative size adjectives can 
degree-modify gradable nouns when there is no extension gap between the standards of the 
negative size adjective and its positive counterpart. It has nothing to offer regarding exceptional 
cases in which an individual is characterized by a gradable noun degree-modified by a negative 
                                                             
45 Mats Rooth (p.c.) suggested that all three types of exceptions to the Bigness Generalization can be understood as 
involving some kind of focus on negative size adjectives. The suggestion is intuitively appealing, but at this stage I 
do not know how to categorize focus to the right extent to ‘umbrella’ the three types of exceptional cases and at the 
same time exclude other cases involving focus. Moreover, when discussing the first type of exceptional cases, I have 
mentioned some sentences in which contrastive focus cannot license negative size adjectives to have degree readings.  
46  This sentence was adapted from http://englishliteratureblog.blogspot.com/2007/09/waiting-for-godot-act-1-by-
samuel.html.Acceptability judgment regarding the sentence shows cross-speaker variation. I have no idea regarding 
where the variation comes from. 
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size adjective when the gradable noun is explicitly specified to hold of the individual in the first 
place. In addition, it is not clear whether and how his analysis can explain the observation that 
focus intonation on negative size adjectives somehow can make the degree reading of negative 
size adjectives possible. 
These theoretical and empirical problems suggest that Morzycki’s analysis must be 
revised or even abandoned. I conjecture that revising the analysis is the right route to take 
because, in spite of the above challenges that it is faced with, it does make use of an appealing 
analytic intuition: the degree use of size adjectives parallels AP-modifying MPs. I will argue that 
it is Morzycki’s use of the minimality operator and his definitions of the MEAS morphemes that 
lead to the problems. It is a natural move to redefine the morphemes.  
The exceptions to the “Bigness Generalization” are of particular theoretical importance 
for an explanatorily sufficient analysis of size adjective degree-modifying gradable nouns. These 
exception cases suggest that the generalization is not a monolithic constraint as Morzycki (2009, 
2005) assumed. The observation is particularly important that the presence or absence of an 
extension gap between the standards of a gradable adjectival antonym pair affects whether the 
negative polarity adjective in the pair can degree-modify a gradable noun. Such a “grey area” is 
pragmatic in nature. It suggests that whether the modification of a gradable noun by a negative 
size adjective is acceptable or not has to do with some pragmatic factors. Thus, the semantic-






3.5. “Bigness Generalization” at the semantic-pragmatic interface 
3.5.1  Redefining MEAS morphemes 
Morzycki’s essential analytic insight is that the degree reading of size adjectives parallels AP-
modifying measure phrases in terms of the syntactic structure and semantic representation. 
Intuitively, they both predicate of a degree coming from an element that they modify. However, 
Morzycki’s actual implementation is at best “half-correct”. It correctly captures the Position 
Generalization, but falls short of the Bigness Generalization. The Position Generalization follows 
trivially from the syntactic representation of size adjectives degree-modifying gradable nouns. 
Morzycki’s explanation of the Bigness Generalization makes use of the scale structure of size 
adjectives and the semantics of degree measurement. His explanation does not leave any room 
for pragmatic violability of the Bigness Generalization. I will argue that pragmatic factors play 
an important role in analyzing (negative) size adjectives degree-modifying gradable nouns. My 
argument starts with revising the degree morpheme for MP-modifying MPs (MEASA) and then 
extending the new definition to the MEASN morpheme. In particular, my analysis will take into 
consideration the relation between the standard of the size adjective and the standard of the 
gradable noun it modifies. This is where my proposal departs from Morzycki’s analysis, even 
though it shares the essential analytic intuition about the similarity between AP-modifying MPs 
and the degree use of size adjectives.  
When discussing the conceptual challenges that Morzycki’s analysis is faced with, I cited 
evidence to show that AP-modifying MPs do not have the “at least” semantic interpretation. 
Rather, because number words have the “exactly” semantics and measurement nouns add no 
additional scalar information to the semantics of MPs, AP-modifying MPs should have the 
“exactly” semantics. I follow Morzycki (2009) in assuming that the interpretation of AP-
modifying MPs involves a MEASA morpheme as the degree head for the adjective phrase. To 
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encode the fact that AP-modifying MPs have the “exactly” interpretation as the semantic default, 
my definition of the MEASA morpheme involves the identity relation rather than the ≤ relation. 
The morpheme (70) specifies that the degree of an individual x on the scale associated with the 
adjective equals the only degree denoted by the measure phrase. In the definition, ∃!d[ф] is an 
abbreviation for ∃d[ф ˄ ∀d’ [d’ ≠ d  ~ ф[x/x’]]]. That is, ∃!d stands for “there exists one and 
only one d”. In the definition of the MEASA morpheme, this d has to verify m(d), where m is a 
measure phrase. The “exactly” interpretation of AP-modifying MPs is encoded in the morpheme. 
Take “six feet tall” (71) for example. The only degree d to verify the first conjunct six feet(d) has 
to be six feet exactly. There is no one particular degree greater than six feet that can privilege 
over other alternative degrees: all the degrees d’ greater than six feet are non-distinguishable 
with regard to whether six feet(d’) is true or false. Likewise, all degrees less than six feet have 
the same status, and no one degree can be picked over others to be the single degree making the 
first conjunct true. The second conjunct d= tall(x) requires that the height of an individual equals 
this single degree that verifies the first conjunct. Therefore, “six feet tall” denotes the set of 
individuals that are exactly six feet tall, rather than those who are at least six feet tall.   
 
(70) [[ MEASA]]  = λg<e,d> λm<d,t> λx. ∃!d [m(d) ∧ d= g(x)] 
(71) [[  six feet    MEASA  tall  ]]  = λx. ∃!d[six feet(d)  ∧ d= tall(x)] 
 
Given the afore-mentioned intuitive similarity between the degree reading of size 
adjectives and AP-modifying MPs, the MEASN morpheme for gradable nouns can be defined in a 
fashion similar to MEASA. For convenience of reference, I repeat the LF representations 
associated with the two morphemes below. In the new definition, the MEASN morpheme is similar 
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to MEASA and does not involve a minimality operator or a comparative relation (i.e. “≤”). Rather, 
it establishes an identity relation between two degrees. This is the essential similarity between 
the two MEAS morphemes.  
   
(72)                        DegP<e, t> 
 
                MP<d, t>                          Deg’<<d,t>, <e,t>>                                        
                                                                                       
              six feet        Deg<<e, d>, <<d,t>, <e,t>>>                 AP<e, d> 
 
                              MEASA                                                                      tall 
(73)                                                DegNP<e,t>    
 
                              DegP<d, t>                                           DegN’<<d,t>,<e,t>> 
         
         Deg<<d,d>, <d,t>>                      AP<d,d>                    DegN<<e,d>,<<d,t>,<e,t>>>             NP<e,d> 
 
       POSd                               big                              MEAS
N
                                       idiot 
 
There are an important difference between MEASA and MEASN, however. Though an MP 
denotes just a singleton set of degree, their counterpart in size adjectives degree-modifying 
gradable nouns -- size adjectives headed by the posd morpheme -- denotes a non-singleton set of 
degrees. In order to see this, let us draw a further parallel between the “regular” use of a size 
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adjective and its degree use. Take “big table” for example. The LF for this phrase (74) is very 
similar to that of “big idiot”. The size adjective “big” (in its regular size use) headed by the pose 
morpheme denotes a set of individuals. It is obvious that the key difference between size 
adjectives as “regular” non-degree modifiers and as degree modifiers is in the semantic types of 
the DegP projection (bold-faced in (73) and (74)). All instances of the individual type e in the 
DegP projection in (74) are replaced with the degree type d in (73).  The DegP in (74) denotes a 
set of individuals, so it is natural to conclude that the DegP in (73) denotes a set of degrees.  
 
(74)                                                       NP<e,t>    
 
                                DegP<e, t>                                                 N<e, t> 
         
         Deg<<e,d>, <e,t>>                       AP<e,d>                                            table    
 
       POS                                    big                               
 
The claim that the degree use of size adjectives, via combining with a POS morpheme, 
denotes a set of degrees also makes intuitive sense. When a non-maximum degree d1 on a certain 
scale is considered big in a context, any degree bigger than d1 should also be considered big. The 
definition of MEASN does not require the ∃! operator that is present in the definition of MEAS
A. 
Rather, it involves the ∃ operator, which picks up a random degree from the set of degrees. 
The revised definition of the MEASN morpheme is given in (75). It requires that an 
individual x satisfy the gradable predicate to a degree that (i) is identical to some degree that 
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satisﬁes the size adjective on the relevant scale associated with the modified gradable noun, and 
(ii) is at least as great as the contextual standard for the gradable noun. 
 
(75) [[  MEASN ]] = λg<e,d> λm<d,t> λx.∃d d∊{d’:d’∊scale(g) ∧ m(d’)} ∧ d= g(x) ∧ STND (g) ≤ g(x) 
 
 My analysis assumes the same general LF for size adjectives degree-modifying gradable 
nouns as in Morzycki’s. This is represented in (73). Recall that the Position Generalization roots 
from the syntactic configuration of size adjectives as degree modifiers. Thus, my explanation of 
the Position Generalization is the same as in Morzycki’s analysis. The remaining task is to 
explain how the Bigness Generalization and the exceptional cases to the generalization arise.  
3.5.2 Positive size adjectives as degree modifiers 
It has been argued above that the Bigness Generalization is a violable constraint. There are three 
aspects related to the generalization that need to be addressed. The first is why positive size 
adjectives can act as degree modifiers for gradable nouns. The second is why negative size 
adjectives often cannot. The third is how to explain the exceptional cases to the generalization. 
To explain the first aspect, I will again use the phrase “big idiot” as a representative of positive 
size adjective degree-modifying gradable nouns. The semantic derivation of the phrase is given 
in (77). It denotes a set of individuals x such that the degree of x’s idiocy equals to some degree 
which falls on the scale of idiocy and which is at least as great as the standard of being big, and 
at the same time x meets the standard of being an idiot.  
 
(76) [[ POSd]]  = λg<d,d>λrd. STND(g) ≤ g(r)                                 (repeated from (44))    
(77) a.[[  POSd big ]]  = [λg<d,d>λrd.STND(g) ≤ g(r)] (big) = λr.STND(big) ≤big(r) 
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   b. [[  MEASN  idiot ]]   
            = [λg<e,d> λm<d,t> λx.∃d d∊{d’:d’∊scale(g) ∧ m(d’)} ∧ d= g(x) ∧ STND (g) ≤ g(x)] (idiot) 
             = λm<d,t> λx.∃d d∊{d’:d’∊scale(idiot) ∧ m(d’)} ∧ d= idiot(x) ∧ STND (idiot) ≤ idiot(x) 
   c. [[   big idiot ]]  = [[  MEAS
N
  idiot ]]  ([[  POSd big ]]  ) 
                = λx.∃d d∊{d’: d’∊scale(idiot) ∧ STND (big) ≤ big(d’)} ∧ d = idiot(x) ∧ 
                   STND (idiot) ≤  idiot(x)      
 
The semantics of “big idiot” involves degrees on two different scales, i.e. the scale 
associated with “big” and the scale associated with “idiot”. In spite of the intuition that the two 
scales are separate and cannot be identified with each other, when evaluating “big idiot” the scale 
of “big” is relativized to that of “idiot”. Suppose the degree use of “big” constitutes a scale that 
stands independently of any restriction from the scale associated with the gradable noun it 
modifies. Then the bigness of two degrees on different scales (say “idiocy” and “enthusiasm”) 
will both be degrees on an abstract bigness scale not restricted by any other scale. It would 
follow that the bigness of an idiocy degree and the bigness of an enthusiasm degree can be 
compared, and no cross-scalar comparison is involved to lead to anomaly 
(“incommensurability”). However, such a comparison is impossible, as suggested by the 
infelicity of the sentence (78). It is natural to hypothesize that for “big idiot”, the scale for “big” 
does not exist independently of the scale for “idiot”. Rather, the former scale stands relative to 
the latter scale. 
 




Out of this consideration, I posit that for the phrase “big idiot”, the idiocy scale is 
“measured” from the scalar perspective determined by “big”. Degrees on the idiocy scale can be 
measured via many means (e.g. IQ numbers, scores on some complicated test). One 
measurement is their “size”49. Every degree on the idiocy scale corresponds to some “size” on 
the bigness scale. 
It is reasonable to assume that in the case of “big idiot”, the scale associated with “big” 
and the scale associated with “idiot” are isomorphic. They have exactly the same ordering of 
degrees. The size adjective simply provides a perspective to measure degrees on the scale 
associated with the gradable noun. Nevertheless, for simplicity of illustration I will treat the two 
scales like they are separate.   
In particular, the standard for being an idiot STND(idiot) and the standard for being big 
STND(big) can enter into an ordering relation. The latter standard corresponds to individuals who 
are a “standard-big” idiot, meaning that his or her idiocy degree is just the standard of having a 
big degree of idiocy. Moreover, “big” and “idiot” are both positive gradable predicates, and thus 
their scales have the same, positive polarity. In this chapter, I use “” to represent the positive 
polarity, and “” to represent the negative polarity. With all the considerations, the relation 
between the idiocy scale and the bigness scale can be schematized as in Figure 2. STND big has to 
be located to the right of STND idiot, because a big idiot is necessary an idiot. With the ontological 
formalization of degrees as intervals (see Kennedy, 1999, 2001; Schwarzschild and Wilkinson, 
2002), STND big can be seen as a superset of STND idiot.   
 
                                                             
49 The ‘size’ of degrees on the scale associated with a gradable noun must be different from the ‘abstract size’ as 
illustrated in such phrases as ‘a small problem’ and ‘an enormous disaster’. The latter use appears to make reference 
to size along an abstract scale of severity or gravity. By contrast, the degree use of size adjectives makes reference to 
degrees along the scale determined by the modified gradable noun itself. 
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     Sidiocy                                            ●                                                          () 
                                                   STND idiot 
  Ssize-big                                                    ●                                                () 
                                                                  STND big 
Figure 2: relation between the idiocy scale and the bigness scale 
 
I take that the degree use of size adjectives is remotely related to its original size use. 
This is why I use “size” in the subscript for the scale associated with “big”. I also distinguish the 
scale for a negative polarity adjective from that of its positive counterpart, by using arrows to 
represent the polarity of scales. The scales of an antonym pair of gradable predicates differ (only) 
in the ordering imposed on the dimension that they share in common (von Stechow, 1984; 
Kennedy, 1999). 
 Now we can draw on the relation between the idiocy scale and the bigness scale to see 
why the phrase “big idiot” is consistently acceptable. According to the semantic interpretation in 
(77c), for an individual to qualify as a big idiot, her idiocy degree needs to be a degree on the 
Sidiocy scale whose correspondent on the bigness scale falls on, or to the right of, STNDbig, and at 
the same time his idiocy exceeds STNDidiot. Because an idiocy degree whose bigness exceeds 
STNDbig necessarily exceeds STNDidiot, a big idiot is an individual the size of whose idiocy exceeds 
STNDbig. It corresponds to some point in the region on the bigness scale that falls on, or to the 
right of, STNDbig. Because this region is not empty, the phrase “big idiot” has a non-empty 





3.5.3 The violable nature of negative size adjectives as degree modifiers 
The next task is to explain why “small idiot” is often unacceptable in the degree reading, but 
becomes acceptable at times. It is clear that the size adjectives “big” and “small” are an antonym 
pair. They map the same argument onto two scales that share the same dimension and only differ 
in terms of polarity. The relation between the two scales is illustrated below. Represented in it is 
the canonical size use of “big” and “small” for the case of a room of exactly 7 square meters.  
 
          |                       room’s   bigness                     | 
   |          |          |         |         |         |         |         |          |         |         |         |          …..     (  ) 
0m2     1m
2
      2m
2     3m2    4m2   5m2    6m2    7m2     8m2     9m2    10m
2  11m2 
                                                                                    |                  room’s smallness 
             |          |          |         |         |         |         |         |          |         |         |         |          …..      () 
0m2     1m
2
      2m
2     3m2    4m2   5m2    6m2    7m2     8m2     9m2    10m
2  11m2 
Figure 3: scales of an antonym pair 
 
From the schematization in Figure 3, it is obvious that, ignoring the polarity difference 
between the two scales, “big” and “small” maps an identical argument onto complementary 
regions of the same scale. Ontologically speaking, a degree can be represented as an interval that 
is tantamount to a set of points. When the polarity factor is taken into consideration, the 
projection of an argument x on the positive bigness scale, which is a degree, and its projection on 
the negative smallness scale, which is also a degree, have the same “boundary” element.  
The standard for “big” (STNDbig) is a degree on the bigness scale, and the standard for 
“small” (STNDsmall) is a degree on the smallness scale. If everything is either big or small in the 
relevant context, then there is no extension gap between STNDbig  and STNDsmall. This means that 
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the two standards stand in a strictly complementary relation. It has already been established that, 
in a context of talking about the abstract size of idiocy degrees, STNDbig is necessarily located to 
the right of STNDidiot. Thus, when there is no extension gap between STNDbig  and STNDsmall, 
STNDbig also should appear to the right of STNDidiot
50. 
 
  Sidiocy                                       ●                                                                      ( ) 
                                              STNDidiot 
  Ssize-big                                                   ●                                                           () 
                                                         STNDbig 
Ssize-small                                               ●                                                           () 
                                                                                              STNDsmall 
Figure 4: situations without extension gap 
 
The semantic interpretation of “small idiot” can be defined in a fashion parallel to “big 
idiot”, as in (79). An individual x is a small idiot if the smallness of x’s idiocy degree exceeds 
the standard of being small on the idiocy scale and at the same time x is an idiot. This requires 
that x’s idiocy degree fall between STNDsmall and STNDidiot. In cases that can be represented by 
Figure 4, because a non-empty region exists between the two standards, “small idiot” denotes a 
non-empty set and has a sensible semantics.  
 
                                                             
50 Mats Rooth (p.c.) pointed out that the gradable noun ‘idiot’ is also associated with an extension gap: some people 
may have a dubious status with regard to whether they are considerd an idiot or not. As discussed above, this type of 
extension gap generally results from epistemic indeterminacy of the speaker who does not know where the standard 
of being an idiot falls on the idiocy scale. This is different from the more objectively-oriented extension gap for the 
standards of an antonym pair. In this chapter, I do not consider extension gap arising from epistemic indeterminacy, 
in order not to complicate the discussion. 
 155 
 
(79) [[   small idiot ]]  = [[  MEAS
N
   idiot ]]  ([[  POSd small ]]  ) 
= λx.∃d d∊{d’: d’∊scale(idiot) ∧ STND (small) ≤ small(d’)} ∧ d = idiot(x) ∧  
    STND (idiot) ≤ idiot(x)      
 
Xiao Li (p.c.) suggested to me that “small idiot” should be outright ungrammatical given 
the polarity opposition between “small” and “idiot”. Along the lines of her idea, “small idiot” 
should be treated as being parallel to such ungrammatical phrases as “6 meters short”, because 
both appear to involve a gradable element of one polarity modifies another gradable element of 
the opposite polarity. The phrase “6 meters short” imposes an ordering relation between a 
negative-polarity degree (i.e. short(x)) and on a positive-polarity degree (i.e. “6 meters”) (80).  
Because the two degrees do not have the same polarity, the ordering relation cannot be evaluated 
and thus is not defined (Kennedy, 1999, 2001). Xiao Li suggested extending this reasoning and 
hypothesized that negative size adjectives should be incompatible with gradable nouns at all, 
because the ordering relation between the negative-polarity smallness degree of an individual’s 
degree of idiocy and his degree of idiocy cannot be evaluated due to polarity opposition. 
    
(80) λx.short(x) = 6 meters 
 
However, it is clear from the semantic interpretation of “small idiot” in (79) that the 
phrase establishes no ordering relation between a smallness degree and an idiocy degree. Thus 
“small idiot” should not be considered comparable to “six feet short”. More specifically, 
small(d’) compares to STND (small), both of which are degrees on the smallness scale. Both “d = 
idiot(x)” and “STND (idiot) ≤idiot(x)” compare degrees on the idiocy scale. Thus, though “small” 
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and “idiot” are opposite in scale polarity, the incompatibility that underlies the ungrammaticality 
of phrases such as “six meter short” does not apply to “small idiot”.  
  There are cases which contains an extension gap that corresponds to individuals the size 
of whose idiocy degree is neither big enough to qualify as a big idiot nor small enough to qualify 
as an idiot to a small degree. The gap exists within the maximum point of the standard of being 
“big” and the maximum point of the standard of “small”. How large the extension gap is depends 
on the choice of comparison class, a subset of the discourse domain relevant to the conversation 
context. It is possible that the extension gap is small and STNDsmall still falls to the right of 
STNDidiot. This type of situations can be schematized in Figure 5. 
 
  Sidiocy                               ●                                                                                 ( ) 
                                      STNDidiot 
  Ssize-big                                                         ●                                                           () 
                                                         STNDbig 
Ssize-small                                        ●                                                                      () 
                                                                                  STNDsmall 
Figure 5: situations with a small extension gap 
 
With regard to whether such contexts allow a meaningful interpretation for “small idiot”, 
they behave the same as contexts in which STNDsmall and STNDbig stand in a strictly 
complementary relation. In both types of contexts STNDsmall falls on, or to the right of, STNDidiot. It 
is clear from Figure 5 that there do exist degrees of idiocy that correspond to individuals whose 
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degree of idiocy is small enough but at the same time exceeds the contextual standard of being 
an idiot. In such scenarios “small idiot” denotes a non-empty set and is acceptable.   
Figure 4 and Figure 5 represent situations in which the extension gap between the 
standards of a negative size adjective and of its positive counterpart is zero or contextually small. 
In these situations, the negative size adjective can degree-modify a gradable noun. However, 
there may well be a relatively large subgroup of individuals in the comparison class whose 
idiocy degrees are neither big nor small. The difference among their idiocy degrees may span 
over a long interval on the idiocy scale. In such cases, it is likely that STNDbig and STNDsmall fall 
onto opposite sides of STNDidiot. In the schematization in Figure 6, the relevant extension gap for 
the antonym pair “small” and “big” is the region between the two vertical dotted lines.  
 
  Sidiocy                                       ●                                                                      ( ) 
                                              STNDidiot 
                                                          STNDbig 
Ssize-big                                                   ●                                                           () 
                                                          
            Ssize-small                                                                                                          () 
                                                          STNDsmall 
Figure 6: situations with a big extension gap 
 
Because STNDsmall falls to the left of STNDidiot, there is no idiocy degree which exceeds 
STNDidiot and whose smallness degree exceeds STNDsmall at the same time. Thus, given the 
interpretation in (79), “small idiot” denotes an empty set and has no interpretation. More 
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specifically, the semantics for “small idiot” as defined in (79) contains “d’∊scale(idiot) ∧ STND 
(small) ≤small(d’)”, which establishes the requirement that the smallness of an individual x’s 
idiocy degree be at least as great as STNDsmall. The ordering of degrees is sensitive to the polarity 
of the scale(s) associated with the degrees. The scales for “small” and “idiot” have opposite 
polarity. The bigger the smallness degree of an idiocy degree is, the smaller the idiocy degree is. 
Therefore, when the requirement is met, the corresponding degree of x on the idiocy scale has to 
be a proper subset of STND idiot. In such cases as represented in Figure 6, when an individual x’s 
degree of idiocy satisfies “d’∊scale(idiot) ∧ STND (small) ≤ small(d’)} ∧ d= idiot(x)”, x’s 
idiocy degree falls below STNDidiot (“idiot(x) < STND (idiot)”). This contradicts the last chunk in 
the semantic representation of “small idiot”, “STND (idiot) ≤ idiot(x)”.  
Thus, when the extension gap for the standards of “big” and “small” is large enough to 
the extent that STNDsmall falls below STNDidiot, the semantics of “small idiot” denotes an empty set. 
There are other alternative ways to interpret “small” such that “small idiot” does not denote an 
empty set. For example, “small” can mean “slender” or “young”. In order for the phrase to have 
a sensible semantic interpretation, “small” has to be interpreted in these alternative ways.  
My reasoning here is similar to Morzycki’s explanation of the general unacceptability of 
“small idiot” in the intended degree reading. Both analyses take the unacceptability as resulting 
from the lack of a sensible degree interpretation for negative size adjectives. However, my 
analysis differs from Morzycki’s with regard to how the lack of sensible interpretation arises. In 
Morzycki’s analysis, on the intended degree reading of “small idiot”, “small” contributes nothing 
to the interpretation. Alternative ways to construe the adjective should be sought. When all 
potential alternative ways are blocked, it is reasonable to assume that “small” will “accept the 
fate” of having the vacuous degree interpretation. However, such is not the case, as evident in the 
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ungrammaticality of (58-59). In my analysis, “small idiot” denotes an empty set only when the 
extension gap between the standards of “big” and “small” is contextually large enough. Denoting 
an empty set means there is no interpretation, so alternative interpretations have to be sought for 
to make the relevant phrase meaningful. When none of the potential alternative interpretations is 
available, the negative size adjective will have no interpretation whatsoever.  
To summarize the discussion based on “big”, “small” and “idiot”, “big idiot” is 
invariably acceptable, because STNDbig consistently falls on, or to the right of, STNDidiot. Whether 
“small idiot” has an acceptable degree interpretation or not depends on the ordering relation 
between STNDidiot and STNDsmall, which is affected by the size of the extension gap between 
STNDbig and STNDsmall. When there is no such extension gap or the extension gap is contextually 
small so that STNDsmall falls to the right of STNDidiot, “small idiot” can have the degree 
interpretation. On the other hand, when the extension gap is large enough such that STNDsmall 
stands to the left of STNDidiot, “small idiot” denotes an empty set, and it has to be interpreted in an 
alternative, non-degree way.   
Therefore, my analysis predicts that only when STNDsmall is contextually big enough will 
“small” be not able to degree-modify the gradable noun “idiot”. In other types of cases, “small 
idiot” should have the intended degree interpretation. A natural question to ask is why “small 
idiot” is perceived to be unacceptable in most natural situations, given that my analysis holds that 
ungrammaticality should be restricted to only one of many cases. I believe that the answer has to 
do with the proportionally uneven distribution of the different types of cases.  
More specifically, the evaluation of the standard of being an idiot appears to be less 
contextually-oriented than, for example, for the standard of being tall. An individual can qualify 
as being tall in one group but not tall in another group. Evaluating whether an individual is tall is 
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highly sensitive to what the comparison class is like. This is evident in the numerous for-phrases 
that “tall” can take to specify the comparison class: tall for a first grader, tall for her age, tall for 
an Asian woman, tall for a Hollywood movie star. Each of the for-phrase provides a domain of 
individuals for calculating the standard of being tall. By contrast, “idiot” is not as sensitive to the 
comparison class and is not as free to take such a wide range of for-phrases. The most natural 
comparison class for “idiot” is a large population available to the speaker to evaluate idiocy on. 
Furthermore, the large comparison class most probably has a normal distribution in terms of 
idiocy, so that there are many members in the class who idiocy is neither big nor small. This 
means the extension gap for STNDbig and STNDsmall with respect to idiocy is big in most naturally-
occurring scenarios. More often than not STNDsmall is lower than STNDidiot. I take this 
consideration to be the reason why “small idiot” usually cannot have the intended degree 
interpretation51, especially when it is used out of a context. 
The above discussion based on “big”, “small” and “idiot” can be readily extended to 
other combinations of size adjectives and gradable nouns. My analysis draws on the scale 
structures of size adjectives and gradable nouns, the complementation relation between the 
standards of  a pair of adjectival antonyms, the ordering relation between the standards of size 
adjectives and of the modified gradable nouns, and the notion of “extension gap for the standards 
of an antonym pair”. Because both “standard” and “extension gap” are functions of the utterance 
context, my analysis is more pragmatic than Morzycki’s analysis and duly leaves room for 
contextual manipulation such that negative size adjectives can serve as degree modifiers, a point 
to which I turn next. 
                                                             
51
 The discussion in this paragraph is obviously very informal and discursive. I believe that carefully-designed 




3.5.4 Exceptional cases explained 
In this subsection I will show how my analysis avoids the problems that Morzycki’s proposal is 
faced with. Firstly, in section 3 I pointed out that Morzycki’s analysis is based on the wrong 
assumption that MPs have the “at least” interpretation. The assumption is reflected in the 
definition of the MEASA morpheme, which involves the minimality operator and the ≤ relation. 
Morzycki (2009) defined the MEASN morpheme in a parallel fashion. His semantics of size 
adjectives modifying gradable nouns based on the definition makes wrong predictions. In my 
analysis, I adopted the well-argued position that MPs have the “exactly” interpretation as the 
semantic default, and encoded the interpretation in the MEASA morpheme. By extension, MEASN 
involves an identity relation between two degrees. My semantics of size adjectives modifying 
gradable nouns builds on this new definition and allows for contextual manipulation which 
permits negative size adjectives to be degree modifiers in some contexts.  
Second, Morzycki’s analysis wrongly predicts, or at least is compatible with, that when 
all non-degree interpretations of a negative size adjective modifying a gradable noun are blocked, 
the phrase would, as last resort, receive a (vacuous) degree reading. According to Morzycki, (81a) 
(repeated from (58a)) would have the same meaning as (81b). My analysis does not make such a 
prediction. Rather, under my analysis (81a) cannot have a degree interpretation unless the 
extension gap between the standards of “big” and “small” with respect to idiocy is non-existent 
or sufficiently small. As no linguistic context specifies the extension gap to be zero or small, the 
sentence is perceived not to have the degree reading. 
 
(81) a. Michael Bloomberg, an old, tall media tycoon and mayor of NYC, is a %/??small idiot. 
   b. Michael Bloomberg, an old, tall media tycoon and mayor of NYC, is an idiot. 
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Thirdly, Morzycki’s analysis of the Bigness Generalization is purely semantic in nature 
and leaves no room for exceptional cases to the generalization. I have shown that there indeed 
exist empirical exceptions to the generalization: negative size adjectives can act as degree 
modifiers in some restricted contexts. The first type of exceptions occur when no extension gap 
exists between the standard for a negative size adjective and that of its positive counterpart, as 
evident in the acceptability of the sentence in (82). The word “whether” has an exhaustivity 
component in its semantics (Guerzoni, 2007). Music fans are exhaustively classified into two 
categories: big fans and small fans. There is no fan whose liking of music is neither big nor small. 
In other words, there exists no extension gap between the standards for “big” and “small” 
evaluated against “fan”. STNDsmall falls to the right of the standard for “fan” (see Figure 4). It is 
clear that my analysis can capture this type of exception cases.  
 
(82) Whether you are a big fan or a small one, the Beatles music is familiar and classic.  
 
The same consideration also holds when the extension gap is contextually small (see Figure 5).  
However, because there is no linguistic device to measure the “size” of extension gap, the 
prediction is hard to test from a purely linguistic perspective. 
There is an even more direct way to make the denotation not empty, which corresponds 
to the second type of exceptional cases to the Bigness Generalization that I discussed in section 3. 
The linguistic context can explicitly specify that the characterization of an individual by a 
gradable noun modified by a negative size adjective exceeds the standard associated with the 
gradable noun. This is exactly what happens in (65a) and (66a). Take for example the sentence in 
(66a), repeated below as (83). The first clause specifies that the degree of idiocy for each 
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individual in the group referred to by “they” exceeds the standard of being an idiot. The second 
clause specifies that, for some members of the group, the degrees of idiocy are small. However, 
the first clause already guarantees that the sizes of these members’ idiocy degrees are not small 
to the extent of disqualifying them being an idiot. The denotation of “a small idiot” in the 
sentence is not an empty set; an alternative interpretation of “small” does not need to be sought.   
 
(83)  They are all idiots, but some can congratulate themselves on being a small idiot. 
 
The third type of exceptional cases to the Bigness Generalization corresponds to still 
another means to guarantee that the gradable noun holds of an individual characterized by the 
gradable noun modified by a negative size adjective. This is done through putting special focus 
intonation on the modifying negative size adjective. The interpretation of focus makes use of 
alternative sets, and alternative sets can trigger presupposition in the local context (Abusch, 
2010). For the sentence in (84), the focus on “small” in the if-clause triggers the alternative set 
whose elements are of the form you are a _ idiot, where the _ symbol is filled by a size adjective. 
The alternative set, in turn, triggers the presupposition that you are a fan of the Monkees. This is 
very similar to the second type of cases discussed just above. Because the speaker presupposes 
that the hearer is a fan of the band, the speaker takes the size of the hearer’s degree of liking the 
band to be not smaller than the size of the contextual standard degree of liking the band. The 
denotation of “a small fan” is not an empty set, and “small” does not have to be interpreted in an 
alternative way.   
 
(84) You can't go wrong with this CD if you are even a [small]F fan of the Monkees. 
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3.6. Final remarks 
This chapter dealt with the special case of size adjectives used as degree modifiers for gradable 
nouns. Not all nouns are gradable, and not all gradable nouns behave alike in terms of degree 
modification. In this chapter I divided gradable nouns into two separate classes. One type of 
gradable nouns have scale structures similar to gradable adjectives. Their scale structures consist 
of one simple categorization criterion or a set of such criteria integrated together via Boolean 
operations. For the other type of gradable nouns, their scale structures cluster together multiple 
dimensions that are integrated through weighted-mean operations. Only members of the first 
type are subject to degree-modification by size adjectives.  
There are two generalizations that constrain the degree modification of gradable nouns by 
size adjectives: the Position Generalization and Bigness Generalization. The existing analysis of 
the two generalizations, by Morzycki (2005, 2009), builds on the analytic insight that the 
structure for degree modification of gradable nouns by size adjectives mirrors the structure for 
measure phrases that modify adjective phrases. The Position Generalization can be easily derived 
from the syntactic configuration proposed by Morzycki. However, Morzycki’s actual explanation 
of Bigness Generalization crucially rests on an unjustified assumption and makes wrong 
predictions. In particular, Morzycki wrongly took the Bigness Generalization to be an absolute 
constraint. Empirical data show that negative size adjectives indeed can serve as degree 
modifiers, though they are not as productive as positive size adjectives. In this chapter I proposed 
an alternative analysis that lies at the interface between the semantics and pragmatics of nominal 
gradability. A negative size adjective cannot serve as a degree modifier only when the extension 
gap between the standards for the negative size adjective and for its positive counterpart is large 
enough so that the standard of the negative adjective falls to the left of the standard for the 
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gradable noun it modifies. My analysis is more pragmatic in nature. It correctly allows more 
room for contextual variation in negative size adjectives used as degree modifiers.  
There are some questions that are left open in this chapter. The most eminent one 
concerns the comparative and superlative forms of negative size adjectives as degree modifiers. 
According to my analysis, a negative size adjective can act as degree modifiers when the 
extension gap between the standards for the negative size adjective and for its positive 
counterpart is small or even non-existent. For the comparative and superlative forms of negative 
size adjectives intended as degree modifiers, the notion of “extension gap” is not relevant. Thus, 
my analysis, as it is, would predict that the comparative and superlative forms of negative size 
adjectives consistently can degree-modify gradable nouns. The prediction appears to be not 
borne out, however. Though there do exist cases in which the comparative or superlative form of 
a negative size adjective serves as a degree modifier for a gradable noun (85-86), there are many 
other instances in which such modification is unacceptable (87).  
 
(85) There’s no such a thing as a worse enthusiast, but a smaller enthusiast. 
(86) (After talking about what an idiot Lee Corso is, the speaker continues,) but he does 
deserve credit for being the smallest idiot at that moment. 
(87) a. %George is a smaller idiot than Dick is. 
      b.%George is the smallest idiot in the room.             (Morzycki, 2009: ex. 93(b-c)) 
 
At this point I do not yet have a good explanation for the mixed behavior of the 
comparative and superlative forms of negative size adjectives as degree modifiers. I suspect that 
whether the comparative or superlative form of a negative size adjective is used evaluatively 
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plays an essential role in determining the (un)acceptability of the degree use of the negative size 
adjective. With this tentative hypothesis, I will leave the question for future research. 
Another question not addressed in this chapter is crosslinguistic variation observed with 
size adjectives used as degree modifiers. As noted in Xie (2010), the Bigness Generalization also 
has a gradient status in Chinese. However, negative size adjectives in the language appear to be 
more lenient to serve as degree modifiers for gradable nouns. If the analysis proposed in this 
chapter is to be extended to Chinese, one potential conclusion to draw is that there exist 
differences between English and Chinese in terms of extension gaps related to antonym pairs of 












The Interpretation of Weak Generic Sentences 
 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Quantificational flavors of bare plurals 
It has been widely accepted that the generic interpretation of bare plurals (BPs) comes in a 
variety of flavors52. In certain contexts, they behave like a universal quantifier: the sentence in 
(1) expresses a true proposition because all dogs are mammals. In some other contexts, they can 
be most naturally paraphrased as “most”. The sentence in (2) is true on the fact that most (but not 
all) dogs bark. The Basenji species, for instance, does not make any noise similar to barking, and 
the New Guinea Singing Dog sings. Sometimes, they are paraphrasable as “roughly half”. The 
sentence in (3) is generally held true in spite of the fact that only male lions wear manes. Still in 
some other contexts they can be paraphrased as “less than half”. For the sentence in (4), only 
healthy and fertilized female birds lay eggs. In spite of the intuitive differences in terms of 
quantificational strength of the BPs, the sentences in (1-4) share a core similarity: all of them 
appear to express a quite strong generalization.  
 
(1) Dogs are mammals. 
(2)  Dogs bark. 
(3)  Lions have manes. 
(4) Birds lay eggs. 
                                                             
52 The claim is intended to apply on the intuitive level only. In discussing the sentences in (1-4), I will only concern 
myself with the question of what percentage of the population denoted by the subject satisfy the predicate. On the 
analytical level, it is possible that the qualificational force is not as different if some implicit restriction is imposed 
on the domain of qualitification.  
 168 
 
There is another class of generic sentences that involve a BP subject but have a weaker 
interpretation than those in (1-4). The property expressed by the predicate in such generic 
sentences holds of proportionally rather few of those individuals denoted by the BP subject. 
Because of the rather weak interpretation they have, in this chapter I will call them weak generic 
sentences, or sometimes weak generics for short. The sentences in (5-8) are all generic sentences 
of this kind. For (5), most Dutchmen do not know how to sail, let alone being good sailors, but 
the sentence is still held true, or at least so when the Netherlands was one of the major seafaring 
powers in the 17th century. In the literature the sentence has been commonly referred to as the 
Port Royal Puzzle. Similarly, (6-7) are true in spite of the fact that most Brazilians do not play 
soccer and the fact that most Bostonians take advantage of public transportation and do not drive 
in the first place. The sentence in (7) is perhaps also consistent with most driving Bostonians 
being careful drivers. There are just enough “bad apples” to make the driving situation really bad 
in the city.53 The sentences in (8-9) are also true, though the relevant properties in the two 
sentences hold only of a tiny proportion of Frenchmen and anopheles mosquitoes respectively. 
 
(5) Dutchmen are good sailors. 
(6) Brazilians are skillful soccer players. 
(7) Bostonians are careless drivers. 
(8) Frenchmen eat horsemeat. 
(9) Anopheles mosquitoes carry malaria. 
                                                             
53 Mats Rooth (p.c.) observed that the following sentence does not have a weak generic interpretation, in contrast to 
the minimal pair in (7). Though the judgment is crispy, the sentence appears to require that a significant percentage 
of the Swedish population to be careful in driving. In this chapter I will not address the question why there exists 
such a discrepancy.  
 
(i) Swedes are careful drivers. 
 169 
 
The interpretation of weak generics is qualitatively different from that of “regular” 
generic sentences with BP subjects as represented in (1-4) (Krifka et al, 1995; Cohen, 2001; 
Nickel, 2009). According to Krifka et al (1995: p83), the sentences in (5-9) seem to “express a 
property that distinguishes the subject referent from other entities that might belong to the same 
category”. They characterize a distinguishing property of the referent of the subject. For example, 
the sentence in (5) says that the Dutch set themselves apart from alternative nations in the 
relevant context in that they have good sailors among themselves. None of the sentences in (1-4), 
by contrast, is interpreted with reference to an alternative population or expresses a property that 
distinguishes the referent of the subject from other comparable groups of entities.   
4.1.2 Research questions defined 
The exact semantic interpretation of weak generics is pretty elusive and remains to be specified. 
This is the task that this chapter is to undertake. The objective is even more modest than 
addressing the whole range of weak generics. Even among weak generics, the exact mechanisms 
of interpreting them are not uniform. Nickel (2009, 2010a) suggested that weak generics of the 
form Ks are Q as in (5-7) are interpreted distinctively from weak generics whose predicate is a 
“regular” verb phrase such as those in (8-9). According to his idea, while the interpretation of the 
former involves the interaction of the semantics of generics and the semantics of gradability, the 
interpretation of the latter is subject to a modality-based analysis. This chapter acknowledges the 
interpretational distinction between the two types of weak generics, and only deals with the 
question of how to interpret the former subset of weak generics. For convenience of reference, 
except for where distinctions between the two subsets are relevant for discussion, I will simply 
use the broad term “weak generics” to refer to the first subset. 
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To make the discussion more concrete, in this chapter I use the Port Royal Puzzle (PRP) 
sentence in (5) as a representative of all weak generics of the form Ks are Q. There are one 
puzzle and one challenge regarding the interpretation of the PRP sentence. The one puzzle has to 
do with explaining the fact that the sentence does not entail the proposition Dutchmen are sailors. 
The former sentence is generally held to be a true generic sentence, while the latter is clearly 
false. My take at this puzzle essentially will be a lexical one. The one challenge, on the other 
hand, is to answer the question of why weak generics as represented by the PRP sentence can be 
true, given that more often than not generic sentences have rather strong truth conditions.  In 
order to provide a solution to this challenge, I will put under the microscope the two main 
surface constituents in the PRP sentence, i.e. “Dutchmen” and “good sailors”. They correspond 
to the two following questions that this chapter aims to address. Answering the two questions 






The gist of the proposal to be developed in this chapter is that the PRP sentence is true if 
and only if among those Dutchmen whose sailing skills are considered good relative to all 
Dutchmen who have any level of sailing skills, there are generic-many whose sailing skills 
exceed the contextual standard of having good sailing skills relative to those people of the 
contextually-relevant alternative nationalities who have any level of sailing skills, and at the 
same time the Dutch-internal standard of having good sailing skills should be higher than its 
Question 1: Which sub-group of Dutchmen is relevant for the evaluation of the PRP 
sentence?   




counterpart for the alternative nations. To see how the interpretation works more concretely, 
suppose there are only two nations in the relevant context: Holland and Germany. Within the 
Dutchmen population who can sail, there is a standard of having good sailing skills. Some 
Dutchmen are as skilled as or more skilled than this standard, and the others fall below the 
standard. Among the German people, there is another standard of having good sailing skills. The 
Dutch-internal standard may be higher or lower than the German-internal standard. For the PRP 
sentence to be true, among all the Dutchmen whose sailing skills exceed the Dutch-internal 
standard of having good sailing skills, there are generic-many who sail better than the Dutch-
external (i.e. German-internal in this particular context) standard of having good sailing skills, 
and the former standard exceeds the latter one.  
 Here is how the chapter is organized. The analysis that I will develop regarding the 
interpretation of weak generics makes reference to the GEN(eric) operator54. In the literature 
weak generics have been taken to provide crucial evidence against a (strong) quantificational 
analysis of generic sentences in general. If this is indeed the case, the use of the GEN operator in 
analyzing the semantics of weak generic would be problematic. In the next section I will show 
that the most crucial entailment pattern used in the literature (most notably Carlson (1977)) to 
argue against the quantificational analysis of weak generics can receive an alternative 
explanation and thus does not really argue against an analysis that makes reference to the GEN 
operator. The entailment puzzle with the PRP sentence actually arises from a lexical ambiguity 
with the noun “sailor”. In section 3 I will review several recent analyses of (weak) generics, 
especially ones by Cohen (1999, 2001) and Nickel (2009). I will show that they both make 
wrong predictions. On the other hand, each of them makes use of insightful analytic intuition, 
                                                             




which, when combined, provides a promising direction to analyzing weak generics. In section 4, 
I combine Cohen’s and Nickel’s analyses to provide a new analysis of weak generics, and then I 
show how the new proposal avoids the problems that are faced with their analyses. In section 5 I 
will briefly discuss some further issues and conclude the chapter. 
4.2  Entailment and the generic quantifier  
4.2.1 The prima facie lack of entailment  
The analysis of weak generics to be spelled out in section 4 makes crucial reference to the GEN 
quantifier. However, it has been argued by some linguists, most notably by Carlson (1977), that 
the generic use of BPs cannot be given a quantificational analysis and that generic sentences are 
not associated with a tripartite, sentence-level generic quantifier. One piece of crucial evidence 
that Carlson cited in support of his argument has to do with one type of prima facie lack of 
entailment for weak generic sentences. It is worthwhile to devote some space to show that the 
entailment pattern that Carlson discussed can receive an alternative explanation and does not 
guarantee the conclusion that he desired to draw. 
 Carlson (1977) cited precisely the PRP sentence to argue against the quantificational 
analysis of generic sentences. According to his idea, if the sentence involves a covert 
quantificational operator GEN, its LF should be something along the lines of (10). This LF 
parallels (11), which involves overt quantifiers and corresponds to the sentences in (12). Carlson 
held that (12) entails (13). If the PRP sentence does involve a quantification operator as 
represented in (10), Carlson argued, by analogy to (12) and (13), the PRP sentence should entail 
(14). However, the entailment relation clearly does not go through: the PRP sentence expresses a 
true proposition but (14) expresses a false proposition. This lack of entailment has long remained 
a puzzle in analyzing weak generics. Carlson (1977) took this lack of entailment relation as one 
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piece of crucial evidence for his claim that generic sentences, weak generics included, cannot be 
subject to a quantificational analysis. 
 
(10) GEN [x: x is a Dutchmen] (x is a good sailor)  
(11) ALL/MOST/SOME[x: x is a Dutchmen] (x is a good sailor)  
(12) All/Most/Some Dutchmen are good sailors.   
(13) All/Most/Some Dutchmen are sailors.  
(14) Dutchmen are sailors.  
4.2.2 An alternative analysis 
Carlson’s argument crucially relies on an assumption which seems intuitively right on first blush 
but careful scrutiny suggests that it actually does not hold water. For Carlson, the sentences in 
(12) mean that all/most/some Dutchmen are sailors and their sailing skills are good. Only as such 
can the sentences entail the sentences in (13). However, the entailment relation does not 
necessarily go through. This is best illustrated by the lack of entailment between (15) and (16) 
(Menendez-Benito, 2007, citing Karina Wilkinson via Roger Higgins). The former may be 
understood to mean the majority of chisels can function as good screwdrivers, and the sentence is 
true in this sense. However, it is definitely not the case that most chisels are indeed screwdrivers. 
Hence (16) cannot be true. It then follows that (15) cannot entail (16). The relation between (12) 
and (13) appears to parallel the relation between (16) and (17). As will become clearer shortly, it 
is indeed possible that (12) does not entail (13). Thus, the assumption about entailment that 
Carlson’s analysis crucially rests on does not hold.  
 
(15) Most chisels are good screwdrivers.                       
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(16) Most chisels are screwdrivers. 
 
What is responsible for the lack of entailment between (15) and (16) is that two different 
senses of the same word are used (Larson, 1998). In the most natural reading of (15), the word 
“screwdriver” is used intensionally and denotes the functions or characteristics of a screwdriver, 
for example, as a hand tool for turning screws. On the other hand, the same word in (16) denotes 
the physical hand tool which happens to be called screwdrivers. The former does not entail the 
latter, because something that has the functions of a screwdriver is not necessarily a screwdriver. 
The use of a noun to refer to essential properties associated with the physical denotation of the 
noun is nothing rare in English. For example, the noun “teacher” in (17) makes reference to the 
properties that make a (good) teacher, not to the set of individuals who actually take a teaching 
job. Carlson (1977) did not consider this possibility. 
 
(17) Everyone in the medical field is a born teacher, so just keep your ears and mind open. 
 
The word “sailor” in (12) can likewise be understood to denote individuals who possess 
(good) sailing skills but not necessarily is a member of the sailing profession. This reading of the 
word is available in some other contexts as well. For instance, the word “sailor” in (18) means 
individuals who have good aptitude for sailing. By contrast, the same word in (13) can be 
understood to denote individuals who make a living from sailing.  
 
(18) Some people are natural sailors, even before they hit the water.55 
 




Likewise, the PRP sentence should entail (14), when the meaning of the word “sailor” in 
the two sentences is held consistent. I believe that the prediction holds in theory, but the actual 
situation is more complex. Most naturally, the word “sailor” in the PRP sentence makes 
reference to the skills, qualities, etc. that make a person good at sailing. If this sense of the word 
is unequivocally ruled out, it is less clear whether the resulting sentence can have a weak generic 
reading. For instance, the word “sailor” in (19) means a person of the sailing profession, and the 
sentence seems not to have a weak generic interpretation. Nevertheless, because the word 
“salior” in the sentence has the same meaning as the word “sailor” in (20), the former entails the 
latter. On the other hand, for reasons unclear to me, the word “hunter” in (21) seems to be more 
prone to have the quality reading, and the sentence can be understood to have a weak generic 
reading. At the same time, the same word can receive a quality reading in (22), which has a weak 
generic reading as well. The latter sentence seems to entail the former sentence. Similarly, the 
sentences in (24) and (25) can be understood to involve no profession-denoting nouns and can be 
controlled for a weak generic reading. When they are under the weak generic reading, the first 
sentence entails the second one.56   
 
(19) Dutchmen are good sailors by profession. 
(20) Dutchmen are sailors by profession. 
(21) Texans are hunters.  
(22) Texans are good hunters.  
(23) Dutchmen are good and careful at sailing. 
(24) Dutchmen are careful at sailing. 
                                                             
56 Thanks to Mats Rooth for bringing the sentences in (23) and (24) to my attention. 
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The discussion in this section points to the conclusion that the lack of entailment between 
the PRP sentence and (14) is not a valid telling argument against a quantificational analysis of 
weak generics. This conclusion is important in two aspects. First, the analysis of weak generic to 
be developed later in this chapter will make crucial reference to the GEN operator. As far as 
entailment is concerned, proposing a GEN operator does not cause any theoretical or empirical 
problems. In fact, many works subsequent to Carlson (1977) adopted the GEN operator in 
representing the meaning of generic sentence in general (Wilkinson, 1991; Chierchia, 1995; von 
Fintel, 1997). Second, in the introduction I mentioned that the lack of entailment between the 
PRP sentence and (14) has been a long-standing puzzle that has drawn considerable attention in 
the literature on generic sentences. By attributing the phenomenon to a lexical ambiguity, a 
formal semantic analysis of weak generics does not have to take it in its grip. I believe this is the 
right thing to do. Assuming that the entailment puzzle has been tackled, I will focus on 
addressing the two questions instantiating the challenges for the semantic interpretation of weak 
generic sentences. 
I should point out at this point, though, that I am only suggesting that the PRP sentence 
may involve a different sense of the word “sailor” than generally thought in the literature. I am 
definitely NOT saying that the weak generic reading of the sentence is illusionary. The sentence 
is true, even though just a small percentage of Dutchmen possess the skills to sail well, and only 
a proportion of this small percentage of Dutchmen happen to be professional sailors. Moreover, 
the sentence represents a broad phenomenon, as many predicates can appear in weak generics. In 
addition to the sentences in (5-7), here are some more example sentences that can have a weak 




(25) Italians are good skiers. 
(26) Europeans are tall. 
(27) Tacos purchased at NYC food stands are filthy 
4.3 Previous analyses  
There have been several proposals about the exact semantic meaning of weak generics. These 
proposals were developed within different theoretical frameworks. In this section, I will review 
three of them: Carlson (1977), Cohen (1999, 2001), and Nickel (2009, 2010a). For each analysis, 
I will provide a brief summary and point out problems with it. 
4.3.1 Carlson (1977)  
In his analysis of the interpretation of bare plurals, Carlson (1977) took a formal semantic 
approach to generic sentences in general. He proposed that a BP functions grammatically as the 
name of a kind of things. The different interpretations that BPs can receive are determined in 
large part by the kind of predicates they combine with. Predicates can be classiﬁed into three 
categories: individual-level predicates (e.g. “intelligent” and “a man”), stage-level predicates 
(e.g. “drunk” and “available”), and predicates that select kinds (e.g. “extinct” and “be/have 
atomic number 16”). When a BP takes an individual-level predicate or a kind-selecting predicate, 
the resulting sentence can have a generic interpretation. Carlson”s proposal was intended to 
apply to all kinds of generic sentences, including weak generics. Because the predicate “good 
sailors” is an individual-level predicate, the PRP sentence has the generic interpretation. The 
relatively weak truth conditions for the sentence stand in an obvious contrast to generic sentences 
that have stronger truth conditions and that even can be paraphrased with quantifiers like “all” 
and “most”.   
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Carlson’s semantic analysis treats generic sentences as simple predications, without 
specifying what is needed for a generic sentence to be true. To cope with the difference in 
qualification force among generic sentences, Carlson argued that the actual interoperation of a 
generic sentence makes recourse not only to the property of the predicate of the sentence, but 
also to the worldly affairs of how the referent of the subject stands with respect to the predication 
(i.e. Carlson’s “extra-grammatical processes”). The question is what pragmatic considerations 
are relevant for determining how strong the interpretation of a particular generic sentence. 
Carlson did not provide an explicit solution. Obviously, the answer cannot be something too 
broad or inclusive, like “what (ever) the world is like with regard to what is expressed by the 
generic sentence.”  
More specifically, Carlson’s analysis of generic sentences, as it is, does not capture the 
finer interpretation distinctions between weak generics and other generic sentences with stronger 
truth conditions (as well as distinctions among different types of generic sentences within the 
latter group). Take the PRP sentence for example. What percentage of the Dutchmen who know 
how to sail have to satisfy the predicate in order to the PRP sentence to be true? How do “extra-
grammatical processes” make the lineation? This is essentially the challenge that needs to be 
addressed. An analysis of weak generic sentences that makes less or even no reference to “extra-
grammatical processes” would be more preferable.  
4.3.2 Cohen’s probability-based analysis  
Cohen (1999, 2001) took a mathematical probabilistic approach to generic sentences in general. 
He divided generic sentences into two mutually-exclusive categories: absolute and relative 
generic sentences. Absolute generic sentences are those generics that satisfy the definition in 
(28). Some examples of this type of generic sentences include the sentences in (1-4). For the 
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generic sentence Dogs bark to be true, the probability that a random dog which makes any noise 
(by barking, singing, etc) bark is greater than half. Because this conforms to what the world is 
like, the sentence is held to express a true proposition.  
 
(28) Ks are Q is an absolute generic sentence iff its truth requires that the probability that an 
arbitrary K that satisfies some predicate alternative to Q satisfies Q is greater than 0.5.57 
 
The definition of absolute generic sentences is suggestive of how they are interpreted. 
Their interpretation requires computing the set of alternatives to the predicate Q (ALT(Q)), in 
which the property denoted by Q itself is included. For example, the alternative set for “(are) 
mammals’ consists of animal classes: {arthropods, amphibians, birds, fish, mammal, …}. The 
semantics of absolute generic sentences can be defined as in (29) (Cohen, 1999: 37). In the 
definition, P(A|B) means the conditional probability of A given B, and “˅A” stands for the 
disjunction of all members in the alternative set ALT(Q). P(Q|K ∧ ∨A) is the probability of 
being Q given K intersecting with any member in ALT(Q).  
 
(29) genx[K(x)][Q(x)] is true iff P(Q|K ∧ ∨A) > 0.5, where A = ALT(Q). 
 
To see this more clearly, let us take two sentences for example. For the sentence in (30a), 
the alternative set to the predicate fly is, say, {fly, swim}. For the sentence to be true, of all birds 
that can move by flying or swimming, the probability of a bird being able to fly should be greater 
than .5. Because the actual situation in the world verifies this, the sentence is true. For the 
                                                             
57 The alternative set to the predicate Q includes Q itself.  
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sentence in (31a), suppose bear-live-young is a member of the alternative set which contains 
means of producing offsprings A={bear-live-young, lay-eggs, undergo-mitosis}.Though 
(supposedly) less than half of all mammals give birth to live young, if a mammal reproduces 
through any means, it is more likely that it gives birth to live young than it reproduces through 
laying eggs or undergoing mitosis.    
 
(30) a. Birds fly. 
       b. ALT(fly) = {fly, walk, swim} 
(31) a. Mammals bear live young. 
 b. ALT(bear-live-young) ={bear-live-young, lay-eggs, undergo-mitosis} 
 
Cohen’s notion of “relative generic sentences” roughly corresponds to “weak generics” 
used in this chapter. The semantic definition given in (29) cannot account for the truth conditions 
of relative generic sentences. For instance, the PRP sentence is true, but the truth does not 
require that more than 50% of those Dutchmen who have any level of sailing skills 58are good at 
sailing. Therefore, relative generic sentences should have more restrictive interpretation than do 
absolute generic sentences.  
According to Cohen, in addition to ALT(Q), the interpretation of relative generic 
sentences (of the form Ks are Q) requires computing the set of alternatives to Ks (ALT(K)). For 
the PRP sentence, the alternative set to the subject “Dutchmen” contains all people from those 
nations (Holland included) relevant in the context, e.g. {Dutchmen, Englishmen, Germans, 
Italians, Spaniards …}.   
                                                             
58 Those Dutchmen are members of the alternative set {good at sailing, middling at sailing, poor at sailing}. In the 
rest of the chapter, I will refer to this subset of Dutchmen as the Dutch sailing-knowing population 
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According to Cohen’s idea, a relative generic sentence is true if and only if the 
probability that a randomly chosen member in the denotation of K that satisfies at least one of 
the properties in ALT(Q) has the property Q is greater than the probability that a randomly 
chosen member from the alternative set ALT(K) that satisfies at least one of the properties in 
ALT(Q) has the property Q. More formally, the semantics of relative generic sentences can be 
defined as in (32): 
 
(32) genx[K(x)][Q(x)] is true iff P(Q|K ∧ ∨A) > P(Q|∨A), where A = {K’ ˄ Q’ | K’ ∈  ALT 
(K) and Q’∈ ALT (Q)}. 
 
Under Cohen’s interpretation mechanism of relative generic sentences, the PRP sentence 
is true if and only if the probability of a randomly chosen Dutchman who has any level of sailing 
skills being good at sailing is greater than the probability of an arbitrary person of an alternative 
nationality in the context who has any level of sailing skills being good at sailing. If there are 
only two countries in the context: Germany and Holland, then the sentence is true if and only if a 
randomly selected individual from the Dutch sailing-knowing population is more likely to sail 
well than the a randomly selected individual from the sailing-knowing population in the two 
countries combined. 
4.3.3 Problems with Cohen’s analysis 
In spite of its merits to be discussed later, Cohen’s analysis makes too permissive predictions. 
First, Cohen’s analysis requires a clear understanding of what group of people are “good sailors”, 
both for the Dutchmen and for those people in the alternative nations. There has to be a standard 
for “good sailors” to make this evaluation possible. Cohen’s discussion seemed to suggest that 
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the standard for evaluating who are “good sailors” among the Dutch sailing-knowing population 
is the same as the standard for evaluating who are “good sailors” among the sailing-knowing 
population of the alternative nationalities. According to his analysis, as far as the proportion of 
Dutchmen who have good sailing skills out of all the Dutch sailing-knowing population exceeds 
the corresponding proportion for the population of the contextually relevant alternative countries, 
the PRP sentence is true. He did not consider the level of sailing skills for those Dutchmen who 
can sail but whose sailing skills fall below the contextual standard of being a “good sailor”. A 
potential problem could arise from this particular lack of consideration. The distribution of the 
sailing skills of those non-good sailors in the Dutch population and in the international 
population can have an effect on how well the former sail relative to the latter.  
A scenario to illustrate this effect can be schematically represented by Figure 7. Suppose 
30% of the Dutch sailing-knowing population exceed the common contextual standard of having 
good sailing skills, and the rest of the Dutch sailing-knowing population are doing just badly in 
sailing. Somehow there are no Dutchmen who have middling sailing skills which fall between 
“good” and “bad”. On the other hand, 15% of the sailing-knowing population in the alternative 
nations exceed the same contextual standard of having good sailing skills, and the rest of them 
are either middling or bad (with respect to the same standards as for Dutchmen). Can this 
scenario verify the PRP sentence? The answer appears to depend on how the sailing skills of 
those people with middling or bad sailing skills are distributed in terms of their sailing skills. 
Because nobody among the Dutch population has middling sailing skills, all middling sailors are 
from non-Holland countries. If most of the non-good sailors from the non-Holland countries 
belong to the middling category, the PRP sentence is most likely false, because the non-Holland 
countries, overall, may have better sailing skills. If most of them belong to the “bad” category, 
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the sentence is most likely to be true. However, what matters for Cohen’s analysis is the 
percentage of Dutchmen who are considered “good at sailing” within the Dutch sailing-knowing 
population in relation to the corresponding percentage for the alternative nations. Those who are 
not considered good at sailing are irrelevant in Cohen analysis. Therefore Cohen’s analysis 
would predict the PRP sentence to be necessarily true in the scenario represented in Figure 7. 
The prediction does not conform to intuition. 
 
Dutch sailors 30% good 70% bad 
 
 Alternative sailors 
 
Figure 7: lack of distinction among “non-good sailors” 
 
Second, Cohen’s proposal may predict two contradictory weak generics to have the same 
truth value at the same time, which is another undesirable situation that an adequate analysis of 
weak generics should avoid. Let us consider a scenario in which Cohen’s analysis would treat 
both “Dutchmen are good sailors” and “Dutchmen are bad sailors” to be true. It would occur 
when both the probability of a randomly chosen Dutchman with any level of sailing skills 
exceeding the contextual standard of having good sailing skills and the probability of a randomly 
chosen Dutchmen with any level of sailing skills sailing worse than the contextual standard of 
having bad sailing skills each exceed the corresponding probability for the population of the 
alternative nationalities. Imagine 30% of the Dutch population who have some level of sailing 
skills are good at sailing, 40% are middling, and 30% are bad. Among those people of the 
alternative nationalities who have any sailing skills, the figures are 20%, 60%, and 20% 
15% good 85%  middling or bad 
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respectively. This is represented in Figure 8. Notice the symmetry between the numbers of 
people who have good sailing skills and the numbers of people who have bad sailing skills, 
Under Cohen’s analysis, because a randomly chosen Dutchman who knows how to sail is more 
likely to be a good sailor than a randomly chosen person from the alternative nations who knows 
how to sail, so “Dutchmen are good sailors” is true. Likewise, “Dutchmen are bad sailors” 
should also be true in the same scenario. But the two sentences are contradictory and cannot be 
true at the same time. 
 




Figure 8: symmetric distribution of “good sailors” vs. “bad sailors” 
 
The above two problems with Cohen’s analysis have to do with his using probability in 
defining the semantics for generic sentences and using the same standard of having good sailing 
skills for both the Dutch population and the alternative nations. There is a third problem which is 
different in nature and which has to do with how different types of predicates fare with weak 
generics. Weak generics are systematically available for relative gradable predicates (such as 
good, expensive, fat). This claim is supported by the sentences in (33), whose truth conditions 
only require Americans or Europeans more tend to be fat or tall than people in other relevant 
countries (Nickel, 2009). Minimum standard absolute gradable predicates like “dirty” and “wet” 
also can serve as predicates for weak generics (contra Nickel, 2009). For example, though 
supposedly most football players (both professional and non-professional players included) have 
    20% good 60%  middling 20% bad 
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their shoes clean after a game, the generic sentence in (34a) is still true. In addition, even for a 
gradable predicate that has a conceptually fixed standard that does not correspond to the 
minimum or maximum degree on the relevant scale, it can license a weak generics. The word 
“lemon” is one such predicate. The claim that the word has a fixed standard gradable predicates 
can be seen from the infelicity of using “pick the lemon one” in a case where two cars are 
mechanically non-functioning to significantly different degrees (Kennedy, 2007a, Syrett et al, 
2010). The sentence in (34b) has a weak generic reading. The by-far majority of Chevys are not 
lemons at all, but the sentence can still be used a weak generic from a personal perspective.    
 
(33) a. Americans are fat. 
b. Europeans are tall. 
(34) a. Shoes worn by football players are dirty after a game. 
        b. Chevy cars are lemons.  
 
By contrast, weak generics are unavailable for maximum standard absolute gradable like 
“full” and “transparent”59. Though many New York City subways are packed in rush hours, the 
sentence in (35a), which is adapted from Nickel (2009: 20c), does not have a weak generic 
reading. In addition, non-gradable predicates such as “locked” and “6-feet tall” cannot act as 
predicates for weak generics either. A considerable percentage of the American population have 
a height between 6’ and 6’5’’, probably comparable to the percentage of good sailors accounting 
for the Dutch population. However, the sentence in (35b) does not express a weak generic 
meaning.  
                                                             
59 There exist variations of speaker judgment regarding whether maximum standard absolute gradable nouns can be 
predicates for weak generics. I will leave this cross-speaker variation for future research. 
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(35)  a. New York City subways are full of passengers in rush hours.               
  b. Americans are 6’ to 6’5’’ tall. 
 
Cohen’s probability-based analysis makes no reference to the scale structure of the 
predicate of a weak generic sentence. As such, it cannot explain why some gradable predicates 
can appear in weak generics, but some others cannot.  It does not make any prediction regarding 
what type of predicates can appear in weak generics. 
Thus far the careful reader may notice that my criticism of Cohen’s analysis is primarily 
restricted to his employment of probability in the semantics, not about his use of alternative sets. 
Reference to alternative sets is one essential merit of Cohen’s proposal that a more adequate 
analysis can or even should adopt. Krifka et al (1995) suggested that the PRP sentence involves 
comparing Dutchmen to other relevant nations and characterizes some distinguishing property of 
the Dutch people. The suggestion corroborated that the semantic interpretation of weak generic 
sentences should make reference to alternative sets. 
4.3.4 Nickel (2009, 2010a) 
Nickel’s analysis of weak generic sentences was partially motivated by two observations that I 
have already touched upon when discussing Cohen’s proposal. The first one is Cohen’s lack of 
considerations of those Dutchmen whose sailing skills are not good enough to qualify as “good 
sailors”. According to Nickel (2009), the truth conditions of the PRP sentence are “sensitive not 
only to facts about the sailors that exceed the contextually salient standard required for the 
evaluation of a sentence of the form x is a good sailor (where x is replaced by a name for a 
particular person), but also the sailors that fall below that standard.” (pg.17). The other 
observation has to do with the behavior of different types of gradable predicates in weak generic 
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sentences. His observation is similar to, but not the same as, the third problem that I noted with 
Cohen’s analysis. He argued that the interpretation of weak generics parallels the distributive 
reading of such simple degree sentences as (36a). In its distributive reading, the sentence does 
not require every member of John’s family to be taller than one single common contextual 
standard of being tall. Rather, the sentence can be true when every member of John’s family is 
tall with respect to the standard for the comparison class that he/she belongs to (adult man for the 
father, adult women for the mother, teenagers for the teen sons and daughters, etc.). The idea is 
formally represented in (36b). The subscript i indicates the comparison class that an individual 
belongs to. “Degheight” is a function from individuals to their degree on the dimension of height. 
 
(36) a. Everyone in John’s family is tall. 
 b. ∀xi. [Member-of-John’s-Family(xi)](Degheight(x) > STND (xi)) 
 
According to Nickel’s idea, weak generics are interpreted by way of a very similar 
distributive mechanism. The evaluation of the PRP sentence requires considering how each and 
every sub-group of the Dutch sailing-knowing population partitioned on the baisis of their levels 
of sailing skills do in comparison with some contextual standard of sailing skills appropriate for 
the particular sub-group. In order for the sentence to be true, for each partition of the Dutch 
sailing-knowing population, the sailing skills of the members in the partition exceed a contextual 
standard appropriate for the partition to which they belong. The formal semantic representation 
of the sentence, as given in (37) is very similar to that of the sentence in (36a). The standard with 
respect to which “good sailor” is interpreted is bound by the GEN operator, which Nickel took to 
be a special distributive operator. The subscript i indicates the partition that the individual x 
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belongs to. The shorthand “Dutch sailor” stands for “Dutchmen who have any sailing skills”. 
The interpretation can be schematically represented as in Figure 9. 
 
(37)  GENi(x). [Dutch.sailor(x)] (deggood.sailor (x) > STNDi (x)) 
 
Good at saling >GEN STNDgood sailor 
So-so at sailing >GEN STNDso-so sailor 
Poor at sailing >GEN STNDpoor sailor 
               
                         Figure 9: illustration of Nickel’s analysis 
 
4.3.5 Problems with Nickel’s analysis 
In section 3.2, I pointed out that Cohen’s analysis makes predictions that are too permissive. 
Nickel’s proposal avoids some of the challenges that Cohen’s is faced with. For instance, when 
the percentage of Dutchmen who are good at sailing within the Dutch sailing-knowing 
population is higher than the corresponding percentage in the alternative nations, Nickel’s idea 
correctly predicts that the PRP sentence is not necessarily true, because further considerations 
should be given to other partitions of the Dutch sailing-knowing population. In addition, Nickel 
insightfully included gradability (via the use of degree function and standard in the formal 
representation) in the semantic interpretation of weak generic sentences. This potentially offers a 
way of explaining why only some gradable predicates can appear in weak generic sentences. 
But Nickel’s analysis has its own problems. Overall, the truth conditions he proposed are 
sufficient but not necessary. First, his analysis requires evaluating each partition of the Dutch 
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sailing-knowing population with respect to an appropriate contextual standard associated with 
the partition. The PRP sentence is true “so long as within each subdivision according to skill, the 
Dutch sailors in that subdivision reach a skill level that exceeds the standard appropriate for that 
subdivision.” I will argue that the requirement is too strong. Let us take the more contemporary 
sentence in (6) (repeated below) for example, of which I find the intuition to be somehow clearer 
for this particular purpose of discussion. Playing soccer is a popular sport in Brazil, so 
presumably many Brazilians play soccer. It is likely that though, say, the top seven partitions 
(out of eight partitions in total) of the Brazilians soccer-playing population have better soccer-
playing skills than their respective counterpart from other relevant nationalities, those Brazilians 
whose soccer-playing skills fall in the very bottom partition somehow underperform their foreign 
counterparts. Nickel’s analysis would predict (6) to be necessarily false in this scenario, because 
not all partitions of the Brazilian soccer-playing population exceed the corresponding standards. 
However, many native speakers of English that I have consulted reported the sentence to be true 
(or at least not necessarily false for some other native speakers), especially when the bottom 
partition does not account for a big proportion of the Brazilian soccer-playing population. I think 
that the truth of the sentence only requires that a sufficient number of Brazilians who play soccer 
have better soccer-playing skills than the contextual standard60. The question is how to determine 
what this “sufficient number of Brazilians” amounts to. 
 
(6) Brazilians are skillful soccer players. 
 
                                                             
60 The weak generic reading of the sentence in (7) should be carefully distinguished from the case where the top 
soccer players in Brazil are taken to be representative of all the soccer players in the country as a whole. For the 
weak generic reading, it is necessary but not sufficient that the best Brazilian soccer players are among the best in 
the whole world (Nickel 2009, p21-22).  
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Second, Nickel’s analysis does not specify any explicit way of partitioning the Dutch 
sailing-knowing population with respect to their sailing skills. His analysis allows the 
partitioning to be extremely coarse or extremely fine-grained. Normally this causes no problem. 
However, when there is a big variation in terms of sailing skills within some coarse partition, it is 
possible that a coarse partitioning of Dutchmen who have any sailing skills verifies the PRP 
sentence, while a finer partitioning that makes the variation relevant falsifies it. This amounts to 
saying that weak generics do not have consistent truth conditions. Of course this is an 
undesirable conclusion that an adequate analysis should avoid. Nickel’s analysis cannot avoid 
this problem by simply claiming that the Dutch sailing-knowing population can only be 
bipartitely partitioned in accordance with the contextual standard of having good vs. not good 
sailing skills. Doing so would be equivalent to requiring those sailing-knowing Dutchmen who 
have good sailing skills and those sailing-knowing Dutchmen who do not have as good sailing 
skills to both sail better than their corresponding standard. This is too strong and brings us back 
to the previous problem.  
The third problem has to do with the prediction that Nickel’s analysis makes regarding 
what type of gradable predicates can appear in weak generics. Absolute gradable predicates are 
associated with a maximum standard (e.g. for ‘full’ and ‘clean’) or a minimum standard (e.g. for 
“empty” and “dirty”), which does not vary from context to context. In addition, non-gradable 
predicates are not interpreted with respect to a standard at all. Thus, neither type of predicates 
has contextual standards that can co-vary with a higher binding GEN operator. Nickel’s analysis 
would, as he actually did in his 2009 paper, predict that generics with non-gradable and absolute 
gradable predicates cannot be used as predicates in weak generics. The prediction can also be 
extended to predicates with a non-endpoint standard that does not vary contextually (such as for 
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“lemon” and “suicidal”).  Unfortunately, this prediction overshoots, because non-maximum 
standard absolute gradable predicates indeed can appear in weak generic sentences. This claim is 
confirmed by the observation that weak generic readings are available for such sentences as in 
(38) (repeated from (34)).  
 
(38) a. Shoes worn by football players are dirty after a game 
       b. Chevys are lemons.                                          
 
I suggested that the interpretation of a weak generic should make reference to an 
alternative set to the denotation of the subject BP. This is an essential merit of Cohen’s analysis. 
Though the co-varying standard in Nickel’s semantic interpretation of the PRP sentence may be 
calculated by considering a comparison class that contains some partition of the Dutch sailing-
knowing population and the corresponding partition in the contextual relevant alternative 
nations, Nickel did not explicitly say so in his paper. As far as I can see, nothing in his analysis 
can guarantee such alternative sets to be relevant. This is another problem with Nickel’s analysis. 
To summarize, in this section I discussed three proposals regarding the interpretation of 
weak generic sentences. Carlson’s analysis (1977) does not fully consider the difference in 
qualification strength among different types of generic sentences. As such, it does not 
satisfactorily explain why weak generic sentences have a rather weak interpretation. Cohen’s 
proposal (1999, 2001) is too permissive. On the one hand, it predicts some scenarios where weak 
generics are intuitively false to be licensing environments. On the other hand, it predicts generic 
sentences that do not have weak readings to have such readings. Nickel’s analysis, on the other 
hand, is in some sense too restrictive. It makes reference to partitioning the whole population 
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denoted by the BP subject in a weak generic sentence who have the property denoted by the 
predicate to any degree. His analysis does not specify an explicit way of partitioning the 
population denoted by the BP subject and as such allows a sentence to have contradictory truth 
values in some cases. In addition, the prediction Nickel’s analysis makes regarding what 
gradable predicates can appear in weak generic sentences is too strong. 
4.4 A Dual-Standard Analysis 
4.4.1 The gist of the proposal 
In section 3 I primarily focused on the challenges that Cohen’s and Nickel’s analyses each are 
faced with. Now let us shift gears to focus on two particular merits of the proposals, one for 
each. The merits suggest a promising direction to tackle the question of how to interpret weak 
generic sentences. Cohen’s analysis (along the lines of Krifka et al, 1995) makes reference to the 
population alternative to the denotation of the BP subject. The truth conditions of the PRP 
sentence are determined in relation to how well people in other contextually relevant countries 
sail. In addition, Cohen’s analysis makes reference to the set alternative to the predicate “good 
sailor”. Within the Dutch sailing-knowing population, there are people who sail well, as well as 
people whose sailing skills are of varied distances from being “good”. The same remark applies 
to the population of contextually relevant non-Dutch countries. I believe that an adequate 
semantic analysis of weak generics should incorporate the “meritful” alternative sets.  
 Nickel’s analysis, on the other hand, resorts to the intuition that the interpretation of 
weak generics parallels the distributive reading of simple degree sentences. The sailing skills of 
each partition of the population denoted by the BP subject are compared to an appropriate co-
varying contextual standard. What a more adequate analysis can learn from Nickel’s proposal is 
the use of comparison of degrees. More specifically, the semantic interpretation of weak generics 
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involves comparison between the denotation of the BP subject and other alternative entities in 
the context. Degree comparison is conceptually the most likely candidate for such comparison to 
make sense. Thus, I hypothesize that another component of an adequate semantic analysis of 
weak generics should be degree comparison.  
My proposal exactly combines alternative sets with degree comparison. The definition of 
the alternative sets used in my analysis is similar to the definition given in Cohen’s analysis. For 
convenience of reference, I will repeat the informal definitions of the alternative sets. The first 
alternative set, ALT(K) for the weak generic sentence Ks are Q, is the contextually relevant 
population alternative to the denotation of the BP subject Ks. For the PRP sentence, this 
alternative set contains all people from Holland and from other countries relevant in the context. 
The second alternative set, ALT(Q), is the set of properties that are alternative to the predicate in 
a weak generic sentence, including the property expressed by the predicate itself. For the PRP 
sentence, this second alternative set is {excellent sailors, good sailors, middling sailors …}. 
People who do not know how to sail at all are excluded from the alternative set, otherwise, as it 
will become evident, the alternative set would lose the restriction intended for it.  
The disjunction of members in the second alternative set can conjoin with the denotation 
of the BP subject (i.e. K ˄ ˅ALT(Q)) to yield a subset of the population denoted by the BP 
subject who have at least one property in ALT(Q). For the PRP sentence, this set contains 
Dutchmen who have any non-zero level of sailing skills. When deciding whether a Dutchman or 
a group of Dutchmen is/are (a) good sailor(s) among his/their compatriots, it is wrong to use the 
Dutch population as a whole to be the comparison class. Who counts as a “good sailor” within 
the Dutch population is determined with respect to the sailing-knowing population in the 
country. Likewise, the disjunction of members in ALT(K) can conjoin with the disjunction of 
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members in ALT(Q) (i.e. ˅ALT(K) ˄ ˅ALT(Q))  to yield the set of individuals that have at least 
one property from ALT(K) and at least one property from ALT(Q). For the PRP sentence, the set 
contains all individuals of any contextually relevant nationality who have a non-zero level of 
sailing skills. Who counts as a “good sailor” within all the contextual relevant individuals of all 
nationalities is determined with respect to the sailing-knowing population in all the countries 
combined, but not the general population of all the countries including people without any 
sailing skills at all. 
The use of alternative sets, however, serves a different purpose in my analysis than does 
in Cohen’s analysis. In my analysis they are not used to calculate conditional probability. They 
contribute to determining standards associated with the gradable predicate in a weak generic 
sentence. For instance, whether a Dutchman has good sailing skills is evaluated not with respect 
to the general Dutch population, but with respect to the Dutch sailing-knowing population. 
Moreover, the standard of having good sailing skills within the Dutch sailing-knowing 
population is generally different from the standard of being a “good sailor” within the sailing-
knowing population in the alternative nations. A Dutchman who is considered to have good 
sailing skills within his own country may well fall under the standard of having good sailing 
skills for the alternative sailing-knowing population, or vice versa.  
Following Nickel (2009, 2010a) and Krifka et al (1995), my analysis will incorporate 
gradability via degree comparison. In the spirit of Nickel’s proposal, for the PRP sentence to be 
true, there needs to be some number of sailing-knowing Dutchmen whose sailing skills exceed a 
certain standard. Two issues have to be spelled out before the previous sentence can constitute 
an informative interpretation of the PRP sentence. One is what this “certain standard” amounts 
to, and the other one is the exact definition of “some number”. 
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The PRP sentence, due to the presence of the evaluative “good”, involves comparison to 
a standard of having good sailing skills.  The comparison cannot be restricted within the Dutch 
sailing-knowing population. If this was the case, the sentence would be true no matter how well 
or bad Dutchmen sail with respect to other nations. Unless those Dutchmen who know how to 
sail are few and considered outliers in the Dutch population, there always exist generically many 
Dutchmen whose sailing skills can be considered good with respect to the Dutch-internal 
standard of having good sailing skills. Given this consideration, the standard against which to 
compare the sailing skills of the relevant sailing-knowing fraction of the Dutch population 
cannot be Dutch-internal. Rather, it has to be some external standard that is calculated based on 
the sailing skills of (the relevant sailing-knowing fraction of) the alternative population.  
The set ˅ALT(Dutchmen) ˄ ˅ALT(good sailors) provides a natural comparison class 
against which to determine the Dutch-external standard of having good sailing skills for the 
sailing-knowing population among all the contextually relevant nations. The Dutch-external 
standard of having good sailing skills is sensitive to how individuals in the set do in terms of 
sailing. If a big fraction of those individuals have excellent sailing skills, then the Dutch-external 
standard is high. In this case, the Dutch sailing-knowing population relevant for evaluating the 
sentence will have a higher standard to exceed than when the Dutch-external standard is low. 
Another question needs to be addressed before the semantics of the PRP sentence can be 
defined is what fraction of the Dutch sailing-knowing population is relevant for determining the 
truth conditions for the PRP sentence. It cannot be the whole Dutch population or the whole 
Dutch sailing-knowing population, because doing so would treat weak generics on a par with 
generic sentence with stronger truth conditions. 
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Here are some reasons for the above claim. The discussions above have already 
suggested that the actual predicate at the LF level for the PRP sentence involves comparing a 
subset of Dutchmen’s levels of sailing skills to the Dutch-external standard of having good 
sailing skills. This comparison itself does not contribute the “weak reading” with the sentence 
(cf. Nickel 2010a). This is evident from the fact that the sentence in (39) involves a comparative 
predicate but clearly lacks a weak generic interpretation. In addition, the sentence in (40) may 
well involve a comparison predicate in the LF, but it makes a stronger claim than the PRP 
sentence. With (40) “we can more or less expect that a random Dutchman we pick out will turn 
out to be a good sailor” (Krifka et al, 1995: p82). From the evidence, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the LF predicate of a weak generic should not be held responsible for the weak 
interpretation. Now the question becomes what other element accounts for the “weak reading”.  
 
(39) Lions are bigger than wolves.  
(40) A Dutchman is a good sailor. 
 
In this chapter I assume that the interpretation of weak generics, just like “regular” 
generic sentences, makes use of the general tripartite interpretation scheme with recourse to the 
GEN-operator (Carlson, 1989; Krifka et al, 1995). The general interpretation pattern is illustrated 
in (41). It involves the GEN operator, a restrictor specifying the domain for the operator to 
quantify over, and a matrix specifying the property for the individuals in the domain filtered by 
the GEN operator. Because the matrix contains the predicate, the above discussion is equivalent 




(41) GEN (x1, x2, … xn) [restrictor] (matrix)  
 
We cannot place the burden on the GEN operator by assuming there is a weak GEN 
operator and a “regular” GEN operator. Doing so would invite many conceptual and empirical 
problems, For example, what factors determine whether the GEN operator in a particular 
sentence is strong or weak?  What is the relationship between the two operators? 
There is virtually just one option left regarding where the “weak reading” comes from: 
the restrictor. Furthermore, unless we assume that the “weak reading” arises purely from some 
covert element in restrictor, there is practically only one constituent in the sentence that can 
make this contribution, and that is the BP subject.  
At this point, it is helpful to compare a BP subject in a weak generic with a BP subject in 
a “regular” generic sentence (42a).  The interpretation for (42a) is given in (42b). The GEN 
operator quantifies over a domain that includes all (normal) potatoes. Given that the restrictor is 
responsible for the “weak reading”, the GEN operator in the interpretation of weak generic 
cannot quantify over a domain that contain all (normal) members in the denotation of the subject. 
Otherwise, the interpretation of weak generics would be non-distinguishable from that of a 
“regular” generic sentence.   
 
(42) a. Potatoes contain vitamin C. 
 b. GEN(x) [potato(x)] (contain-vitamin C (x)) 
 
Then, a natural move to get the “weak reading” is to restrict the domain over which the 
GEN operator quantifies over. If the domain is specified to be a fragment of the Dutch sailing-
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knowing population to begin with, further restriction from the GEN operator would probably 
yield a smaller fragment that consists of those Dutchmen whose sailing skills exceed the Dutch-
external standard of having good sailing skills. When those Dutchmen are seen within the whole 
Dutchmen population (including those Dutchmen who cannot sail at all), they account for an 
even smaller proportion. Figuratively speaking, this is just like first restricting the definition 
domain to be the set of natural numbers when specifying the concept of odd numbers and later 
switching to the domain of all real numbers. This domain-widening makes the relative proportion 
of odd numbers significantly smaller. I hypothesize that the interpretation of the PRP sentence 
involves evaluating “good (Dutch) sailors” within some restricted domain. The “weakness” 
observed in the interpretation of the sentence is due to widening from this restricted domain to a 
larger domain, i.e. the Dutch population as a whole.  
The whole Dutch sailing-knowing population (i.e. Dutchmen ˄ ˅ALT(good sailors)) 
cannot be this restricted domain referenced above. Otherwise we would expect the generic 
interpretation of the sentence in (43) (at least) can have an interpretation as weak as that of the 
PRP sentence. I do not think that (43) can be verified by a scenario where only a small 
percentage of the Dutchmen who know how to sail are good sailors relative to some Dutch-
external standard. Rather the truth of the sentence more or less requires a randomly picked 
sailing-knowing Dutchman to have sailing skills that exceed the Dutch-external standard of 
having good sailing skills.  
 




Therefore, the relevant restricted domain should be a still smaller domain than the whole 
Dutch sailing-knowing population. In the meantime, it has been demonstrated that Dutchmen 
who know nothing about sailing is irrelevant for the evaluation of the PRP sentence. Combining 
the two claims together, it follows that the restricted domain is a proper subset of the whole 
Dutch sailing-knowing population.  
The set containing sailing-knowing Dutchmen is defined on the sole criterion of whether 
a Dutchman possesses some level of sailing skills. A most natural way to extract from this set a 
subset to serve as the restricted domain is to divide the sailing-knowing population based on the 
levels of their sailing skills. Conceptually the linguistic context in the PRP sentence only 
specifies one coherent and prominent means to make this division, that is, based on the standard 
of having good sailing skills. This standard of having good sailing skills is the Dutch-internal 
standard against which to determine whether a Dutchman has good sailing skills with respect to 
other members of the Dutch sailing-knowing population. I take the restricted domain that the 
GEN operator quantifies over to be the subset of Dutchmen whose sailing skills exceed the 
Dutch-internal standard of having good sailing skills. 
My analysis of weak generic sentences involves three essential components: the usual 
GEN quantifier, a standard restricting the domain of individuals quantified over, and a predicate 
involving degree comparison. Recall that I assume the general tripartite interpretation pattern for 
weak generic sentences (41). The main components are the restrictor and matrix. The restrictor 
provides a domain for the GEN operator to quantify over. It is clear by now that for the PRP 
sentence the restricting domain contains just those Dutchmen whose sailing skills are considered 
good with respect to the Dutch sailing-knowing population. Slightly more formally, the restrictor 
can be spelled out as in (44). For the sake of simplicity, here I use “Dutch sailor” to stand for a 
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Dutchman who has any level of sailing skills. The shorthand “deggood sailor” stands for the 
function from individuals to their levels of sailing skills (how far they can sail in an hour, how 
many sailing tricks they can successfully perform, etc). The level of an individual’s sailing skills 
is objective and not relative to anything. Lastly, “i-STND (good Dutch sailor)” stands for the 
Dutch-internal standard of having good sailing skills. This is distinguished from “e-STND (good 
alternative sailor)” that I will use to refer to the standard of having good sailing skills among the 
sailing-knowing population in the alternative countries.  
 
(44) Dutch sailor(x) ∧ deggood sailor (x) > i-STND (good Dutch sailor)] 
 
I have also argued that the matrix in the tripartite interpretation of the sentence involves 
degree comparison. Given the discussion above, the comparison takes place between the sailing 
skills of the Dutchmen in the restricting domain and the Dutch-external standard of having good 
sailing skills (i.e. e-STND(good alternative sailor)). The matrix can be spelled out as in (45). 
Assembling the restrictor, matrix and GEN-operator together gives the (almost final) semantic 
representation of the PRP sentence (46).  
 
(45) deg good sailor (x) > e-STND (good alternative sailor) 
(46) GEN(x) [Dutch sailor(x) ∧ deggood sailor (x) > i-STND (good Dutch sailor)] (deg good sailor (x) > 
e-STND (good alternative sailor)) 
 
However, the interpretation in (46) still overshoots. Suppose the Dutch-internal standard 
of having good sailing skills is slightly lower than the Dutch-external counterpart. In this 
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scenario, the PRP sentence appears to be false. However, if the majority of Dutchmen whose 
sailing skills exceed the Dutch-internal standard are still above the Dutch-external standard, there 
are generic-many Dutchmen who satisfy (46). The interpretation would be wrongly predicted to 
be true in this scenario. 
To avoid this issue, I will simply add a presuppositional component to the representation 
in (46). The component requires the Dutch-internal standard of having good sailing skills exceed 
its Dutch-external counterpart (i.e. i-STND (good Dutch sailor) > e-STND (good alternative 
sailor)). Thus, (46) can be revised as (47). The PRP sentence is true if and only if within the 
group of Dutchmen who have good sailing skills relative to the Dutch-internal standard, there are 
generic-many people whose sailing skills exceed the Dutch-external standard of having good 
sailing skills, and the former standard exceeds the latter standard.  
 
(47) GEN(x) [Dutch sailor(x) ∧ deggood sailor (x) > i-STND (good Dutch sailor)] (deg good sailor (x) > 
e-STND (good alternative sailor)) ˄ i-STND (good Dutch sailor) > e-STND (good alternative 
sailor) 
 
At this point some may wonder whether the PRP sentence simply means that the Dutch-
internal standard of having good sailing skills is higher than the Dutch-external counterpart. This 
cannot be right, for at least two reasons. First, if the interpretation only involves comparison of 
standards, then in what sense is the sentence generic, let alone weakly generic? Second, imagine 
that only a tiny proportion of Dutchmen can sail, but most of those Dutchmen sail wonderfully. 
In this case, the Dutch-internal standard of having good sailing skills is high. The other 
contextually relevant countries have a large number of people who can sail, and not many of 
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them sail as well as the top sailors in Holland. As a result, the Dutch-external standard of having 
good sailing skills is not as high as the Dutch-internal standard. Under such a scenario, although 
the Dutch-internal standard is higher than the Dutch-external standard, the sentence may still be 
false, because there may be not enough Dutchmen who sail better than the Dutch-internal 
standard in the first place.   
The semantic interpretation in (47) can be easily generalized to all weak generics of the 
form Ks are Q. “Dutch sailor” in (47) corresponds to “K ˄ ALT(Q)”, the subscript “good sailor” 
to Q, “good Dutch sailor” to “K ˄ Q”,  “good alternative sailor” to “ALT(K) ˄ Q”. Abstracting 
away from the concrete terms, (48) specifies the interpretation of weak generic sentences. 
 
(48) GEN(x) [{K ˄ ALT(Q)}(x) ∧ degQ (x) > i-STND (K ˄ Q)] (degQ (x) > e-STND (ALT(K) ˄ Q)) 
˄ i-STND (K ˄ Q) > e-STND (ALT(K) ˄ Q) 
4.4.2 Theoretical advantages 
In this subsection, I will show how the dual-standard analysis developed in the previous 
subsection avoids the problems that Cohen’s and Nickel’s proposals are faced with. At the same 
time, as far as I know, my proposal invites no other problems. As such it is more explanatorily 
adequate than the competing analyses. 
 First, recall that Cohen’s analysis compares the percentage of those Dutchmen who sail 
well accounting for the whole Dutch sailing-knowing population to the corresponding percentage 
for the alternative nations. He seemed to evaluate whether a Dutchman is a “good sailor” against 
the same standard of having good sailing skills as the standard used to evaluate whether an 
individual from the alternative nations is a “good sailor”. Moreover, he did not consider how the 
sailing skills of those individuals who fall below the standard of being a “good sailor” are 
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distributed. According to his analysis, what matters most for the truth or falsity of the PRP 
sentence is whether there are proportionally more “good sailors” among the Dutch sailing-
knowing population than among the sailing-knowing population in the alternative countries. This 
could cause a problem, when the “non-good sailors” in the alternative countries sail much better 
than those “non-good sailors” among the Dutch population. This scenario is depicted in Figure 7 
(repeated below). On the intuitive level, whether the PRP sentence is true in the scenario depends 
on how the sailing skills of those “non-good sailors” are distributed. 
 
Dutch sailors 30% good 70% bad 
 
 Alternative sailors 
 
Figure 7: lack of distinction among “non-good sailors” 
 
My analysis does not face the same problem, primarily because my analysis makes 
recourse to two standards of having good sailing skills, a Dutch-internal one and a Dutch-
external one. More specifically, “good” is a context-sensitive gradable adjective. The standard of 
being good at something is sensitive to how each individual in the comparison class performs. 
For example, in a class full of gifted students, a student who gets more than 90 out of 100 in 
his/her quiz can be considered good. In a class whose students are less talented, a student who 
gets 75 out of 100 in the same quiz may be considered good. But a student in the first class with 
the same 75 out of 100 grade cannot be considered good in his/her own class. Along these lines, 
when Dutchmen who sail badly account for a big proportion of Dutchmen who have any level of 
15% good 85%  middling or bad 
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sailing skills, the Dutch-internal standard of having good sailing skills is “dragged” low. In this 
case, Dutchmen who are considered good at sailing among their fellow countrymen do not 
necessarily exceed the external standard of having good sailing skills. When the number of such 
people is contextually great, there will be no generic-many Dutchmen whose sailing skills are 
good relative to the external standard of having good sailing skills. In this scenario the PRP 
sentence is false. 
Thus, different from Cohen’s analysis, my proposal does not predict the PRP to be 
necessarily true in the scenario depicted in Figure 7. Whether it is true or not depends on how the 
distribution of sailing skills of the Dutch sailing-knowing population compares to the distribution 
of sailing skills of the sailing-knowing population in the alternative nations. If those people of 
the alternative nationalities whose sailing skills are middling account for only a small percentage 
(say 15%) of the sailing-knowing population in these countries, the Dutch-internal standard of 
having good sailing skills is most likely higher than the Dutch-external counterpart. If this is 
indeed the case and at the same time there are generic-many Dutchmen exceeding the Dutch-
external standard of having good sailing skills, then the PRP sentence is true. This scenario is 
illustrated in Figure 10, where “med.” stands for “middling”.  
 




Figure 10: overwhelming “bad sailors” within the alternative nations 
 
15% good 15%  med.  70% bad 
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On the other hand, if people of alternative nationalities who have middling sailing skills 
account for a big percentage (say 75%) of the sailing-knowing population in the alternative 
countries, such that the Dutch-external standard of having good sailing skills is elevated beyond 
the Dutch-internal standard and/or few Dutchmen exceed the Dutch-external standard of having 
good sailing skills, then the PRP sentence is false. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 11. 
  




Figure 11: overwhelming “middling sailors” within the alternative nations 
 
Second, my semantic representation of weak generics makes reference to the GEN 
operator. In this respect, my proposal differs from Cohen’s probability-based analysis. According 
to von Fintel (1997: p33), the GEN operator “is lexically specified to trigger a Homogeneity 
Presupposition.” That is, the use of GEN signals the presupposition that individuals in the 
restricting domain behaves uniformly with regard to the property specified in the matrix. Von 
Fintel further argued that generic bare plural sentences obey the principle of the Excluded 
Middle (49) (adapted from von Fintel’s (76)). 
 
(49) GEN [p](q) iff ~GEN [p](~q). 
 
With this independently proposed theorem, my proposal is able to explain why the 
sentence “Dutchmen are bad sailors” cannot be true when the PRP sentence is true. Clearly, 
15% good 75%  middling  10% bad 
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“Dutchmen are bad sailors” entails that “Dutchmen are not good sailors”. By the principle of the 
Excluded Middle, the latter sentence further entails that it is not the case that Dutchmen are good 
sailors. This second entailment contradicts the assumption that the PRP sentence is true. Then 
“Dutchmen are bad sentences” must be false. Therefore, the mere employment of the GEN 
operator in my proposal will avoid the second problem I discussed for Cohen’s analysis. 
One potential criticism against the use of the GEN operator in the interpretation of weak 
generic sentences comes from the lack of weak generic reading for sentences like the one in (50). 
The sentence is minimally different from the PRP sentence in that it involves the overt adverb of 
quantification “generally”. Adopting the assumption that “generally” is an overt equivalent of the 
GEN operator, some may suspect that the sentence in (50) should have a weak generic reading as 
well. However, it is very hard, though not impossible, to ascribe a weak generic reading to it.    
 
(50) Dutchmen are generally good sailors. 
 
Is this a real challenge to my analysis? The answer is negative. The essential difference 
between (50) in its most natural reading and the PRP sentence lies in their domains of 
quantification. The restrictor in the tripartite representation for (50) is Dutchman (x) (Lewis, 
1975). The domain of quantification for the sentence is the whole Dutch population. By contrast, 
the domain of quantification for the PRP sentence is those Dutchmen whose sailing skills exceed 
the Dutch-internal standard of having good sailing skills. The domain of quantification for the 
PRP sentence is presumably much smaller than that of (50). The “weak reading” for the PRP 
sentence arises because the domain of quantification is widened to the whole Dutch population 
when evaluating the sentence. On the other hand, when evaluating the sentence in (50), there is 
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no widening the domain of quantification, which is already the whole Dutch population in the 
first place. The sentence is true if and only if most Dutchmen are good sailors. The truth 
conditions are strong. 
 
(51) Generally (x) [Dutchman (x)] (good sailor(x))  
 
Earlier I pointed out three problems faced with Nickel’s analysis. First, according to 
Nickel, the truth of the PRP sentence requires that there be generic-many individuals among each 
partition of the Dutch sailing-knowing population such that their sailing skills exceed a 
contextual standard for the partition to which the individuals belong. I have shown that the truth 
conditions are too strong, precisely because it unnecessarily requires evaluating each partition 
among the Dutch sailing-knowing population. In my analysis, only those Dutchmen who exceed 
the Dutch-internal standard of having good sailing skills are relevant for evaluating the sentence. 
It does not require comparing the sailing skills of each subgroup of the sailing-knowing Dutch 
population to some standard.  
Secondly, Nickel’s analysis does not specify how to partition the sailing-knowing Dutch 
population. As discussed earlier, when there is a big variation of sailing skills among the sailing-
knowing Dutch population, whether the PRP sentence is true could depend on how fine or coarse 
the partitioning is. My analysis does not face this problem. It divides the Dutch population based 
on the Dutch-internal standard of having good sailing skills. Because there is a clear standard for 
making the division, my analysis allows no arbitrary partitioning of the Dutch population. 
Thirdly, Nickel’s analysis involves standards co-varying with partitions of the Dutch 
sailing-knowing population. It predicts that the predicate of a weak generic sentence must be one 
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that is associated with a variable standard. Therefore, it cannot be a non-gradable predicate (like 
“6-feet (tall)” and “married”) or an absolute gradable predicate (like “wet”, “dry”, “clean” and 
“dirty”). Non-gradable predicates are not associated with a standard, and absolute gradable 
predicates involve a fixed standard. Both types of predicates do not involve a standard that can 
co-vary with the higher binding GEN operator. I have shown that non-maximum standard 
absolute gradable predicates such as “dirty” and “wet” can indeed appear as predicates for weak 
generic sentences.  
My analysis does not involve a standard co-varying with a higher operator. Rather what 
matters is the > relation between the sailing skills of those Dutchmen whose skills exceed the 
Dutch-internal standard of having good sailing skills and Dutch-external standard of having good 
sailing skills. Weak generics should be available for any predicate whose semantics involves or 
is compatible with the > relation. Because non-maximum standard absolute gradable predicates 
involve the > relation (Kennedy, 2007a), it is not surprising that generic sentences containing 
them allow weak generic readings.  
Lastly, Nickel (2010b) observed that the weak generic reading is also available for 
comparative constructions that involve a bare plural subject, as exemplified in (52). His analysis 
of such sentences is very similar to his analysis of weak generic sentences, and hence suffers 
from the same criticism I discussed. My analysis can be readily extended to such sentences. The 
only difference between (52) and the PRP sentence is that the former explicitly specifies the 
alternative population (i.e. grade school boys). The determination of the external standard 
associated with the predicate is less contextual. 
 
(52) Girls do better than boys in grade school. 
 209 
 
In addition, my discussion so far is limited to weak generic sentences of the form Ks are 
Q. Some other generic sentences appear to have weak truth conditions as well, but are not subject 
to the same interpretation mechanism (53). In this chapter I do not have anything definite to say 
regarding the difference between the sentences in (53) and the PRP sentence in terms of their 
interpretation. For now, I will adopt Nickel’s (2010b) idea that the semantic interpretation of 
weak generic sentences like (53) involves modality and is different from the interpretation of 
such weak generic sentences as the PRP sentence.  
 
(53) a. Sharks attack bathers. 
        b. Seeds germinate. 
 
Intuitively, weak generic sentences like (53) predicate of a potentiality/ability associated 
with the referent of the subject. A viable paraphrase of (53b), for example, is that a “normal” 
seed germinates in some possible world or another. Factoring out this extra layer of modality, the 
semantic interpretation of (53) is the same as that of “regular” generic sentences like those in (1-
4). The “weak reading” probably comes from pragmatic consideration of how things really are in 
the actual world.  
4.5 Final Remarks 
Weak generic sentences of the form Ks are Q have received considerable theoretical attention in 
the semantics and philosophy of language literature. In this chapter I reviewed two of the major 
previous proposals: Cohen (1999, 2001) and Nickel (2009). They both face empirical challenges 
and theoretical flaws. My analysis employs the GEN quantifier, restricts the domain of generic 
quantification, and incorporates degree comparison in the underlying predicate. In the 
 210 
 
interpretation, I make use of two alternative sets, ALT(K) and ALT (Q), which play an essential 
role in determining two standards. One of the two standards, the “internal” one, specifies the 
threshold for those individuals in the denotation of K ˄ ALT(Q) to meet in order for them to 
qualify as being Q evaluated within the population denoted by Ks. The other standard, the 
“external” one, specifies the threshold for those individuals in the denotation of ALT(K) ˄ 
ALT(Q) to meet in order for them to qualify as being Q evaluated within the population denoted 
by ALT(K). The restriction on the quantification domain makes reference to the “internal” 
standard, and the degree comparison in the underlying predicate makes reference to the 
“external” standard.  
During the discussion, I primarily focused on the famous Port Royal Puzzle sentence. 
The semantics of the sentence requires that there be generic-many Dutchmen whose sailing skills 
are good relative to their fellow countrymen exceed the Dutch-external standard of having good 
sailing skills, and at the same time the Dutch-internal standard of having good sailing skills 
exceeds the Dutch-external counterpart. My analysis successfully avoids the problems noted for 
Cohen’s and Nickel’s analyses. 
I should stress that this chapter only gives the precise meaning of weak generic sentences. 
It is not my intention to use this subset of generic sentences as a probe to the semantic 
interpretation of generic sentences in general. Thus whether the analysis can be extended to 
“regular” generic sentences is irrelevant for my purpose. In fact, the answer is most likely 
negative. This is nothing surprising or undermining, because it has widely acknowledged that 
weak generic sentences have unique properties that set them apart from “regular” generics. 
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In addition, in this chapter I only discussed what should be satisfied in order for a weak 
generic sentence to be true. I did not address how to derive the truth conditions from the 







The dissertation set out with the general objective to explore how the linguistic notion of 
gradability interacts with other language phenomena. Such interactions provide an insightful 
perspective for studying the empirical linguistic properties of these particular phenomena. More 
importantly, studying them is conducive to understanding theoretical issues behind the 
phenomena. The dissertation has fulfilled the overall objective through investigating three topics 
instantiating such interactions. The first one was what I call the possessive equative construction, 
in which possessive verbs take a prima facie degree expression in the object position to express 
equative meanings. The second one was the use of size adjectives as degree modifiers for a 
certain type of gradable nouns. The third one was weak generic sentences best represented by the 
Port Royal Puzzle sentence “Dutchmen are goo sailors”. 
Each of the main chapters discussed one of the three topics. For every topic, I offered a 
detailed review and evaluation of major previous proposals dealing with it. The reviews served 
to lay foundations on which my own analyses were based. When laying out my proposals I 
discussed some essential motivating observations, which provided bases to evaluate the 
proposals. In addition, I discussed predictions made by my proposals. Where relevant, I also 
pointed out the broad theoretical implications of my analyses. 
Chapter 2 addressed the phenomenon in which possessive verbs take a degree expression. 
In particular I focused on the syntax and semantics of the Chinese verb you appearing in the 
construction “X + you + Y + (zheme ‘this’ or name ‘that’) + G”, where the G element expresses a 
gradable notion. Because the construction shows similar (though not identical) patterns to the 
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“as…as” equative construction, I called it the “possessive equative construction”. I argued that, 
in the degree use you functions as an abstractor over a variable in its complement, which bears an 
index that eventually comes from the subject. The possessive equative construction involves a 
subset/subinterval relation between X”s and Y”s degrees on the relevant dimension specified G. 
This relation is “forced out” in large part by the absence of comparative subdeletion in Chinese. 
My analysis suggests that the degree use of you has the same semantic function as its other uses 
such as possession and existence. The various uses of you are not as different as many traditional 
descriptive works have claimed. The possessive degree construction lends strong support to the 
small clause-based analysis of possessive verbs.  
Chapter 3 focused on a peculiar, violable constraint on size adjectives used as degree 
modifiers for a certain class of gradable nouns. This Bigness Generalization says that positive 
size adjectives like “big” and “enormous” can characterize the degree to which a gradable noun 
holds of an individual, but negative size adjectives like “small” and “tiny” cannot. I showed that 
that the generalization is not categorical as previously assumed. Negative size adjectives can 
serve as degree modifiers in some contexts. In addition, the previous analysis of the 
generalization, by Morzycki (2005, 2009), rests on the unjustified assumption that measure 
phrases receive the “at least” interpretation. Though Morzycki was right in assuming the basic 
analytic intuition that the degree use of size adjectives is analogous to measure phrases that 
modify adjective phrases, his actual purely semantic implementation of the intuition was on the 
wrong track. Different from Morzycki’s, my proposal draws on the scale structures of size 
adjectives and gradable nouns, the (non-strict) complementation relation between the standards 
of antonymous adjective pairs, the ordering relation between the standards of size adjectives and 
the modified gradable nouns, and the semantic-pragmatic notion of “extension gap”. Because 
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“standard” and “extension gap” are both contextual notions, my analysis is more pragmatic and 
allows more room for contextual variation in negative size adjectives used as degree modifiers. It 
can explain the violable nature of the Bigness Generalization. More broadly, my analysis relies 
on, and thus illustrates the relevance of, the interval-based ontology of degrees to the realm of 
degree modification of nominal gradability. 
In Chapter 4 I addressed the question of how to interpret weak generic sentences of the 
form Ks are Q. The exact semantics of these sentences is elusive compared to generic sentences 
with stronger truth conditions. During the discussion I used the famous Port Royal Puzzle 
sentence “Dutchmen are good sailors” as a representative of weak generic sentences. The 
proposal that I pursued was inspired by considering the advantages and problems in Cohen’s 
(1999, 2001) probabilistic analysis and in Nickel’s (2009, 2010a) distributive analysis. The 
former correctly makes reference to alternative sets to the subject “Dutchmen” and to the 
predicate “good sailors”, and the latter rightly incorporates gradability into analyzing weak 
generic sentences. The advantages of one proposal, to a certain extent, can “offset” the problems 
of the other. Therefore, my analysis combines alternative sets and gradability together. Under my 
analysis, the semantics of the Port Royal Puzzle sentence requires that there are generic-many 
Dutchmen whose sailing skills are good relative to their fellow countrymen who possess any 
level of sailing skills exceed the standard of having good sailing skills relative to all people from 
the contextually relevant alternative nations who possess any level of sailing skills, and at the 
same time the Dutch-internal standard of having good sailings exceeds the Dutch-external 
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